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ABSTRACT 
INDIA'S PALESTINE POLICY SINCE 1992 
India has had a consistent and unwavering record of support for the 
Palestinian cause since the days of its freedom struggle. During the pre-
independence period, the Indian attitude was represented by the Indian National 
Congress and its prominent leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal 
Nehru. Gandhi believed that Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that 
England belongs to the English or France to the French. He rejected Zionism which 
was based on the assumption that the Jews all over world constitute a 'nation' and 
that by virtue of their religion alone they are the prospective citizens of Israel. For 
Nehru, Palestine "was not a wilderness or an empty uninhabited place. It was 
already somebody else home. He identified a similarity between the freedom 
struggles of India and the Palestinians on two grounds. First, both are national 
liberation movements against the British imperialism. Second, in India, the British 
sponsored the Muslim League to undercut Indian demands for independence. In 
Palestine, the British sponsored the Zionist movement to counter Arab claims for 
immediate independence. He suggested that only 'on the stable foundation of Arab-
Jews cooperation and the elimination of imperialism" the future of Palestine could be 
secured. This, he suggested, required that the Jews abandon their exaggerated 
claims and seek peaceful accommodation with the Palestinians. 
Thus the INC and its leaders had consistently taken the Arab side on the 
Palestine question and assessed the entire issue from the India's point of view. This 
is not without reason. One reason could be the Muslim population of India. This 
section of people had sympathised the cause of their co-religionists in Palestine. The 
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Congress could not ignore this fact. Another reason may be the Congress party's 
uncompromising stand against colonialism. The Palestinian Arabs were placed 
under the British colonial rule after First World War and were struggling against the 
colonial power. The Congress was thus brought closer to the Palestinians. It is also 
possible that the secularist approach of the Congress to politics could be one reason 
to oppose Zionism and sympathise with the Palestinians. The Congress vehemently 
advocated secular politics. This made it see Zionism as a movement based on 
religion. Moreover, Zionism was seen as a tool to be used by the colonial and 
imperial power, which the Congress could not tolerate. 
India's historic and principled support to the Palestinian people during the 
freedom struggle continued even after independence. Moreover, Nehru's assumption 
of power as the first Prime Minister of India as well as the Foreign Minister of the 
country added continuity to its post-independent Palestine policy. 
In the initial period, India's policy towards Palestine was consistently in 
conformity with the basic tenets of its foreign policy: anti-imperialism, anti-racism, 
support to the liberation struggles around the world, opposition to military occupation, 
solution of the international disputes through negotiation, a relentless struggle 
against neo-colonialism etc. In addition to these broad principles, India's position 
with regard to Palestine was also guided by the general consensus in the Arab 
world, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. 
Indian stand on Palestine had also a pragmatic dimension. The partition of 
India and the creation of an exclusively Muslim state of Pakistan, the subsequent 
Kashmir problem, the Pakistani attempts to bring about a Pan-Islamic Alliance 
stretching from Turkey to Pakistan (the emergence of an Anti-India Islamic bloc with 
Pakistan as its leader) and the fear of the Indian leaders that the Muslim population 
of India could identify with pan-lslamism that could rise out of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
influenced India to forge a conscious policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict over 
Palestine. Nehru viewed this pan Islamic tendency as regressive and 
counterproductive as it could divide and weaken the movement of the Asian people 
against the imperialist states. Similarly, Nehru did not want Arab-Israeli conflict to 
affect the Muslim populace of India by giving additional boost to the pan-islamic and 
separatist element among them. 
India's provided support to the Palestine issue both at the international forums 
like the UN and NAM and at the bilateral level after the PLO emerged as a significant 
force in the post 1973 Arab Israeli war period. 
In the UN General Assembly, India voted against the partition of Palestine 
along with the Arabs countries. Two reasons can be given for the Indian stand. First, 
since the leaders of the Indian National Congress were against the two nation theory 
and opposed the partition of India on religious ground, it then followed that India was 
against the partition of Palestine on such grounds. Second, since the Indian leaders 
had always supported the Palestinian Arabs, they were unable to take a stand 
against them all of a sudden. India therefore wanted the Jews and Arabs to work out 
their differences within one Federal State of Palestine but this was not possible since 
the relations between Zionists and Arabs were unbridgeable by that time. 
Soon after its establishment on 14 May 1948, Israel applied for admission to 
the UN and the matter was put to vote. India's first reaction was to abstain but later 
India chose to vote against Israel. This was because 'India could not recognise a 
state which had been achieved through the force of arms and not through 
negotiations. India, however, recognised Israel on 17 September 1950, after more 
than years of its creation and after two Muslim majority countries, Turkey and Iran, 
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had accorded recognition. Neiiru, however, made it clear that recognition did not 
mean endorsement of Israeli position on its frontiers and India would continue to 
support the cause of the Palestinians. 
During the Suez Crisis in October 1956, India denounced Israeli aggression 
as a fragrant violation of UN Charter and in opposition to all principles laid down in 
Bandung Conference. India also cosponsored resolutions in the General Assembly 
urging the immediate withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces from Egypt. 
Suez crisis had, however, brought in a major Impact on India's policy perspective on 
West Asia. Though it did not make any direct implication on India's Palestine policy, 
it hardened India's attitude towards Israel and brought Egypt and India closer to each 
other. 
The border dispute between the Arabs and Israel led to the escalation of 
another war in West Asia in 1967. Although the closure of Gulf of Aquaba by Nasser 
and the ordering of the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force were the 
immediate reasons for the escalations of war in 1967, India took a blatantly pro-Arab 
position during the crisis. At the UN where India was a non-permanent member of 
the Security Council, its representative, G Parthasarathy placed the responsibility for 
the 'grave situation' prevailing in West Asia's squarely on Israel. During the 1973 
war, India also extended full support to the Arabs. Though Egypt and Syria had 
launched a coordinated attack on Israel, the Indian government held Israel 
responsible for encouraging the Arab countries to do so as Israel had refused to 
vacate the territories occupied by force. 
Meanwhile, in the post-1973 war period, India gradually moved away from the 
policy of supporting individual Arab countries on Palestine issue to back the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by its Chairman Yasser Arafat. 
Following the Algiers declaration, India co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN 
General Assembly, on October 8, 1974 calling for the PLO's participation in the 
deliberations of the General Assembly on Palestinian issue. It was the continuous 
efforts of India and other like-minded countries the PLO acquired observer status in 
the UN in 1974. India also joined as a co-sponsor of General Assembly Resolution 
3379, which equated Zionism with racism in November 1975. 
As a founder member of the Non-Aligned Movement, India also played a very 
important role in setting the NAM's anti-colonial agenda that included strong support 
to the liberation movements around the world including the one led by the 
Palestinians. In addition, India highlighted the problems of the Palestine people at 
different NAM summits starting from the first NAM summit at Belgrade in 1961 and 
also constantly supported the PLO in its diplomatic bid to become a full member of 
the NAM. It was also due to the continuous efforts of India and other Non-AIigned 
Nations, Palestine formally entered into the NAM as a full member in August 1976. 
At the bilateral level, India decided to directly deal with the PLO. In 1969, the 
Al Fatah delegation visited India at the invitation of the Indian association for Afro-
Asian solidarity. In December 1974, about 30 MPs demanded the granting of 
diplomatic status to the PLO to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the 'Palestine 
Revolution'. On January 10, 1975, India became the first Non-Arab country to 
recognize the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people and permitted it an independent office at New Delhi which paved the way for 
an official Palestinian presence in India. When Janata party came to power in 1977 
after internal Emergency, there were speculations about a possible shift in India's 
Palestine policy. Belying all expectations, the Janata Government reaffirmed India's 
support to the Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular and was supportive of 
any peace initiative between Arabs and Israel. In 1980, Indira Gandhi returned to 
power with a thumping majority and continued her support to the Palestinian 
struggle. Her Foreign Minister P.V Narasimha Rao announced in Parliament on 26'^  
March 1980 that India had decided to accord full diplomatic recognition to the office 
of the PLO in New Delhi by upgrading its office to that of an embassy endowed with 
all diplomatic immunities and privileges. 
In the Algiers Declaration of November 15,1988, the PLO declared its belated 
acceptance of the 1947 partition plan and proclaimed the "state of Palestine." India 
became one of the first countries to recognize the state of Palestine and received 
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat as a head of state. 
Though India has always extended full support to the Arabs on the Palestine 
issue, the Government of India's policy on the Arab Israel conflict remained a subject 
of deep dispute by the opposition political parties-- the right wing Jan Sangh and the 
Swatantra Party and the middle of the road Pra/a-Socialist Party (PSP) and the 
Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP)~, the national media and the informed Indian 
citizens. The Congress party itself was also divided on the issue and even senior 
cabinet ministers had been known to entertain serious reservations regarding the 
unqualified support extended by the Prime Minister and the External Minister to 
various moves made by the West Asian nations on different occasions. There are 
several reasons for opposing India's all out and automatic support for the Arab 
countries. The first reason was that when the chips were down between India and 
Pakistan, all Arab countries supported the latter irrespective of the merits of the 
dispute because of religious considerations. Another reason for opposition was that 
India's 'one sided' policy on Arab Israel conflict was inconsistent with its avowed 
foreign policy of non-alignment. The third criticism hinged on the concept of 
reciprocity in international relations. The contention in connection with West Asia 
was that since most Arab countries took up a neutralist stance at the time of the 
Chinese aggression in 1962 and tended to side with Rawalpindi at the time of the 
Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 & 1971, New Delhi was under no moral obligation to 
support them in their dispute with Israel. The fourth reason for criticism was that If 
India clearly identified with one side in a conflict, it could hardly have any leverage in 
helping to bring about a settlement in the Arab Israel conflict. The fifth reason for 
opposing India's West Asia policy arose from the misplaced 'fear of the Govemment 
that if India displeased the Arabs, the latter would take the side of Pakistan and will 
eventually support Pakistan's demand for Kashmir. Finally, it was argued that the 
Arabs and the Palestinians had made a historic 'mistake' in rejecting the 1947 UN 
General Assembly Resolution 181, which paved the way for the partition of the 
British-ruled mandate Palestine. 
Although it is difficult to dismiss all the points mentioned above, the question 
is had India not followed a pro-Arab policy as it did over the years what would have 
been the consequences? Certainly the consequences of a change of policy would 
have been highly adverse for India. It would have earned the hostility of all Arab 
countries irrespective of their internal differences including India's trade relationship 
and oil imports from the region, confirmed the unhappy and erroneous impression in 
the Soviet bloc that India had for all practical purposes abandoned the policy of non-
alignment, facilitated the task of Pakistani and Chinese diplomacy in isolating India in 
the Third World, created an anti-Soviet alliance of the Muslim countries of West Asia 
by the West with Pakistan cast in a leading role which would have acquired strong 
religious and therefore anti-India overtones and alienated the Muslim intelligentsia at 
home. However, the situation in West Asian witnessed a sea change when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in August 1990. It was during this period the Soviet Union was 
disappearing from the world map marking the era of unipolar world dominated by the 
United States, the remaining Super Power. In the meantime, the P.L.O. lost its 
political leverage on account of its support to Saddam Hussain. The United States 
took the initiative of holding international Middle East Peace Conference immediately 
after expelling Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. This marked new era in West Asia due to 
different varieties of diplomatic manoeuvring. As a consequence to these 
developments, India also made drastic changes in its policy towards West Asia. It 
established full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992, after 40 years it 
recognized that country. 
The Rao Government's decision to normalize ties with Israel, however, did not 
happen all of a sudden. The move in this direction was undertaken in mid-1980 when 
Rajiv Gandhi, known for his non-ideological approach to foreign policy, met his 
Israeli counterpart Shimon Pares during the annual UN General Assembly session in 
September 1985. Other events such as hosting the Israeli team for the quarter-final 
of the Davis Cup Tennis Tournament in July 1987, his meeting with a group of 
Jewish leaders during his US trip in June 1988, the hosting of an-Anti Defamation 
League delegation as well as US Congressman Stephen Solarz in January 1989, all 
contributed towards a rethinking of his policy towards Israel. The kidnapping and 
murder of some Israeli tourists in Jammu and Kashmir in Ju.ne 1991, just few days 
after Narasimha Rao assumed power, provided the Government an opportunity to 
deal with a humanitarian crisis along with the Israeli Government. On 16 December 
1991, India voted with the majority of UN members in repealing the 1975 General 
Assembly Resolutions equating Zionism with racism. During this time, the Indian 
media, both electronic and print, started what could be termed as a concerted 
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campaign for normalization of relationship with Israel. Spearheaded by the well-
known strategic expert-turned-academic C. Raja Mohan, the pragmatists saw 
normalization within the context of the emerging post-Cold War global order. They 
argued that the earlier justifications for an anti-Israeli policy had crumbled and urged 
India to recognise and capitalise the new Middle Eastern reality opened up by the 
1991 Gulf War that dispelled any doubts as to where the loyalties of the oil-rich Arab 
monarchies laid, in spite of their many grievances against the United States and the 
Madrid Peace Conference. The country's opposition parties also maintained a pro-
Israeli stand and kept a constant pressure on the government to establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel. The traditionalists who strongly opposed any diplomatic move 
towards Israel and favoured status quo on moral and humanitarian grounds put 
forward equally powerful counter-arguments in this regard. 
However, with the change of the international scenario caused by the end of 
the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the United 
States as the only super power, the pragmatists got an upper hand in the foreign 
policy debate as the Government began negotiations over normalisation of ties with 
the Jewish state. Other factors like the liberlisation of the Indian economy, the 
change of PLO's strategy towards Israel, the start of the Middle East peace process, 
India's delinking of Pakistan from its Middle East policy, the rising problem of 
terrorism in the country and the change in India's domestic politics also influenced 
India's decision. The response and reaction to this decision was however different in 
different quarters. The commencement of diplomatic relationship was greeted both 
by the US and Israel. The Arab press greeted the news with a mute reaction 
mentioning that it was not 'unexpected and dramatic' since efforts had been building 
up in that direction over the last few months. However, in India, the reaction was 
mixed. While the political parties like the BJP and Shiv Sena hailed the move, others 
such as the CPI, Janata Dal were critical of the move. Indian media, intellectuals 
and religious leaders were equally divided on the issue. 
Although India's relation with Israel started at a low profile during the 
Congress regime, the relations between the two countries reached new heights 
during the BJP led National Democratic Alliance regime of Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
(1998-2004). When the United Progressive Alliance Government under the 
Congress leadership came to power in mid-2004, it decided to follow the same line 
of the policy adopted by the earlier NDA regime. The growing ties between India and 
Israel and its consequent effect on New Delhi's posture towards Palestine have 
generated another lively debate in the country. There are two different viewpoints on 
this issue. According to one view, India's growing ties with Israeli has neutralised its 
traditional support to the Palestine issue. The other view argues that India's 
friendship with Israel has not affected its support to the Palestinian cause. A careful 
examination of the whole issue makes two things clear: First, since the end of the 
Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world has changed 
dramatically and so also the perception and attitude of Arab countries towards Israel. 
This is evident in their recognition of Israel and participation in the Middle East peace 
process. India's changed posture towards Israel was the result of these altered 
circumstances. Second, there is a tendency among scholars to interp/et everything 
through a zero-sum approach i.e., Palestine's gain is Israel's loss and vice versa. 
Palestinians would not get anything if India condemns Israel all the time and 
completely disengages the Jewish State. What is actually important is to use India's 
leverage vis-a-vis Israel and work towards a just and fair solution of the Palestine 
problem. 
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After establishing diplomatic relationship with Israel in 1992, India continued 
to support the cause of Palestine. At the political and diplomatic level, India provided 
strong support to the people of Palestinian in their quest for a sovereign, 
independent and viable state, economically India provided both material and 
technical support to the Palestinian government and its people in their search for 
nation-building. The Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat frequently visited India, so 
also other high level dignitaries. After Arafat's death, the new Palestinian President, 
Mahmoud Abbas, accompanied by several ministers visited New Delhi in May 2005, 
October 2008 and in February 2010. From the Indian side, the Union Home Minister, 
the External Affairs Minister, the Minister of State for External Affairs and other 
senior officials visited Palestine. 
Besides supporting the cause of Palestine through several bilateral visits, 
India also espoused the cause of Palestine at various international forums such as 
the UN and NAM. It also provided much needed economic, technical and 
humanitarian assistance to the PNA, especially after its establishment in 1994 in 
pursuance of the Oslo principles. India also continues to financially contribute to the 
UN Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) for undertaking relief work in the occupied 
Palestinian territories from time to time. Besides, the Government of India has 
recognised the passport/ travel documents issued by the PNA and established a 
Representative Office to the Palestine National Authority which is working since June 
1996 which was shifted to Ramallah in 2003. 
However, the Government's claim that it continues to provide diplomatic and 
political support to the Palestinians in their effort to have a separate homeland and 
help them in "the reconstruction of their nation" through economic, technical and 
humanitarian assistance from time to time, has not been shared by a number of 
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leaders, scholars, journalists and activists who on the contrary argue that India's 
support Palestine has now been reduced to mere statements, resolutions and 
occasional economic assistance. In other words, it is clear that India, under the given 
the circumstances, is no longer supporting the national struggle movements that it 
used to do in the past. In the garb of so called 'pragmatism', India is steadily getting 
sucked into the vortex of Western design and quagmire. Whether India is under the 
NDA or UPA rule, the Government has diluted the country's principled foreign policy 
for certain interests that are not going to pay it in the long run. 
In addition to the Government support, the people of India have always come 
forward in support of the Palestine issue. This is evident from the numerous 
campaigns and demonstrations against Israel's actions in Palestine by several civil 
society groups from time to time. Moreover, frequent seminars and conferences 
have also been organised in the country in the recent past to raise awareness and 
garner support for the just cause of Palestine. 
India has also played a limited role in the Middle East peace process to solve 
the problem of Palestine. It was invited to become a participant in the multilateral 
track of the Peace Process that began in 1991 and actively participated in all the five 
working groups discussing Middle East-Palestine question such as regional 
economic development, arms control and regional security and environment and 
water resources. India welcomed the mutual recognition by the State of Israel & the 
PLO and the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli agreement on Palestinian self-rule on 
13 September 1993. It welcomed the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement in Cairo 
on 4*^  May 1994 (also known as Gaza-Jericho Agreement). An Indian delegation led 
by the Minister of State for External Affairs, R.L Bhatia was present during the 
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signing ceremony. India also greeted the Oslo Interim Agreement (Oslo II) signed 
on 30th September 1995 and reiterated the view that durable peace in the region 
was necessary to resolve all outstanding issues to the satisfaction of all concerned 
parties. Terming the Wye River Memorandum signed between Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on 23 October 1998 as 'an 
important milestone' in the stalled peace process, India supported its unconditional 
implementation. The Indian Trade and Industry Minister Ashwani Kumar participated 
in the Sharm El Sheikh summit in February 2005 between Israeli and Palestinian 
leaders to end the 2000 Intifada and resume negotiations under the 
roadmap.summit, India was invited as a participant in the Annapolis Conference 
which was held on November 27, 2007 and Kapil Sibal, the Minister for Science and 
Technology and Earth Sciences, represented the country at Annapolis. 
In recent years, there is a growing perception that India should play a more 
direct and mediatory role in the Israel Palestine Peace process. While India has 
shown some interest in the regard and this is welcomed by the Israelis and the 
Palestinians, the domestic discourse on India's new role is sharply divided. There 
are four different discourses: the Radicals, the Nehruvians, the pragmatists and the 
status quoits. The Radicals want India to fully support the Palestine issue, end all 
cooperation with Israel and call for a combination of global isolation, sanctions and 
external pressure against the Jewish country by the international community. The 
Nehruvians want India to provide more vigorous support and play an active role in 
the peace process because unlike in the past, it is now in a better position to play 
such a role. They support an active role for India in the Palestine issue because the 
Palestinians are not only fighting for a just and humanitarian cause but there has 
also not been any change on the ground situation in the occupied territories. The 
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pragmatists, like the Nehruvians, want India to play a leading role in the peace 
process but for the sake of its own rising power profile and national interest. 
According to the status-quoits, India should not change its present policy of keeping 
a low profile in the Middle East peace process because such a posture better serves 
its national interests. In other words, the status-quoits maintain that India should 
continue to resist any temptation to play any overt role in the peace process as it 
helps to maintain normal ties with all parties to the Middle East conflict without 
forcing the country into unpleasant situations. In view of these differing perceptions, 
the real challenge for India in future would be to balance its domestic concerns with 
the actual requirements at its extended neighbourhood. 
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INTRODUCTION 
India's foreign policy posture in recent years, particularly towards 
Palestine has been a subject of intense debate. India's growing relationship with 
Israel and its declining support to the Palestine issue has been seen as a 
fundamental shift in the Indian foreign policy exercise. Critics have accused the 
succeeding Indian governments during the past two decades of abandoning its 
independent foreign policy, of deviating from Nehruvian national consensus on 
the Palestine issue, and towing the pro-Israeli line. Supporters have argued that 
the shift in the orientation of Indian foreign policy in terms of its changed policy 
towards Israel bears the mark of "realism" and "pragmatism" and a more 
balanced approach to the Middle East that is dictated by the changed global 
circumstances and national interest. In view of this, there is an urgent need to 
understand India's actual policy posture towards Palestine especially after the 
establishment of full diplomatic relationship with Israel in 1992. However, before 
examining India's Palestine policy, it is important to know West Asia as a region, 
its importance for India and the genesis of Palestine question which is 
considered as the region's core issue and the source of instability in much of 
West Asia and the world. 
West Asia (Southwest Asia) is a term that refers to the western most part 
of Asia. It broadly refers to those countries that are members of the League of 
Arab States, Israel (with its Jewish and Arab population), and the non-Arab 
countries of Turkey and Iran (which have small Arab populations). These 
countries are clustered into three sub regions. 1) North Africa, which includes the 
countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, 2) The area along the 
eastern part of the Mediterranean is the Fertile Crescent (Levant of the colonial 
times) that includes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, as well as non-Arab Turkey to the north. 3) Lastly, the oil-producing 
countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, namely, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen and the non-Arab, 
Persian state of lran\ The UN also includes Armenia and Azerbaijan (parts of 
Caucasus) in its extensive categorization of West Asia. 
The debates questioning the logic behind the clustering of countries, 
which are as varied historically and culturally, as Iran, Turkey, Israel, Somalia, 
Yemen and Tunisia under a single category (Middle East/ West Asia) arose from 
time to time. Yet, the grouping (West Asia) does have an underlying principle, as 
the category of nations do share historical experiences in the spread of Islam, the 
reach of the Ottoman Empire and the experiences of European colonialism. The 
point, here, is not to settle on a better or more accurate category but, as 
Schwedler and Gerner (2008) have pointed out, to recognize the myriad ways in 
which the region coheres as a whole around some issues, less so around 
others^. 
Contemporary West Asia is differently portrayed by different people. Some 
emphasise the importance of the region in world politics especially for its geo-
^ "Perspectives on West Asia; its Evoiution as an Area of Study in the Changing Geopolitical 
Discourses", Concept Note prepared by the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 
Kolkata, 17-18 January 2011 at: 
http://www.makaias.gov.in/concept_note_west_asia_seminar.pdf 
^ Jillian Schwedler and Deborah Gerner eds. Understanding the Contemporary Middle East. 
Lynny Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2008 at https://www.rienner.com/uploads/4934147ec4983.pdf 
strategic location (the entire region acts as a link among the Mediterranean Sea, 
Black Sea, Red Sea, Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean and connects two 
hemispheres and four continents), vast oil resources and as the cradle of three 
world religions namely Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Others typically portray it 
as a region of intrigue and war, the cradle of terrorism and religious extremism. 
Journalists more often than not report stories of conflict and dispute, abuse of 
power and privilege accompanied by anxious calls for reform and political 
change. 
India and West Asia: 
India considers West Asia as its extended neighbourhood and shares 
civilisational, historical and cultural ties with the West Asian countries. Not only 
did Arabs and Indians knew each other before the advent of Islam but it is said 
that the Arabs even played a crucial role in the emergence of the very notion of 
"Hindustan" and even in giving a name to the religion of Hinduism^ India's 
cultural links with West Asia can be traced to the early years of recorded history. 
There is evidence, for instance, of trade links between the Harappan civilization 
and that of Dilmun in the Gulf. In pre-lslamic times, .Arab traders acted as 
middlemen in trade between Bharuch in Gujarat and Puduchery and the 
Mediterranean through Alexandria and even through the Palakkad gap as 
evidenced in archaeological finds of Roman coins and artifacts in southern India. 
^ "New Dimensions of Indo-Arab Relations", Inaugural Address by Minister of State for External 
Affairs Shashi Tharoor at an International Seminar at Maharaja College, Ernakulam, 11 August 
2009 at: http://tharoor.in/speeches/inaugural-address-by-mos-dr-shashi-tharoor-at-international-
seminar-on-new-dimensions-of-indo-arab-relations/ 
And it is no accident that so many distinguished Arab families in many different 
Arab countries bear the surname al-Hindi, or that Hind is still a desirable name 
used by many Arab women. 
Some scholars trace Indian studies on the hadith to the early days of the 
arrival of Islam in India in the South in the 7th century and in the north in the 8th 
century AD. Islamic scholars from the turn of the 8th Century AD to al- Baruni 
(d.1048 AD) have, in their writings, documented Indo-Arab cultural links, 
including Indian contributions to Arab thought and culture. Translations of Indian 
works were sponsored by the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad where, especially 
under Harun al-Rashid, Indian concepts in secular subjects ranging from 
medicine to mathematics and astronomy were absorbed into the corpus of Arab 
scientific writing. Scholars have also documented the compilation of a large 
number of Indian works in Quranic studies over the last 500 years as also in 
Islamic jurisprudence over a slightly longer period. Perhaps less remembered 
today is the contribution of Indians to Islamic scholarship in the medieval period. 
Amongst notable scholars was Shah Waliullah of Delhi and his descendants. 
Travellers between India and the Arab world were the vehicles not only for 
scholarly exchanges but also for cultural interaction at a popular level. Much of 
the Sufi tradition is the result of Indo-Arab interaction and Khwaja Moinuddin 
Chisti, whose shrine at Ajmer is visited by people of many faiths, was himself an 
Arab. Over centuries, stories from the Panchatantra have blended with the 
Fables of Aesop and stories from Alf Laila wa Laila or the Arabian Nights. 
According to Liaqath Ali, many Arabic words can be found in several languages 
particularly In Hindi and Urdu. Similarly, the Arabs themselves acknowledge that 
they learned from India what are known in the West as Arabic numerals. 
The age old civilisational ties between the two regions matured into a full-
blown multi-dimensional relationship during the medieval period. There was 
regular interaction between the Mughal Empire in India and the Safavid and 
Ottoman empires in West Asia. The contours of such interaction extended to a 
variety of fields'*. The colonization of the Indian subcontinent by the British gave a 
new dimension to the relationship. At one level, the strategic importance of West 
Asia increased as never before for Great Britain to preserve its empire in India 
while at another; there was a sufficient scaling down of commercial transactions 
between the two regions. After India became an independent country, there was 
a qualitative change in the relationship between the two regions. 
For a variety of reasons, West Asia has become important for India's 
foreign policy. First, the West Asian region functions as a bridge between India 
and other continents and regions like Europe, Africa, and Central Asia through 
land as well as prominent sea routes^. Major ports like Aden (Yemen), Bandar 
Abbas (Iran), Basra and Umm Qasar (Iraq) and port Said (Egypt) serve as transit 
points for Indian goods not only to West Asia itself but also to other regions and 
vice versa. Further, the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Suez Canal provide the 
shortest sea routes between India and Europe by linking the Arabian Sea with 
the Mediterranean Sea. Mention may also be made about other international 
" For a detail account see Maqbul Ahmad, Indo-Arab Relations, Indian Council for Cultural 
Relations, New Delhi 1978. 
^ Bansidhar Pradhan, "Changing Dynamics of India's West Asia Policy" International Studies, Vol. 
41, No. 1,2004, pp. 2-3. 
water ways in the West Asian region like the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, 
Bab el-Mandeb etc. Developments in the region naturally have a direct bearing 
on India's economy as well as national security. 
Second, the presence of huge amounts of oil and natural gas in West Asia 
(it provides some 40% of global energy requirements today) is yet another factor 
that makes the region strategically very important for India. India imports almost 
70 per cent of its energy needs from West Asia and this dependence on the 
region will only increase as India becomes one of the largest energy consumer in 
the world due to rise in population, rapid economic growth and industrialization. 
Third, West Asia also provides a good and thriving market for various 
Indian commodities like tea, pulses, rice, wheat, dairy products etc. Bilateral 
trade has assumed added importance in view of the economic liberalization on 
both the sides. As a group, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is India's second 
largest trading partner. It is the largest single origin of imports into India and the 
second largest destination for exports from India. During 2007-2008, the total 
two-way trade between India and the Gulf region was US$ 76 billion^. To further 
strengthening and deepening of this relationship, India and the GCC are 
negotiating an India-GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) although there are 
differences over whether oil should be part of the agreement or not. 
Fourth, the discovery of oil and manpower shortages in the Gulf 
precipitated phenomenal labour migration to the region. Given the population 
pressure and bleak economic prospects at home, Indian laborers flocked to the 
' Tharoor, "New Dimensions of Indo-Arab Relations", op cit. No. 3. 
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Gulf in search of employment and higher wages. Currently, around 6 million 
Indians live in the Gulf and West Asia'', making them one of the largest expatriate 
community in the region. The Indian expatriate community can be categorized 
into four broad groups, viz., (a) unskilled workers, employed in construction 
companies, municipalities, agricultural farms and as domestic workers; (b) skilled 
and semiskilled workers; (c) professionals, such as doctors, engineers, 
accountants, employed in government and private sectors; and (d) businessmen. 
The Indian Diaspora serves as a major source of India's foreign exchange 
resei-ves through remittances in hard currency. The World Bank in its 'Migration 
and Remittances Fact Book 2011 Report estimated that India was the largest 
recipient of the remittances from Diaspora in 2010 followed by China and Mexico. 
The report further said that remittances flow to India was expected to increase to 
$58 billion in 2011, compared to around $55 billion in 2010^ Of the total 
remittance inflows of $52 billion sent by expatriate Indians in 2010, the West 
Asian economies had a share of 48% or $26 billion^. The remittances of 
expatriate Indian workers in the Gulf have contributed significantly to India's 
economic resurgence even as there have been growing concerns in recent years 
^ Text of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Speech at the Tenth Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas in 
Jaipur, January 8, 2012 at: http://www.pravasitoday.com/read-complete-text-of-pm-manmohan-
singhs-speech-at-2012-pravasi-bhartiya-clivas 
Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011,Report of the World Bank at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTiJ\C/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf. Also see "Are 
Africans Replacing Indian Workers in Gulf?", Business Today, December 25, 2011 
' "West Asia Unrest Could Lead to Fail in Remittances to India", Financial Express, Feb 23, 2011 
at: http://www.financialexpress.com/news/west-asia-unrest-could-lead-to-fall-in-remittances-to-
india/753590/0 
about their living and working conditions in the host countries. Towards this end, 
India is pursuing manpower and labor agreements with Gulf States intended to 
help Indian workers in the region. In addition, the Indian workforce has been 
instrumental in sustaining and strengthening the centuries-old socio-cultural links 
between India and the West Asian region. Moreover, India hosts the second-
largest Muslim population in the world which remains interested in Saudi Arabia 
as the site of the holy shrines at Mecca and Medina. 
Fifth, as a rising major power, India considers West Asian region very 
important in shaping its political, economic, defence and security policies at both 
the regional and global level. For instance, an India that grows at 7 to 9 per cent 
will increasingly depend on natural resources from other countries to sustain 
higher levels of prosperity at home. Resource security will also involve 
developing special political relationships with the key resource rich nations and 
the military capabilities to protect the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. India also 
has an interest in preventing hostile powers from either denying access to 
resources or disrupting the maritime trade routes. As India globalizes, the size of 
its diaspora will continue to expand and place new demands on protecting its 
expatriates in the region. India has a high stake in preventing the emergence of 
failed states in the region which in turn could become havens of international 
terrorism and religious extremism. Given its own large Muslim population, India 
would like to see the evolution of the Gulf towards political modernization and 
religious moderation. India would also prefer to see the Gulf States avoid siding 
with Islamabad in its disputes with New Delhi and keep away from the internal 
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politics of the Indian Subcontinent^". In pursuing these expansive interests in the 
region, New Delhi has institutionalised bilateral relations with key West Asian 
countries, deepened commercial ties, expanded energy partnerships and 
increased political interaction at the highest levels. 
Is India important for West Asia? The answer is certainly yes. First, India's 
location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a 
strategic location in Eurasia as well as among the littoral states of the Indian 
Ocean from East Africa to Indonesia. India's peninsular projection in the ocean 
gives it a stake in the security and stability of the Sea Lanes of Communication 
(SLOC) which is crucial for oil trade - the llfeblood of Gulf economies^\ Second, 
India's credibility and role as a "neutral" player in Asia may serve Gulf interests in 
managing their emerging security and strategic objectives. Unlike the US and 
other European powers that tie security cooperation with sensitive issues such as 
human rights, democracy and regime change, India is viewed, even in the Gulf, 
as a non-interfering partner to align with^^. Third, in many areas, the Gulf 
countries have the capital, while India offers the opportunities, especially for the 
development of infrastructure. Moreover, India has developed experience and 
expertise in key areas such as institution and capacity building, governance, 
science and technology including Information Technology, space technology and 
'" C Rajamohan," India's Strategic Challenges in the Indian Ocean and Gulf in India's Growing 
Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States, Monograph jointly published 
by the Gulf Research Center, Dubai and The Nixon Center, Washington D.C, October 27,2009 
at: www.cftni.org/Monograph-lndias-Growing-Role-in-the-Gulf.pdf 
" Samir Pradhan, "India's Economic and Political Presence in the Gulf: A Gulf Perspective" in 
Ibid. 
'^  Ibid. 
biotechnology, healthcare and higher education which could prove crucial for the 
economic development of the West Asian countries. Finally, India's model of a 
secular and democratic polity and its commitment to ensuring minority rights has 
a great attraction in today's West Asia where religious and cultural differences 
amongst the diverse ethnicities have been exposed^^. 
In view of all the above, India has a stake in the peace and stability in 
West Asia which is evident from the fact that it is the only region for which the 
Government of India had appointed a Special Envoy. However, of several issues 
that trouble the region, the Palestine question is considered as the region's core 
issue and the source of instability in much of West Asia and hence it is important 
understand the genesis of this problem. 
The Genesis of the Palestine Question 
History, and different perceptions of history, is perhaps the most 
important factors in the Israeli Palestine conflict. Accounts of history, 
interpreting history in different ways, are used to justify claims and to negate 
claims, to vilify the enemy and to glorify "our own" side. Dozens of accounts 
have been written. Most of the accounts are intended to convince rather than 
to inform. This very brief account is intended as a balanced overview and 
introduction to Palestinian and Israeli history, and the history of the conflict. 
Palestine takes its name from the Philistines—a sea people from Crete 
and Asia Minor, who lived in the area around 1300 B.C. Around 1000 B.C, the 
^^  Rajendra M Abhyankar ed. West Asia and the Region: Defining India's Role, Academic 
Foundation, New Delhi, 2008, p. 64. 
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Israelite King David defeated the Philistines and set up an independent Jewish 
kingdom of Israel with Jerusalem as capital. This first independent kingdom 
provided the religious and emotional basis for the persistent Jewish interest in 
Palestine and the Zionist claims to the area in late 19"^  century '^*. After the 
death of David's son Solmon, the kingdom got divided into two parts: Israel 
and Judah which eventually fell to invaders, after which Palestine experienced 
a succession of foreign rulers. 
About 61 B.C., Roman troops under Pompei invaded Judea made it a 
client state of Rome. The Romans called the large central area of the land, 
which included Jerusalem, Judea. According to Christian belief, Jesus Christ 
was born in Bethlehem, Judea, in the early years of Roman rule. Roman rulers 
put down Jewish revolts in about A.D. 70 and A.D. 132 which attempted to 
restore independence and retain their 'promised land'. In A.D. 135, the 
Romans drove the Jews out of Jerusalem, following the failed Bar Kochba 
revolt after which the Jews existed in dispersal. The Romans named the area 
Palaestina, at about this time. The name Palaestina, became Palestine in 
English aftenwards^ .^ 
In the fourth century A.D, Christianity became the state region of the 
after the conversion of the Emperor Constantine. Jerusalem enjoyed the 
official patronage and protection as a result; it became the most important 
'" Bansidhar Pradhan, From Confrontation to Hostile Intimacy: PLO and the US, Sehyog 
Prakashan, New Delhi, 1994, p.1. 
^^  "Palestine" in Carl L, Bankston ed. World Conflicts: Asia and the l\/liddle East, Salem Press, 
INS, 2003. 
pilgrimage centre for the Christians. The Roman rule over Palestine lasted till 
early seventh century. Around A.D 614, Jerusalem was taken over by the 
Persians which remained under their rule for fourteen years. The Persians 
were defeated by the Byzantines who ruled Jerusalem for a short period of 
time. In A.D 622, Prophet Mohammed made his famous flight from Mecca to 
Medina and his teachings of Islam united the Arabs. The Arabs defeated the 
Byzantines in A.D 634 & 636. During the Muslim rule, a vast majority of the 
people of Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Iraq were converted to Islam and 
adopted Arabic as their language. Another significant development that took 
place during the first phase of the Muslim rule was that in A.D 688, the 9*^  
Caliph built a mosque on the site of the Jewish temple, called the Dome of the 
Rock. 
In A.D 1099, Crusaders from Western Europe conquered Palestine 
which they called as the 'Holy Land' and held it for almost 150 years when it 
was recaptured by the Arabs. In 1516, the region fell to the Ottoman Turks, 
who kept it until the end of the World War I. During mid-1890, an Austrian-
Jewish journalist named Theodor Herzl called for a meeting of the. Jewish 
leaders from all over the world and proposed that they help establish a 
homeland for Jews in Palestine. 
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The movement for resettling Jews in Palestine was called Zionism^^. 
During the period between 1897 and 1914, several thousand Jews immigrated 
to Palestine, financed in part by Lord Rothschild, a Jewish banker living in 
England. In 1917, with World War I hanging in the balance, members of the 
British Government made two contradictory commitments. Arthur Balfour 
issued the famous Balfour Declaration '^', which promised British aid in 
establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine in return for large loans from 
Jewish Banking houses that the British desperately needed to finance their 
participation in World War I. Almost simultaneously, a British Army Officer 
named Thomas Lawrence, best known as 'Lawrence of Arabia', promised 
independence to the Arabs of the Middle East in return for their help against 
the Ottoman Empire. Lawrence's promise stirred Arab nationalism. 
After World War I, the League of Nations awarded Great Britain three 
mandates in the Middle East: Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. Mandate 
Palestine was about 150 miles long and 80 miles wide, stretching from the 
Mediterranean on the West to the Arabian Desert on the East and from the 
Litani River on the North to the Egyptian border in the south. The British 
officials agreed to prepare the mandates for self-government, which accorded 
with the promise made by Lawrence. At the same time, the British began 
^^  For an excellent account of Zionism see Alain Dieckhoff, The Invention of a Nation. Zionist 
Thought and the Mal<ing of Modern Israel, Hurst & Co, London, 2003 and Shamir Hasan, 
Emergence of Political Zionism Centre of West Asian Studies, AMU, Aligarh, 1990 and "Zionism, 
The Big Three and the Partition of Palestine", Journal of West Asian Studies, 1987-88, pp. 80-99. 
" For a detail analysis of the Balfour Declaration see Mid East Website at: 
http://www.mideastweb.org/mebalfour.htm 
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allowing the immigration of thousands of Jews to Palestine, in accordance with 
the Balfour Declaration. The influx of Jews angered many Palestinian Arabs, 
who expected to form their own nation. Almost immediately, violence broke 
out between Jews and Palestinians and against the British officials in 
Palestine. The violence escalated during the period between the two World 
Wars, with both sides forming paramilitary guerrilla units and carrying out acts 
of terrorism against each other. After Hitler came to power in Germany in 
1933, many European Jews began to emmigrate to Palestine to escape the 
Nazi prosecution. This increased influx of Jews angered many Arabs in 
Palestine who accelerated their violent attacks on Jews. Jewish paramilitary 
units retaliated^^. 
Tired of World War II, at odds with the Zionists and Arabs, and facing 
growing disorders in its mandated territory, the British government decided to 
take the Palestine question to the United Nations (UN). On 29 November 1947 
the UN General Assembly voted to recommend the partition of Palestine into two 
states for Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Israel was created in 1948 on the basis of 
the UN partition plan. The Arabs objected to the creation of the Jewish state and 
fought a war against it. The Arab side lost the war, and the Palestinian state 
never really came into being. The territory allotted to the Palestinian state by the 
UN partition resolution was taken over by Israel and Jordan. About 780, 000 
Palestinians became refugees, many of them living in the Gaza strip as well as in 
^^  For more on this see "Israel, Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Arab-Israeli 
Conflict) - A Brief History" - Part I & II, Middle East Web at: 
http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm 
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the West Bank. Some also fled to the neighbouring Arab states of Jordan and 
Lebanon where they lived in appalling conditions in refugee camps. What 
followed afterwards is discussed in the subsequent Chapters. 
Review of Literature: 
The publicly available literature on the subject can be broadly divided in 
four different categories: Literature on Israel and Palestine and the conflict and 
peace process between them, Literature on India's Foreign Policy especially 
policy towards West Asia and North Africa (WANA), Literature on India-Israel 
Relationship and Literature on India-Palestine Relationship. 
A number of works are there on Israel which provides an overview of 
the history and the nature of the Jewish state. Most important works include 
Kallen (1921), Herzl (1943), Magnus (1956), Eytan (1958), Helpern (1961), 
Ben-Gurion (1971), Brecher (1972), Avimor (1991), Goldberg (1996), Dowty 
(1998), Ellis (2002), Dieckhoff (2003), Nimni (2003), , Jansen (1971), Karsh 
(2004), Maoz (2006) etc. 
Scholars who have contributed for an understanding of the history of 
Palestine and the quest for its statehood include Jaffries (1939), Grossman 
(1947), Hodawi, (1967), Cattan (1969 &1973), Abu-Lughod (1971), Darwaza 
(1973), Kazzinha (1979), (David 1980), Amonchana (1981), Knight (1983), 
Dasgupta (1988), Doumani (1995), (Aburish (1998), Friedman, (2000), Gelber 
(2001), Ghanem (2001), Hatina (2001), Carter (2006), Cook (2008), Arthur 
(2011) etc. 
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There is a lot of literature on Arab-Israel conflict. Most important works include 
Sustain (1958), Gabby (1959), Burns (1962), Binder (1964), Khuri (1969),Dupuy 
(1978), Bhutani (1980), Bregman & El-Tahri (1998), Chomsky (1999), Karsh 
(2002), Finkelstein (2003), Hirst (2003), Harms (2005), Herzog (2005), Gelvin 
(2007), Fraser (2008) etc. The studies on Israel Palestine peace process include 
Dayan (1981), Bailey (1990), Corbin (1994), Abbas (1995), Aggestam (1999) 
Beilin (1999), Eran (2002), Agha, Hussein, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and 
Zeev Schiff (2003), Abunimah (2006), Golan 2007) etc. 
There is a long list of literature on India's foreign policy which provides a 
detail account of foreign policy making and policy posture towards the outside 
world. Most important works include: Murti (1953), Karunakaran (1958), Prasad 
(1962 & 1979), Brecher (1968), Das (1969), Vajpayee (1979),Bandyopadhya 
(1984), Appadorai (1985), Appadorai & Rajan (1985), Kapur (1994), Dixit (1996 & 
1998), Mansingh (1998), Jetly (1999), Dutt (1999), Gujral (2003), Rajamohan 
(2003), Koshy (2006), Pant (2009), Sikri (2009), Ganguly (2010), Malone (2011) 
etc. 
Studies on India's policy towards West Asia and North African region are 
quite large and growing. Most important works are: Bhargava (1967), Rao 
(1972), Ahmad (1978), Gopal & Gopal (1981), Farooqi (1989), Heptulla (1991), 
Grover (1992), Ward (1992) Hamid (1993), Singh (1993), Mudiam (1994), Pasha 
(1995 & 1999), Panjabi (1998), Khan (1999), BIyth (2003), Pant (2003), Dubey 
(2005), Alam (2008), Malik (2008), Abhyankar, (2008) etc. 
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Some scholars have extensively researched on India-Israel relationship. 
Important works include: Hamid (1978), Hasan (1990), Bhanumathy (1997), 
Mohapatra (1998) Bachar (2002), Berman (2002), Nair (2004), Riaz (2006), 
Gopal & Sharma (2007), Benkin (2008), Gerbergv (2009 & 2010), Kumarswami, 
(2010) etc. All the studies mentioned above are good sources of information as 
they provide some preliminary explanations of the Palestine question and India's 
policy towards Palestine but they are limited in their scope. 
Some specific literature on India's Palestine policy is there. Important 
works include: Dewan (1966), Gordon (1975), Muslih (1992), Dasgupta (1994), 
Pradhan (1998 & 2008), Dadwal (1998), Cherlan (2000), Karat (2002), Vincent 
(2007), Khan (2007), Cheema (2008), Hasan (2008), , Hasan (2008), Mohiddin 
(2010), Ibrahim (2011), Sajad (2011) etc. But there are a number of short-
comings with these works. First, these are mainly book chapters, research 
papers, articles and event related writings. What is surprising is the fact that 
although India has had a long history of support to the Palestine cause, there is 
not even a single book on India's Palestine policy. This becomes more frustrating 
when one looks at several good books on India Israel relationship although 
normalization of ties between the two states started only in 1992. Second, 
whatever little works are there, these are already overtaken by the important 
events in India-Palestine relationship. Third, these works are mainly descriptive 
in nature. This study not only tries to fill up the gap mentioned above, it also 
looks at the issue from a new perspective i,e it analyses one issue from different 
angles. Moreover by contesting the conventional wisdom relating to various 
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aspects of India's Palestine policy, it identifies the areas for further research and 
policy review. 
Research Methodology 
This study is based on extensive literature survey gleamed from both 
primary and secondary sources of information. The Researcher has consulted 
the literature mainly from two sources: a) print resources and b) online resources. 
She has visited prominent Universities and research institutions in the country for 
relevant library and archival resources. They include West Asia Department 
Library, Maulana Azad Library, AMU, JNU Library, IDSA Library, Teen Murthy 
Library and selected research institutions like IPCS, CPR, ORF etc. Several 
useful websites were used for scholarly online resources on India's Palestine 
policy. Most important of them include: the WWW Virtual Library (http.V/vlib.org), 
the South Asia Resource Access on the Internet (www. 
columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/southasia/cuvl/), the United Nations, the President of 
India, the Parliament of India, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Israeli Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Representative Office of India in Palestine, the 
MideastWeb etc. These websites contain useful official documents and several 
secondary sources of information. 
The researcher has used Historical Method, Comparative Method and 
Analytical method to conduct this study. Historical Method has been used to 
study India's support to the Palestine question right from the pre-independence 
period. By using the Comparative Method, I have tried to ascertain whether the 
establishment of diplomatic relationship with Israel has neutralized India's 
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support to Palestine or not. The Analytical Method is used to critically examine 
different viewpoints related to the theme under study. 
Chapter Outline 
For a better understanding of the study, the thesis has been divided 
into five chapters flowed by a brief conclusion, each with its defined scope 
within the main body of discussion. A brief introduction of each chapter is 
given below. 
The first chapter briefly surveys India's posture towards Palestine 
during the pre-independence era. It especially focuses on the role and views 
of the Indian National Congress and its top leadership such as Gandhi and 
Nehru on the Israel Palestine Question. 
The second Chapter analyses India's Palestine policy from 1947 to 
1992 when India established diplomatic relationship with Israel. India's support 
to Palestine at the United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation are discussed in this chapter. An effort has also been 
made to present the unofficial view of India's Palestine policy. 
The third chapter analyses the public discourse that led to India's 
diplomatic recognition to Israel, the international and domestic response to 
this important political decision and the impact of the growing ties between 
India and Israel on India Palestine relationship. 
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The fourth chapter discusses on India Palestine relationship from 
1992 to 2012. It deals with India's political, diplomatic, economic and 
humanitarian help to Palestine at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels. This 
chapter also examines the gulf between Government's claim for an all-out 
support to the Palestine issue and the perception that exists among a 
number of leaders, scholars, journalists and activists who challenge this claim. 
The last chapter examines India's role in the Israeli Palestine peace 
process. It looks India role in all the stages of the conflict: role before 1991, role 
after the Madrid conference and the possibility of a mediatory role in future in the 
Middle East peace process. The conclusion presents the main arguments and 
research findings. 
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Chapter One 
INDIA AND PALESTINE IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE 
PERIOD 
This chapter briefly surveys India's posture towards Palestine during the 
pre-independence era. An enquiry of the colonial period is necessary for two 
reasons. First, India's thinking and perceptions during the freedom struggle 
especially the views of the Indian National Congress (INC) and its top leadership 
had a direct impact on many of her post-independent policy postures in the 
global and regional contexts^^. This is best explained in the case of Palestine. 
Second, a peep into the colonial era would shed light on India's approach to the 
Palestine question especially the history of India's commitment to the Palestine 
cause, the principles that have moulded India's approach and the rationale of 
such a policy posture. 
It is however instructive to note that during the colonial period, India had 
no foreign policy of its own. It was meant to serve the colonial interest of the 
occupying power. During this period the real projection of the country's worldview 
was made by the INC which passed resolutions and made demands on 
international affairs expressing the aspirations of the Indian people. Like the 
leaders of most of the countries of West Asia, the Indian political leaders were 
engaged in the common struggle against imperialism, hence there grew a strong 
" For more on INC's perception's on world affairs see Bimal Prasad, The Origin of India's Foreign 
Policy: Indian National Congress and World Affairs: 1885-1947, Bookland Pvt. Ltd, Calcutta, 
1962, pp. 14-57. 
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feeling of affinity and solidarity among these peoples. INC's involvement in the 
affairs of the region was through two specific issues—the Khilafat Movement and 
the Palestine question. 
(a) The INC & the Khilafat Movement 
It was the first occasion on which the INC had taken a specific interest on 
a foreign issue. The issue brought up a profound impact on Muslims all over the 
world, since they maintained a unique and grave concern over the issue. The 
situation was not at all different in India also. Hence the INC and its leaders 
thought it as an issue capable of forging unity between the Hindus and the 
Muslims^°. 
The entire issue of Khilafat was unfolded during the First World War, when 
Turkey joined the German side in fighting Britain. This put the Indian Muslims in 
an intrinsic position, as they were torn between their fears about the fate of the 
Caliphate and their loyalty towards the British. The British Government in turn, 
took pains to assure the Indian Muslims that Turkey would get a fair deal in any 
post-war settlement. 
However, the armistice which ended the war not only deprived Turkey of 
its land but also landed the Sultan under the control of the Allied Powers. The 
Sultan of Turkey or Caliph, being the spiritual head of the Muslims of the entire 
world over, the Khilafat Movement was launched aiming at defending the 
Caliphate. 
°^ For a more perceptive analysis on tlie Khilafat Movement and its implications for the Indian 
freedom struggle see A,C Neimeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924, Martinus Nijhoff, 
The Hague, 1972. 
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The INC took the issue into its hearts and expressed solidarity, sorrow and 
sympathy of all Indians towards the fate of Turkey. At the annual session of the 
Congress in 1922, its President, R.N Mudholkar, referred to the matter and at the 
next session of the INC in 1923 its President Nawab Syed Mohammed Bahadur 
made further reference to the troubles of the Islamic world outside India and the 
anxiety that caused among the Indian Muslims^^ 
However, the emergence of Gandhi in the Indian freedom movement 
brought drastic changes in the programmes and strategies of the INC. Realising 
the domestic situation in India; he left no stone untouched in taking up the 
Khilafat issue. He criticised the authorities for "moving from wrong to wrong in 
order to defend their immorality"^^. Further, the Non-Co-operation Resolution 
adopted by the INC at its Calcutta (Kolkata) session in 1920 emphasized the 
importance of the Khilafat issue for the Indian Muslims and exhorted the other 
Indians to extend support to their Muslim brothers in their hours of trial and 
agony. 
Incorporating this particular issue into Gandhi's programme indeed proved 
to be a strong though temporary bridge to the Muslim community. In retrospect, 
Gandhi has been criticized for including an essentially religious issue and an 
extra-India one at that, into the programme of a movement that professed secular 
and pan-Indian aims. But Gandhi's sense that religion and politics were not 
separate" spheres and that a religious issue could be effectively used to recruit 
^^  Bimai Prasad, "Foreign Policy Making in India" in B.N Pande ed. History of the Indian National 
Congress 1885-1985, Vikas, New Delhi, 1985, p.809. 
^^  Quoted in B.N Pande ed. The Indian Nationalist Movement 1885-1947: Select Documents 
Macmiilan, London: 1979, p. 53. 
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Muslim support was not inaccurate. The Caliphate campaign of the early 1920's 
also demonstrated that Congress leaders would give weight to the views of 
Indian Muslims on certain vital issues like Middle East. 
The entire issue, however, turned to be irrelevant when Kama! Pasha 
abolished the Caliphate and declared Turkey a Republic in 1923. Nevertheless, 
the issue has become an important indicator to assess the approach of INC on 
issues affecting the people of West Asia In the pre-independent period. 
(b) The Palestine Question: 
Like the Khilafat issue, India's response to the Palestine question could 
also be traced to the post-World War 1 period. During this period, the Indian 
attitude was represented by the Indian National Congress. Indian national 
leaders who were leading India's struggle for independence from British colonial 
rule had shown a strong interest in the Palestine problem, and the ongoing Arab-
Jews struggle in the Holy Land. The INC while formulating the policies 
considered the domestic situation in India, which in a bigger way conditioned its 
perceptions, policies and the extent of its involvement in the Palestine question^^. 
While the INC was trying to keep the people of India united in a single 
state based on secular principles in the domestic level, the British administration 
was deliberately trying to keep them divided by encouraging Muslim religious 
identity in order to keep the Muslims away from the freedom movement. The 
British tried to develop the feeling that the Muslims were a separate people. 
Indian national leaders, fully realizing the malignancy of the British move, left no 
^^  Suciha Rao, The Arab-Israel Conflict: The Indian View, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1972, p. 12. 
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stone unturned to reassure the Muslinns of India that they were not separate from 
the rest of the Indian masses. Right from the beginning, the INC was firm in its 
political belief that the question of minorities had to be settled within the 
framework of a pluralistic order and not by partition '^*. 
Leaders of the INC such as Gandhi, Nehru and Maulana Azad were 
unanimous in their opinion that a country like India should not be split on the 
basis of religion. In keeping with this political belief, they supported the Arab 
stand opposing the partition of Palestine in the same way as they opposed the 
demands of the Muslim League for the creation of Pakistan by partitioning India. 
As early as in 1921, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) passed a 
resolution to assure the Muslim states that "when India has attained self-
government, her foreign policy will naturally be always guided so as to respect 
the religious obligations imposed upon the Musalmans by Islam"^^. Further, in 
1922, the INC asserted that unless "the Jazirat-el-Arab, (the Arab world) were 
freed from all non-Muslim control, there cannot be any peace and contentment in 
India"^^ 
However, the first direct reference to the Palestine cause was made in 
1923 when Congress President Mohamad Ali Jinnah urged the Indians to make 
common cause with the Palestinians. In 1924, the All India Congress Committee 
'^* Najma Heptulla, Indo-West-Asian Relations: The Nehru Era Allied Publications, New Delhi, 
1991, p. 146. ' • 
^^  A. Main Zaidi ed. Congress and the Minorities Indian Institute of Applied Political Research, 
New Delhi, 1984, p. 40. 
^^  Cited in G.H Jansen, Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism, The Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Beirut, 1971, p.181. 
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passed a resolution on the 'Egyptian Crisis' which was the first non-Khilafat move 
on West Asia^^ Later in 1927, the Congress in its IVIadras session, asked for the 
withdrawal of Indian troops from Iraq, Iran and from all other countries. In 1928, 
the INC extended its sympathy to Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq in their 
struggle against the Western imperialism^^. Further, in the Brussels Congress of 
y Oppressed Nationalities, the INC declared, "this Congress sends its warm 
greetings to the people of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq and its assurance of 
full sympathy with them in their struggle for emancipation from the grip of 
Western imperialism"^^. 
By the mid-thirties, the situation in Palestine had deteriorated due to the 
emergence of Nazi Germany. Violence and counter-violence continued unabated 
in Palestine. The reaction of the INC to this state of affairs was unequivocally in 
favour of the Arab cause. In 1936, the INC adopted a resolution on Arabs in 
Palestine at its Wardha session and expressed its greetings and sympathy "to 
the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle for freedom against British imperialism"^". 
Considering the volume of attention given by the Muslims and the sentimental 
attachment by the Muslim League towards the issue of Palestine, the INC 
observed September 27, 1936 as 'Palestine Day' by holding meetings and 
" The Belgaun Session of the AlCC, December 1924, Encyclopedia of INC, Vol. VIII, p.681. 
^^  Prasad, op c/f. No. 21,p.814. 
''Ibid. 
°^ Encyclopedia of INC, Vol. XI, p. 153. 
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demonstrations throughout the country in support of the Arab cause^\ A mass 
meeting was also held in Allahabad in support of the Arabs. Similarly, the Sindh 
Congress Socialist Conference held at Karachi on July 18, 1936 sent its 
greetings to the Arabs in Palestine and hoped that they would keep up the fight 
till independent Palestine was established^^. 
In October 1937 at its Calcutta session, the All India Congress 
Committee (AlCC) protested "against the reign of terror that has been 
established in Palestine by British imperialism with a view to coercing the Arabs 
into accepting the proposed partition of Palestine and assured them the solidarity 
of the people with them in their struggle for national freedom"^^. The following 
year, it resolved that "Britain would be well advised in reversing its present policy 
and leave the Jews and the Arabs to amicably settle the issues between them" '^*. 
A resolution conveying Bombay citizen's full sympathy to the Arabs in Palestine 
was adopted at a public meeting held under the auspicious of the Bombay 
Provincial Congress Committee to celebrate the Palestine Day. Addressing the 
audience there, Sarojini Naidu stated that the fight against imperialism was a 
world fight and therefore it was the moral duty of the exploited people like Indians 
to sympathise with the Arabs fighting for independence from British domination^^. 
^^  R. Sreekantan Nair, Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed; India and Israel Kalpaz Publications, 
New Delhi, 2004, p.65. 
^^  Prasad, op cit. No. 21, p. 146." • 
^^  Encyclopedia of INC, Vol. 9, p.260. 
"^^  Birendra Prasad, Indian Nationalism and Asia, B.R Publication Corporation, New Delhi, 1979, 
p. 146. 
35 Heptulla, op cit. No. 24, p.149. 
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In its 51®' session in February 1938, the Congress condemned the plan for 
partition of Palestine, protested against the repressive policy of Britain and 
expressed sympathy with the Arabs. It also appealed to the Jews "not to seek the 
shelter of the British Mandatory and not to allow them to be exploited in the 
interests of the British imperialism"^ ®. In 1939, the INC sent a communication to 
Aminul Husseini, the Mufti of Palestine, wishing the Arab Higher Committee 
"complete success in the attainment of their objective" against the Zionists^^. 
Some Muslims iri India also organised themselves separately to 
propagate the cause of the Palestinian Arabs. The Muslims of Uttar Pradesh, for 
instance, organized the Provincial Palestine Conference at Allahabad on July 18, 
1936. Maulana Qutubuddin Abdul Wall, the President of the Conference, 
lamented that after making a number of promises to the Palestinian Arabs, 
Britain, unmindful of those promises, was using the Jews as instruments for 
strengthening her hold upon Palestine, and congratulated the Palestinian Arabs 
for their brave stand against tremendous odds^ .^ Nehru in his message to the 
conference expressed his sympathy and solidarity with the Arabs who were 
fighting bravely for the freedom of their country. This struggle, Nehru 
emphatically stated, had nothing to do with religion. It was not against the Jews. 
It was a national struggle in which the Arabs of different faiths were joining hands 
^^  N.V Rajkumar ed. The Background of India's Foreign Policy, All India Congress Committee, 
New Delhi: 1952, pp. 49, 54-55. 
^^  Joseph B. Schechtman, "India and Israel" in International Relations and Foreign Policy of India, 
ed., V. Grover, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 471-72. 
38 Heptulla, opcit. No. 6, p. 149. 
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for the common object of securing the independence for their country. "And thus 
there is much in common between their struggle and ours", Nehru further 
remarked, "and even on the narrow grounds of self interest we in India should 
support and sympathies with the Arabs. I trust that the Arab struggle in Palestine 
will help us to see our own struggle in a proper perspective and make us forget 
our internal divisions in the face of common diversity"^ .^ 
Maulana Ahmed Sayeed, the President of the first session of the Bihar 
Muslim Independent Party Conference held at Patna on September 12, 1936 
criticised the British Government's policy in regard to Palestine'*". 
Asaf Ali tabled an independent adjournment motion in the Legislative 
Assembly on September 11, 1936 to discuss the failure of the Government of 
India in inviting the attention of the British Government to the danger of 
persuading the policy of denying the indigenous population of Palestine their 
legitimate right of self-determination''\Sir Mohammad Yakub raised the Palestine 
issue on September 14,1936 in the Indian Legislative Assembly. Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah and Shaukat Ali asked the Government of India to clarify the British policy 
towards Palestine'*^. 
On August 1, 1937, a meeting of the Muslims of Calcutta protested 
against the plan of partitioning Palestine into two parts as per the Peel 
Commission plan. Addressing the 'All India Palestine Conference' held in 
®^ Prasad, op cit. No. 21, p. 146. " • 
'°lbid. 
"^  Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), April 27, 1937. 
"^  The Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), September 15,1936. 
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September 1937 to express sympathy with the Arabs in their fight for freedom, 
Saul'cat Ali declared that every Muslim in India felt the strongest sympathy for the 
brave Arabs. A.R Siddiqi, the President of the conference, urged the Muslims of 
India to raise their voice in unison with the rest of the Muslim world against the 
contemplated amputation of Palestine^ .^ 
In October 1937, the Muslim members of the Central Legislature in India in 
a statement noted with concern the developments in Palestine and expressed 
their sympathy with their Arab brethren in the fight against the heavy odds to 
safeguard legitimate rights and to save the Holy Land from Zionist aggression. 
They demanded that the whole of Palestine should be handed over to the Arabs, 
the sons of the soil'^. The All India Shia Political Conference held at Lucknow in 
October 1937 condemned the Peel Commission's recommendations for the 
division of Palestine"* .^ The Raja of Mahmudabad, the Chairman of the Reception 
Committee of the 25"^  session of the All India Muslim League held at Lucknow in 
October 1937, pointed out that Indian Muslims were anxiously watching the 
developments in Palestine and warned the British Government that any further 
inroads upon the rights of the Arabs of Palestine would start a conflagration 
which would lead to disastrous results'* .^ In his Presidential address, Jinnah told 
the British Government that the question of Palestine, if not fairly met, boldly and 
courageously decided, was going to be the turning point in the history of the 
"^  The Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), September 25,1937. 
"" The Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), October 11,1937. 
*^ Indian Annual Register, 1937, vol. II, p. 416. 
^^  Ibid, p.402. 
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British Empire. Expressing India's support to tlie Arab cause Jinnah said, 'The 
IVluslims of India will stand solid and will help the Arabs in every way they can in 
their brave and just struggle that they are carrying on against all odds'^ ^. The All 
India Muslim League wished that the recommendations of the Peel Commission 
should not be compiled with for they were opposed to the religious sentiments of 
the Muslims'*®. 
The Sindh Provincial Muslim League prayed for the success of the Cairo 
conference which was held in October 1938 for the defence of Palestine and 
attended by the Arab and Muslim countries and declared that to achieve a lasting 
settlement of the Palestine issue, it was highly essential that the British 
government should invalidate Balfour Declaration, withdraw the scheme of 
partition of Palestine, and confer full independence upon Palestine'*^. 
On January 31, 1939, H.S Suhrawardy, Secretary of the Bengal Provincial 
Muslim League, issued an appeal stating that 'Palestine Day' should be observed 
on February 8, 1939 throughout India to express the solidarity of the Indian 
Muslims with the Arabs in Palestine^". 
The Jamiat-uj-Ulema-i-Hind conference held in March 1939 urged the 
fulfillment of the Arab demands for the reconstitution of Palestine into a self-
"''A Ahmad, Pakistan and the Middle East, Karachi, 1940, p. 162. 
"^  7/76 Times of India, October 18,1937. 
"^  The Amrit Bazar Patrika, October 12,1938. 
°^ The Star of India, January 31,1939. 
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governing state and the complete stoppage of Jewish immigration into 
Palestine^\ 
Sir Silondar Hyat Khan, the President of the Bombay Muslim League 
conference held in May 1939, declared that the Muslims of India had deep 
friendly feelings for the Arabs in Palestine and urged the British Government to 
settle the Palestine issue in a just manner^ .^ 
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad , one of the most prominent and vocal nationalist 
leaders of India, vehemently opposed to the idea of creating a state Israel in 
Palestine. It is important to note here that his idea was no way influenced by the 
Muslims sentiment in India. He was firm in his belief that one can not divide the 
people on the basis of religion. In Calcutta session in 1937, INC assured the 
Arab people 'full solidarity of the Indian people in their struggle for national 
freedom'^^. 
However, the Jewish dimension of the problem was drawn by Subhas 
Chandra Bose in February 1938, in the 5 f ' session of the INC held at Haripura; 
Bose highlighted the contradiction involved in the British policy in Palestine^. 
Hence, the AlCC in the same year (1938) appealed to the Jews not to seek 
^^  Indian Annual Register, 1939, Vol. 1, p. 382. 
''Ibid. 
'^ N. V Rajkumar ed. The Background of India's Foreign Policy, Navin Press, New Delhi, 1952, p. 
54. 
^*. For full text of the Presidential address see Sisir Bose and Sugata Bose eds. The Essential 
Writings of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 197-219. 
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shelter on the British mandate and not to allow them to be exploited in the 
interest of British Imperialism^^. 
A similar view was expressed by Nehru, while addressing the Peace and 
Empire Conference in London on July 15, 1938. Nehru held British imperialism 
responsible for the unrest in Palestine and suggested that the Palestine problem 
could be solved only when the Arabs and Jews coming together with an 
agreement and not by the British Imperialism^^. 
In its annual session in 1939, the Congress adopted a resolution on 
Palestine expressing its sympathy with the Arabs and hoped for the emergence 
of an independent democratic state in Palestine with specific provision for the 
protection of the rights of the Jews. In the same year, it adopted another 
resolution condemning Hitler's programmes against Jews and criticizing the Jews 
for relying on the "British armed forces to advance their special privileges in 
Palestine and thus aligned themselves in the side of the British Imperialism"^^. 
Finally, the fifty-second session of the INC was held in Tripura in 
March 1939 that categorically reiterated the significance of the earlier resolve^^. 
From the above discussion it is clear that in no other people's affairs 
INC was as much involved as in the case of the Palestine Arabs. Now the 
question is why INC took such interest on Palestinian Arabs. The answer is that 
the attitude of the INC towards Palestine question as a whole was influenced by 
^^  Report of the Fifty-First Indian National Congress, Haripura, 1938, Ahmedabad, 1938, p. 199. 
®^ Prasad, Indian Nationalism and Asia op cit, No. 34, pp. 145-46. 
^^  Cited in Nair, op cit. No. 31, p.66. 
''Ibid 
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its kjadership especially the top leaders like Gandhi and Nehru. Hence an 
analysis of the perceptions of these two leaders on the Palestine question is 
needed which was later bequeathed by free India and its successive political 
leadership. 
Perception of Gandhi 
Even before the emergence of the Palestine question, Gandhi had 
been closely associated with the Jews. During his Satyagraha days in South 
Africa, he was an admirer of the Jewish philosopher Martin Bubber. Moreover, 
Hermenn Kakenbach and H.S.L Palak were his close associates'^. He was also 
deeply shocked by the sufferings and hardships of the Jews, who, he believed, 
were treated worse than the untouchables in lndia^°. However, his personal 
sympathy and affinity towards the Jews did not influence his views on the 
Palestine question. He wrote "my sympathies are all with the Jews. I have known 
them intimately in South Africa. Some of them became life-long companions. 
Through these friends, I came to learn much of their age long prosecutions....But 
my sympathy does not blind me to the requirements of justice. The cry for the 
national home of the Jews does not make much appeal to me. The sanction for it 
is sought in the Bible and in the tenacity with which the Jews have hankered after 
their return to Palestine. Why should they not like other peoples of the earth 
make that country their home where they are born and where they earn their 
^^  For a detail discussions see Gideon Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews: A Formative 
Factor in India's Policy towards Israel Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 
Jerusalem, 1977. 
^ The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 68 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 
Government of India, 1958, p. 137 (hereafter referred to as Gandhi's work). 
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livelihood"^^? Gandhi's perception on the whole issue was based on his deep 
faith in non-violence and the centrality of means over ends. 
Having full faith in Ahimsha, Gandhi wrote, "If I were a Jew, I should 
tell them (the Jews): do not be so silly as to resort to terrorism, because you 
simply damage your own case which otherwise would be a proper case^^ "A 
religious act", he observed "cannot be performed with the aid of the bayonets or 
the bomb"^ .^ They can settle in Palestine only by the goodwill of the 
Arabs'...Again talking to an American journalist, he stressed that the solution to 
the problem lay in the total abandonment of "terrorism and other forms of 
violence" by the Jews^. 
In March 1921, he wrote, "By no cannons of ethics or war can 
Palestine be given to the Jews ^^ The Jews cannot receive sovereign rights in 
a place which has been held for centuries by Muslim powers by right of religious 
conquest"^^. In an article published in the Harijan of November 26, 1938 he 
similarly wrote that "I don't believe in any kind of war, and a war is therefore 
outside my horizon or province"^''. 
^^  Harijan, November 11,1938 and Gandhi's Works, Vol.68, p. 137. 
^^  Gandhi's Works, Vol. 87, p. 417. 
^^  Gandhi's Works, Vol. 68, 1938. 
^^  Gandhi's Works, Vol.88, p.262. 
^^  Young India, March 23,1921, Gandhi's Works, \/o\. 19, p. 472. 
^^  Ibid. 
^^ Harijan, November 26, 1938 and Gandhi's Works, Vol. 68, p. 137. 
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Similarly, on the eve of the Palestine tragedy, he was more convinced of the 
grievous wrong done to the Arabs and wrote expressing his moral support to the 
helpless Palestinians who were being uprooted from their homes and fields. "The 
Jews" he wrote, "have erred grievously in seeking to impose themselves on 
Palestine with the aid of American money or British arms for forcing themselves 
on an unwelcome land"^^. 
He examined the rationale of the Zionist movement. He rejected 
Zionism which was based on the assumption that the Jews all over world 
constitute a 'nation' and that by virtue of their religion alone they are the 
prospective citizens of Israel. Like Indians, he believed the Arabs were also the 
victims of an unpardonable conspiracy of division of their land on the basis of 
race and religion. According to Paul Power, there are four reasons why Gandhiji 
opposed Zionism. "First, he was sensitive about the ideas of Muslim Indians who 
were anti-Zionists because of their sympathy for Middle Eastern Arabs opposed 
to the Jewish National Home; second, he objected to any Zionist methods 
inconsistent with his way of non-violence; third, he found Zionism contrary to his 
pluralistic nationalism, which excludes the establishment of any State based 
solely or mainly on one religion; and fourth, he apparently believed it imprudent 
to complicate his relations with the British, who held the mandate in Palestine"^^. 
Gandhi was hurt when he was told that the Zionist lobby has given a 
new twist to his convictions against the Zionist antics. The international Zionists 
^^  Quoted in G.H Jansen, Statesman (New Delhi), April 5,1966. 
®^ Quoted A.K. Ramakrishnan, "Mahatma Gandhi Rejected Zionism", Released August 15, 2001, 
The Wisdom Fund, Website: http://www.twf.org. 
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magnates especially in Britain and the USA came out with a starling clarification 
of his pronouncements. They argued that Gandhi was opposing the Zionist 
moves because he wanted to please the Indian Muslims some of whom are his 
close associates. He after knowing such perceptions of the Zionists came out 
with a stronger statement. 'I have said often" he wrote, 'that I would not sell truth 
for the sake of India's deliverance. Much less would I do so for winning Muslim 
friendship"^". 
Thus the cry for a national home for the Jews did not make much 
appeal to him. This plea, he believed, could not be sustained on moral or political 
grounds. Morally he advocated that "Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same 
sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French. It is wrong 
and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs"^\ 
At the same time, Gandhi criticized the Jews for their dependence on 
British Imperialism. This he said "The Palestine of Biblical conception is not a 
geographical tract. It is in their hearts. But if they must look to the Palestine of 
geography, as their national home, it is wrong to enter it under the shadow of 
British gun"^^. 
But Gandhi firmly believed that the Palestine question was having 
some moral connotations and so the same should be settled peacefully between 
™ Gandhi's Works, op cit. No 37. 
^^  Quoted in Jansen, op cit. No 68. Also see Gandlii's Works, Vol. 68, p. 137. 
^^  Harijan, November 26,1939. Also see Gandhi's Works, Vol. 68, p. 140. 
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the two parties and hoped that if the Arabs provide refuge to the Jews without the 
mediation of any Nation, it will be in their tradition of generosity''^. 
How could Gandhi reconcile his opposition to Jewish nationalism on 
the grounds of inappropriately mingling religion and politics and his own activity 
of mixing Hinduism and Indian nationalism? Gandhi maintained that Indian 
nationalism was a non-sectarian or all-sectarian movement, i,e it was for all 
Indians regardless of their religion, a point of view which he adhered to the end of 
his life. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that he was taking a pro-Arab stand 
on the Palestine question. This was mainly due to his high moral convincement 
and belief in non-violence. One could also notice in his attitude a soft approach 
for the Jews on humanitarian grounds when he said that "the Jews have a good 
cause in Palestine and in terms of claim they got priority" '^*. This was because of 
his life-long friendship with many Jews and also for the age-long prosecution 
meted out to them. However, a few months before his assassination, Don 
Campbell of Reuters asked him, 'What is the solution of the Palestine problem?". 
In reply, Gandhiji in great despair said that it had become a problem which 
seemed insoluble''^. 
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Gandhi's Works, Vol. 82, p. 262. 
Louis Fischer, Gandhi and Stalin: Two Signs at the World's Crossroads, Rajkamal Publication, 
New Delhi, 1947, p. 42. 
''^  Krishan Gopai and Sarabjit Sharma, India and Israel: Towards Strategic Partnership, Authors 
Press, New Delhi, 2007, p. 113. 
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Perception of Nehru 
Towards the end of the 1920's, Jawaharlal Nehru -a man most travelled 
and conversant with foreign affairs than any of his fellow Indian nationalists- was 
the recognized spokesman of the INC on foreign affairs and every resolution of 
the Congress on foreign affairs was practically inspired, drafted and piloted by 
him^'l 
Nehru's postures about Jews were same as that of Gandhi. On the plight 
of the Jews, he wrote, They had no home or nation, and everywhere they went, 
they were treated as unwelcome and undesirable strangers.... They were 
humiliated, reviled, tortured and massacred"^^. But his sympathy towards the 
Jews did not influence fiis views on Palestine. For him, Palestine "was not a 
wilderness or an empty uninhabited place. It was already somebody else 
home"^^ 
He was also fully conscious of the fact that the real issue in Palestine was 
not religion as some of the Indian Muslims thought it to be but imperialism-a 
phenomena which had been generated by conflicting interests of democracy and 
fascism, nationalism and imperialism and socialism and decaying capitalism. 
Nehru appreciated the brave Arab people for putting up a valiant fight in the 
™ J Bandyopadhya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes 
and Personalities, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, p.286. 
77 Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 
1987, pp.62-3. 
™ Ibid, p.763. 
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cause of national independence and assured them the solidarity of the Indian 
people with them in their struggle for national freedom^^. 
He identified a similarity between the freedom struggles of India and the 
Palestinians on two grounds. First, both are national liberation movements 
against the British imperialism. In his presidential address at the AlCC Session at 
Faizpur on 27^ ^ December 1936, Nehru said that "the Arab struggle against 
British imperialism in Palestine is as much part of this great world conflict as 
India's struggle for freedom"^". 
Second, in India, the British sponsored the Muslim League to undercut 
Indian demands for independence. In Palestine, the British sponsored the Zionist 
movement to counter Arab claims for immediate independence. The Pakistan 
movement and the Zionist movement, to him were false Illegitimate nationalisms. 
They were small disruptive communal movements based on religion, backed by 
Western exploiters. 
He was of the opinion that Jews should not rely on British support and 
should reach an agreement with the Arabs to safeguard their position in an 
independent Arab country. To him, the British appeared to be exploiting the 
differences between the Jews and the Arabs in the same manner they were 
promoting communal tensions in lndia"®\ Hence, while addressing the audience 
^^  Encyclopedia of Indian National Congress, Vol.10, p.260. 
^° Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehm, Vol.7, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1975, pp. 602-3. 
^^  S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography 1889-1947, Vol.1 Oxford University Press, London, 
1975, pp. 232-3. 
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at Allahabad on the occasion of the Palestine Day in September 1936, he 
reminded the British policy of playing off one community against another in order 
-to consolidate its position. To him, England was putting up Jewish religious 
nationalism so as to make it appear that her presence was necessary as an 
arbitrator and to keep the peace between the two. Hence he thought that 
"Palestine is essentially an Arab country and must remain so, and the Arabs 
must not be crushed and suppressed in their own homelands"^^. 
He argued that only 'on the stable foundation of Arab-Jews cooperation 
and the elimination of imperialism" ®^  the future of Palestine could be secured. 
This, he suggested, required that the Jews abandon their exaggerated claims 
and seek peaceful accommodation with the Palestinians. 
Thus, the views expressed by both Gandhi and Nehru were identical in 
character. Both leaders had sympathy for the Jews. However, with regard to their 
claim for a separate state, both of them opposed it. Their opposition was based 
on three grounds. First, both had a firm view that any state based on religious 
exclusivity could not sustain on moral and political grounds. Secondly the Biblical 
Association of the Jews to Palestine (Jews longing for Jerusalem and Mount Zion 
have been recorded many a time in the Bible) has been regarded as insufficient 
basis for the creation of a modern state. Third, it is reprehensible that the Arabs 
in Palestine would have to pay for the crimes of Hitler's Germany and other 
Europeans who had prosecuted the Jews. Both Gandhi and Nehru wanted that 
the issue should be resolved by the parties concerned, away from the 
^^  Nehru, op cit. No. 77, p.767. 
^' Ibid. 
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intervention of the imperialist forces through a federal state comprising of both 
the Arabs and the Jews. At the same time, they were not in favour of the 
victimization of one by the other. They stood for granting all kinds of democratic 
rights normally enjoyed by the minorities In other countries. 
A close look at the above shows that the INC had consistently taken the 
Arab side on the Palestine question and assessed the entire issue from the 
India's point of view. However, the Indian National Congress's attitude towards 
the Palestine question as a whole, to a large extent, was influenced by its 
leadership. The organization's stand on the issue was almost identical to the 
views of both Gandhi and Nehru. This is not without reason. One reason could 
be the Muslim population of India. This section of people had sympathised the 
cause of their co-religionists in Palestine. The Congress could not ignore this 
fact. Another reason may be the Congress party's uncompromising stand against 
colonialism. The Palestinian Arabs were placed under the British colonial rule 
after First World War and were struggling against the colonial power. The 
Congress was thus brought closer to the Palestinians. It is also possible that the 
secularist approach of the Congress to politics could be one reason to oppose 
Zionism and sympathise with the Palestinians. The Congress vehemently 
advocated secular politics. This made it see Zionism as a movement based on 
religion. Moreover, Zionism was seen as a tool to be used by the colonial and 
imperial power, which the Congress could not tolerate. 
When India became independent in 1947, it could not keep itself away 
from these intellectual, ideological and moral legacies of the past. Moreover, 
42 
Nehru gave official colour to the views of the INC on Palestine once he became 
the Prime Minister as well as the Foreign Minister of independent India. 
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Chapter Two 
INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINE (1947-1992) 
India's historic and principled support to the Palestinian people during the 
freedom struggle continued even after independence. Besides, Nehru's 
assumption of power as the first Prime Minister of the country added continuity to 
its post-independent Palestine policy. 
In the initial period, India's policy towards Palestine was consistently in 
conformity with the basic tenets of its foreign policy: anti-imperialism, anti-racism, 
support to the liberation struggles around the world, opposition to military 
occupation, solution of the international disputes through negotiation, a relentless 
struggle against neo-colonialism etc^. In addition to these broad principles, 
India's position with regard to Palestine was also guided by the general 
consensus in the Arab world, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. 
Indian stand on Palestine had also a pragmatic dimension. The partition of 
India and the creation of an exclusively Muslim state of Pakistan, the subsequent 
Kashmir problem, the Pakistani attempts to bring about a Pan-Islamic Alliance 
stretching from Turkey to Pakistan (the emergence of an Anti-India Islamic bloc 
with Pakistan as its leader)®^ and the fear of the Indian leaders that the Muslim 
population of India could identify with pan-lslamism that could rise out of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict influenced India to forge a conscious policy towards the 
^^ For a detail account of India's foreign policy see Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's 
Foreign Policy op cit, No. 76. 
^^  Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, op cit. No. 24, p. 161. 
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Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine. Nehru viewed this pan Islamic tendency as 
regressive and counterproductive as it could divide and weaken the movement of 
the Asian people against the imperialist states. Similarly, Nehru did not want 
Arab-Israeli conflict to affect the Muslim populace of India by giving additional 
boost to the pan-Islamic and separatist element among them® .^ 
Thus, although India and Israel had no serious bilateral problems, their 
only major difference was related to the Palestine issue and by the late 1950s, 
opposition to Israeli policies and commitment to the Palestine cause became one 
of the main features of India's foreign policy. India's policy towards Palestine 
cause can be analysed through the following main headlines. 
India's Support to Palestine Issue at the United Nations 
On February 14, 1947, the United Kingdom, the mandatory power in 
Palestine (1918-48), frustrated in its attempt to solve the Palestine problem at 
London conference, "threw up its hands and handed the problem over to the 
United Nations" '^'. The UN General Assembly, at its session held on 28*^  April 
1947 discussed the Palestine issue and decided to constitute an eleven nation 
investigation commission named as the United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine's (UNSCOP) to investigate the cause of the conflict in Palestine, 
and, if possible, devise a solution for Palestine. India was appointed as a 
member of this special committee. The UNSCOP put fonward two plans, the 
^^  P.J Vincent, "Cultural Determinants of India-Israel Relations and the Question of Palestine" in 
M.H llias and P.J Vincent eds. India-West Asia Relations: Understanding Cultural Interplays, New 
Century Publications, New Delhi, 2007, p. 159. 
^^  Gopal and Sharma, India and Israel, op cit, p. 14. 
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majority plan and the minority plan; the majority plan insisted on the partition of 
Palestine into two states, one Arab and the other Jewish, with the 
internalisation of Jerusalem under UN jurisdiction while the minority plan 
suggested the creation of a federal state with Jewish and Palestine units, with 
Jerusalem as the national capital.^^ 
In the General Assembly, two thirds of the delegations voted for partition 
but India sided with the Arabs and voted against the resolution. Two reasons can 
be given for the stand that India took. First, since the leaders of the Indian 
National Congress were against the two nation theory and opposed the partition 
of India on religious ground, it then followed that India was against the partition of 
Palestine on such grounds® .^ Second, since the Indian leaders had always 
supported the Palestinian Arabs, they were unable to take a stand against them 
all of a sudden. India therefore wanted the Jews and Arabs to work out their 
differences within one Federal State of Palestine but this was not possible since 
the relations between Zionists and Arabs were unbridgeable by that time. 
Despite India's opposition, the majority plan of the UNSCOP was adopted 
by the General Assembly with certain modifications. The plan was adopted by 33 
®^ For a detail discussion on these two plans see United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: 
Report to the General Assembly, New York, 1947, Vol. 1, pp. 47-58. 
^^  Leonard A Gordon, "Indian Nationalist Ideas about Palestine and Israel", Jewish Social Studies, 
Vol.37, No. 3-4, Summer-Autumn, 1975, p. 27. 
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votes in favour, 13 against and 10 abstentions. India voted against the plan along 
with the Arab and other countries^". 
The UN partition plan was followed by unrest and chaos and both Jews 
and the Arabs were preparing to take over control of Palestine after the British 
withdrawal. Meanwhile, on 14 May 1948, on the day in which the British Mandate 
over Palestine expired, the Jewish People's Council gathered at the Tel Aviv 
Museum approved the proclamation, declaring the establishment of the State of 
Israel. 
After its establishment, Israel applied for admission to the UN and the 
matter was put to vote. India's first reaction was to abstain but later India chose 
to vote against Israel. This was because 'India could not recognise a state which 
had been achieved through the force of arms and not through negotiations. The 
General Assembly vote was in favour of Israeli admission to UN (37 to 2 with 9 
abstentions)^^ 
America was the first country to recognise Israel followed by the USSR. 
Israel was keen on securing India's recognition being the most influential post-
colonial state in Asia with considerable say on Asian thinking. India, however, 
recognised Israel on 17 September 1950, after more than years of its creation 
and after two Muslim majority countries, Turkey and Iran, had accorded 
recognition. 
°^ Nair, Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed, op cit, No. 31, p.70. Also see Shamir Hasan, "The 
Evolution of India's Palestine Policy: A Fall from the Heights?",Soc/a/ Scientist, Vol. 36, No. 1-2, 
January-February, 2008, p.82. 
®^  Vincent, op cit. No. 86, p. 160 
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Was this recognition due to domestic concerns, including the fact that 
there was a Jewish community living in India (40,000 Jews out of a population of 
over 360 million)? An official communique gave two reasons for this decision. 
First, as in the case of communist China, the government of India was 
recognising 'an established fact'. Secondly, non-recognition was not only 
inconsistent with the overall relationship between two member states of the UN 
but would also limit India's role as a possible peace-maker between the Arabs 
and Israelis^^. According to Shivshankar Menon, a third reason was to enable 
peace to prevail in the region, enable de-colonization and to put an end to 
imperialism^^. Nehru, however, made it clear that recognition did not mean 
endorsement of Israeli position on its frontiers and India would continue to 
support the cause of the Palestinians. 
Although India recognised Israel, yet it refrained from exchanging 
diplomatic representatives at any level. In 1953, Israel was allowed to open a 
consulate in Bombay but India refrained from maintaining a diplomatic presence 
in Israel. Israel's repeated attempt to establish full diplomatic ties with India failed 
^^  Punyapriya Dasgupta, "Betrayal of India's Israel Policy", Economic and Political Weekly, April 
11-18, 1992, p. 769. 
^^  Shivshankar Menon's talk on "Indian Foreign Policy in the Middle East" at the Palestinian 
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Jerusalem, 7 May 1997 at: 
http://www.passia.org/meetings/97/meet04.htm 
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because of Nehru's firm attitude "^*. David Ben Gurion, the first Prime l\/1inister of 
Israel stated in 1960, "I cannot understand how Mr Nehru fits his behaviour to 
Israel with Gandhi's philosophy of universal friendship"^^. 
According to Prithvi Ram Mudian, "The confusion and fluidity that 
characterised West Asian politics in the aftermath of the creation of Israel and the 
implacable Arab hostility to it, concern over Pakistan's efforts to cultivate West 
Asia on a religious basis, the internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute after 
India took it to the UN, and the sensitivities of the large Muslim population that 
remained in India after partition were some of the major factors that prompted the 
Indian government to be careful and slow in extending formal recognition to 
Israel"^^ 
It may be mentioned that Jawaharlal Nehru Is considered as one of 
the three founder members of the Non-Allgned Movement (NAM), along 
'^' The lobbying to garner India's support for the creation of Israel had started even before India 
got its independence. For instance, Albert Einstein, the great physicist who declined an offer to 
become Israel's second President wrote a four-page letter dated June 13, 1947 to Jawaharlal 
Nehru, the Prime Minister designate of India for supporting the establishment of a Jewish state. 
He opened with praise for India's constituent assembly, which had just abolished untouchability. 
"The attention of the world was [now] fixed on the problem of another group of human beings 
who, like the untouchables, have been the victims of persecution and discrimination for centuries 
- the Jews." He appealed to Nehru as a "consistent champion of the forces of political and 
economic enlightenment"-"to rule in favour of "the rights of an ancient people whose roots are in 
the East". Nehru was not unaware of the sufferings of the Jews. But he did not like the idea of a 
new state being thrust on the land of others. Nehru replied to Einstein and courteously turned 
down the request. For more see Syed Sultan Mohiddin, "Palestine Conflict and India's 
Response", Radiance Views Weel<ly, November 14, 2010. 
^^  Cited in Michael Brecher, Ttie New States of Asia: A Political Analysis, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963, p. 131. 
®^  Prithvi Ram Mudiam, India and the Middle East, British Academic Press, London, 1994, p. 206. 
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with Presidents Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia and Gamal Abdul Nasser'of 
Egypt. This relationship with Nasser and other Arab members of the 
movement made it difficult for Nehru to align openly with Israel. Besides, 
while the NAM was an attempt to stay non-aligned during the Cold War, 
Israel was seen as too closely aligned with the United States. 
The withdrawal of the US offer to finance the construction of the Aswan 
Dam across the Nile led to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by President 
Nasser in 1956. The negotiations between Egypt and Anglo-French 
Governments failed to persuade Nasser to modify his position. While the issue 
was being debated, Israel launched an attack on Egyptian position in Sinai on 
October 29, 1956 '^'. Israel's unabashed and unprovoked aggression on a Third 
World country with ex-colonial powers like UK and France under false pretences 
dissipated whatever little sympathy the Indian leaders and the public entertained 
for Israel. An official statement issued on 31®^  October 1956, denounced Israeli 
aggression as a fragrant violation of UN Charter and in opposition to all principles 
laid down in Bandung Conference^^ and Nehru publicly denounced the Israeli 
action as 'clear naked aggression'^ ^. India also cosponsored resolutions in the 
General Assembly urging the immediate withdrawal of French, British and Israeli 
forces from Egypt. 
^^ "For an excellent account of the Suez Crisis see W. M. Roger Louis and Roger Owen eds. Suez 
1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, Oxford, 1989. 
98 Foreign Affairs Record, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi No. 10, 
October 1956, p. 150. 
^^ Hindu, November 2, 1956. 
50 
According to Kumarswami, India's Israel policy at that time was Influenced 
by three distinct factors: Afro-Asian solidarity based on anti-colonialism; Israel's 
increasing identification with imperial powers and consequent alienation from the 
newly independent countries of the Third World; and the growing friendship 
between Nehru and Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser. As a result, Nehru, 
who was extremely circumspect in his public reaction to the Hungarian crisis the 
same year, was vociferous in denouncing Israeli aggression toward Egypt^°°. The 
Suez crisis had, however, brought in a major impact on India's policy perspective 
on West Asia. Though it did not make any direct implication on India's Palestine 
policy, it hardened India's attitude towards Israel and brought Egypt and India 
closer to each other. 
The border dispute between the Arabs and Israel led to the escalation of 
another war in West Asia in 1967^°\ Israel seized the Sinai, Gaza, the Golan 
Heights, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from the Arabs. Although the 
closure of Gulf of Aquaba by Nasser and the ordering of the withdrawal of United 
Nations Emergency Force were the immediate reasons for the escalations of war 
in 1967, India took a blatantly pro-Arab position during the crisis. At the UN 
where India was a non-permanent member of the Security Council, its 
representative, G Parthasarathy placed the responsibility for the 'grave situation' 
^°° P. R Kumarswami, "Indian-Israeli Relations: Humble Beginnings, A Bright Future", The 
American Jewish Committee, 2002 at: 
http://w/ww.ajc.org/lnTheMedia/PublicationsPrint.asp?did=512 
°^^  For more on 1967 Arab Israel war see John Norton Moorre ed. The Arab-Israel Conflict, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1974, Vol. 1 & 2. 
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The areas shown in bright green (Sinai, Golan Heights, Gaza, West Bank and East 
Jerusalem) were occupied by Israel during the 6-day war. Israel has since returned all of 
Sinai to Egypt in return for peace. Most of Gaza is currently under the jurisdiction of the 
autonomous Palestinian Authority (2002). Parts of the West Bank had been ceded following 
Oslo II agreement to the Palestinian authority, but these areas are currently re-occupied by 
Israel. Following the 6 day war, Israel began building settlements in these areas 
prevailing in West Asia's squarely on lsrael^°^.' Similarly, Indira Gandhi in a 
statement In the Lok Sabha on 6 June 1967 said, "I do not wish to utter harsh 
words or use strong language. But on the basis of information available, there 
can be no doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict 
which has now acquired the proportions of a full-scale war"^°^. 
The Fourth Arab Israeli war started when on October 6, 1973, the 
Egyptian and Syrian armies simultaneously attacked Israel to get back the 
territories they had lost In June 1967. During this war, India extended full support 
to the Arabs. Though Egypt and Syria had launched a coordinated attack on 
Israel, the Indian government held Israel responsible for encouraging the Arab 
countries to do so as Israel had refused to vacate the territories occupied by 
force. "The Government has consistently declared that the cause of the tension 
in the area is due to Israeli aggression and refusal to vacate territories occupied 
by armed force. Our sympathies are entirely with the Arabs whose sufferings 
have long reached a point of explosion"^"'*. Indira Gandhi gave two reasons for 
this Indian attitude. Firstly, India's old and solid relations with the Arabs required 
India to "stand by its friends in the time of their travail" and secondly, Israel's 
refusal to vacate the Arab lands occupied in 1967 war and its refusal to honour 
102 
103 
Quoted in Mudia^, op cit, No. 96, p. 212. 
Ibid,p.2^^. 
^°* Statement by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on the eruption of fighting in West Asia, 
October 7, 1973, in Krishan Gopai and Kol<ila Krishan Gopal, West Asia and North Africa: A 
Documentary Study of Major Crises, V.I Publications, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 145-46. 
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UN r€Jsolutions °^^ . Swaran Singh later revealed in his speech in the Rajya Sabha 
that India also offered some material support to the Arab friends and that 
medicines and doctors were supplied to both Egypt and Syria^°^. 
Meanwhile, in the post-1973 war period, India gradually moved away from 
the policy of supporting individual Arab countries on Palestine to back the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by its Chairman Yasser Arafat in its 
struggles for an independent homeland. Following the Algiers declaration, India 
co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN General Assembly, on October 8,1974 
calling for the PLO's participation in the deliberations of the General Assembly on 
Palestinian issue^°''. It was the continuous efforts of India and other like-minded 
countries that enabled Yasser Arafat to address the UN General Assembly and 
deliver the historical 'Olive branch' address on November 13, 1974^° .^ 
Responding to Arafat's address, India's Foreign Secretary, Kewal Singh made a 
statement at the UNGA on 19*^  November 1974, in which he endorsed the views 
expressed by Arafat at the UN. In a statement he contended that in Arafat's 
speech, India found the echoes of the same values to which India was dedicated, 
i.e., democracy, secularism, human dignity and common nationhood for 
^°^ Ibid, p. ^ 54. 
'°^ Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh's speech in the Rajya Sabha in reply to the debate, 
Decembers, 1973, in Ibid., pp. 153-54. 
°^^  Foreign Affairs Record, No. 3, March 1974, pp. 121-123. 
^°^ For the full text of Arafat's address see Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. iV, No. 2, Winter 
1975, pp. 180-192. 
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multiracial and multi-religious groups^° .^ Further, as a follow up to the success 
and response to her efforts at the UN in favour of the Palestine cause, India 
introduced another draft resolution on 21^' November, 1974. This resolution also 
affirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestine people to self-determination 
without external interference. It also stood for the Palestinian national 
independence and sovereignty^^°. Consequently, the PLO acquired observer 
status in the UN in 1974. India also joined as a co-sponsor of General Assembly 
Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism in November 1975. 
A number of reasons are there for India's decision to strengthen and 
legitimize the diplomatic and international status of the PLO. First, India realized 
that the PLO was much more amenable to pursue its diplomatic option at the 
critical juncture because it began to appreciate both its necessity and efficiency. 
Secondly India was also aware that such a cause would strengthen the hands of 
Arafat and Al -Fatah within the PLO whose ideological moderation suited India's 
political preferences in the region admirably. Thirdly, India was worried that 
unless the momentum for peace and a negotiated settlement was carefully 
nurtured there was always the possibility that it might lead to a new political 
stalemate in West Asia in which the Palestinians would be the worst sufferers^^^ 
°^^  Nair, Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed, op cit, No. 31, pp. 77-78. 
"° Journal of Palestine Studies, op cit. No. 108, pp. 295-96. 
^^^ Mudiam, op cit., No. 96, p. 185. 
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India's Espousal of Palestine Issue at the NAM 
As a founder member of the Non-Aligned Movement, India also played a 
very Important role in setting the NAM'S anti-colonial agenda that iricluded strong 
support to the liberation movements around the world including the one led by 
the Palestinians. In addition, India highlighted the problems of the Palestine 
people at different NAM summits and also constantly supported the PLO in its 
diplomatic bid to become a full member of the NAM. 
However, before the NAM came into being in 1961, two significant 
developments took place In Asia that crystallised the collective thought on NAM. 
The first was the Asian Relations conference of 1947 and the second was the 
Bandung conference of 1955. Speaking in the plenary session of the Asian 
Relations Conference on 24 March 1947, Nehru remarked "Palestine is 
essentially an Arab country and no decision can be made without the consent of 
the y r^abs"^ ^ .^ India played a lead role at the Bandung Conference and declared 
its support to "the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the 
implementation of the UN Resolutions"^^ .^ 
The first NAM summit at Belgrade in 1961 pledged for the "full restoration 
of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the UN Charter 
and resolutions of the United Nations"^ ^ .^ In its second summit in Cairo in 
^^ ^ Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, Vol. 2, New Delhi, p. 511. 
"^ Asian Recorder, New Delhi, April 23-29,1955, pp. 191-2. 
'^'' Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-79, IViinistry of External Affairs, 
Government of India, New Delhi, 1981, p.5. 
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October 1964, NAM explicitly endorsed the principle of self determination for the 
Palestinians and declared its full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their 
struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism^^ .^ The third summit at Lusaka 
in 1970 maintained that Israel had occupied "the territories of three non-aligned 
countries" and added 'the full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people 
of Palestine as a prerequisite for peace in the Middle East" and reaffirmed its 
support to them "in their struggle for national liberation and against colonialism 
and racism"^^ .^ The Algiers declaration of NAM in 1973, at India's insistence 
emphasized that just and durable peace in the region could be obtained only on 
the basis of "two indispensible fundamental pre-requisites; restoration of the 
Palestine people's national rights, the foremost among which is the right to return 
to self-determination—and -ensuring global recognition of the PLO as the 
legitimate and the sole representative of the Palestinian people"^ '^^ . At the 
Colombo NAM Summit in 1976, India wholeheartedly supported a resolution that 
condemned 'Israel's racist, expansionist, terrorist policy and its attempt to 
Judaise Arab territories'^ ^^. It was also due to the continuous efforts of India and 
other Non-Aligned Nations, Palestine formally entered into the NAM as a full 
member in August 1976. 
"^ Summit Declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement 1961-2009, Institute of Foreign Affairs, 
Kathmandu, 2011,p. 13. " • 
^^^ NAM Documents, p. 5^. 
^^^ Ibid, p. 111. 
™lbid,pA86. 
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Thus India had played a very significant role in getting the PLO recognised 
as the true representative of the Palestine people both in the United Nations and 
the Non-Aligned Movement. According to Prithvi Ram Mudiam, India sought to 
help the PLO gain international political acceptance as a reasonable and 
moderate organization and live down its image as a terrorist outfit by canvassing 
its case in the UN and outside, so that when the time for the final settlement 
came, the PLO would have gained sufficient respectability and credibility to 
participate in the negotiations as an independent organization genuinely 
representative of the Palestine people^^ .^ 
India's Relationship with the PLO 
The formation of PLO as an umbrella organization of various Palestine 
guerrilla groups in 1964 was an important step towards the liberation of 
Palestine. The unexpected defeat of the Arab armies in June 1967 brought PLO 
to agree on the necessity of launching independent military action by integrating 
various armed organisations called the fidayeen. The Cairo Congress of the 
Palestinian National Council held in 1 February 1969 elected Yasser Arafat, a 
young Palestinian engineer, as the Chairman of the PLO. The PLO under 
Arafat's leadership acted as a unifying force among the scattered Palestinian 
community and confirmed the Palestinian national identity. The Cairo Congress 
of the Palestinian National Council held in 1 February 1969 elected Yasser 
Arafat, a young Palestinian engineer, as the Chairman of the PLO. In this 
endeavour, India specifically preferred Al-Fatah, the largest of the Palestinian 
^^® Mudiam, op cit, No. 96, p. 185. 
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groups, led by Arafat. This was because of the following reasons. First, Al-Fatah 
was essentially a nationalist organization which embarked on an ambitious effort 
to unite the Palestinians at every level. It wanted to establish a democratic state 
in Palestine regardless of race and religion to build a progressive society 
contributing effectively towards the creation of a progressive and united Arab 
society. These objectives were naturally to India's liking. Second, its approach 
was secular. It did not give a religious colour to its struggle with Israel by 
characterising it as 'Jihad'. Third, India believed that the pragmatic approach of 
Yasser Arafat and his charismatic leadership would be helpful in resolving the 
dispute^2°. 
In 1969, the Al Fatah delegation visited India at the invitation of the Indian 
association for Afro-Asian solidarity^^\ During the visit, the delegation called the 
Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh and requested permission to open an office 
in India. In December 1974, about 30 MPs demanded the granting of diplomatic 
status to the PLO to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the 'Palestine 
Revolution'^ ^^. On January 10,1975, India became the first Non-Arab country to 
recognize the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people and permitted it an independent office at New Delhi which paved the way 
for an official Palestinian presence in India. Mrs. Gandhi told an'interviewer that 
^^ ° Vincent, op cit, No. 86, pp. 166-67. 
^^^Nair, op c/f., No. 31, p. 74. 
^^ ^ Hindustan Times, December 23,1974. 
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this act had nothing to do with economics but was rather a political act "because 
we feel that injustice has been done"^ ^ .^ 
Comparing India's recognition of Israel in 1950 and the PLO in 1975, 
Krishan Gopal and Sarbjit Sharma find the following differences. First, while 
recognising Israel in 1950, India had formally expressed its reservations vis-a-vis 
Israel's frontiers and the status of Jerusalem. There was no official statement 
about any such conditions being attached to the recognition of the PLO. Second, 
while India was one of the last independent non-Muslim states in 1950 to 
recognise Israel, it became the first non-Arab state to recognise the PLO. Third, 
unlike the Israeli example, the recognition of the PLO was soon followed by the 
opening of an independent office in the Indian capital which became an embassy 
within six years. Finally, in 1950s, its recognition of Israel was conveyed through 
a unilateral massage whereas its recognition of the PLO was formalised through 
an agreement between India and the PLO^ '^*. 
When Janata party came to power in 1977, there were speculations about 
a possible shift in India's Palestine policy. However, the presence of the Pro-
Israeli Jana Sangh arid its leader Atal Behari Vajpayee in the Moraji Desai led 
Janata Government could not change India's traditional policy towards West 
Asia. The Janata Government reaffirmed India's support to the Arabs in general 
and Palestinians in particular and was supportive of any peace initiative between 
^^ ^ Cited in Gordon, op c/f., No. 89, p. 228. 
^^ ^ Gopal and Sharma, op cit, No. 89, p. 147. 
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Arabs and Israel. It was during this period, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defence 
Minister made an unofficial visit to India (August 14, 1977). During his meeting 
with the Indian Prime Minister, Moraji Desai told him, 'You must make peace with 
the Arabs. The Israelis have suffered from the Nazi's and from the prosecution in 
Europe, but the Palestinians should not be made to pay for it'''^^ The argument 
of Dayan that the establishment of an independent Palestinian state would be 
permanent threat to the peace and security of Israel was out rightly rejected by 
Desai. When he raised the question of establishing full diplomatic relations 
between the two countries, Desai pointed out that 'India has mistaken., in not 
having done this at the very outset, when Nehru had come to power with India's 
independence. But this mistaken policy could now not be changed'. Desai said, 
according to Dayan, that the Indian people would rise against the government if 
there was an attempt at having diplomatic relations with Israel^ ^ .^ 
On the question of the regularization of Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories, the Janata Government responded very sharply. On 22"'' August 
1977, the Ministry of External Affairs issued an official release in which it said, 
"India was always against acquisition of territory by any country by use of force. 
India therefore strongly deplores the action taken to regularize existing Israeli 
settlements in the occupied areas and to authorize new ones"^^ .^ 
^^ ^ Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough—A Personal Account of the Egypt—Israel Peace Negotiations, 
Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1978, p. 26. 
'''Ibid. 
^" Foreign Affairs Record, No. 8, August 1977, p. 138. 
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The Camp David Accord that was signed between Egypt and Israel on 
17'^  September 1978 was denounced by the PLO and the Arab world. Egypt was 
accused of destroying Arab solidarity by signing a separate treaty with Israel. In 
this context, the response of India was totally in tune with the Arab world. A. B 
Vajpayee, the Foreign Minister said at a press conference that India did not 
welcome the Camp David Accord because it suffered from three major short-
comings. First, Palestine was the key issue in the Middle East problem and there 
could be no lasting peace until the inalienable rights of the Palestine people were 
restored. Secondly, PLO had not been recognized by Egypt and Israel as the 
representative body of the Palestinians. Third, the Camp David Accord was silent 
on the status of Jerusalem. Such a response of India, no doubt, reiterated her full 
and unconditional support to the Palestinian cause and interests of the PLO^^°. 
Following the Camp David Accord, when the Arab states made combined 
efforts to expel Egypt from the NAM at its Havana summit in September 1979, 
India stood by Egypt and firmly opposed such a move. Expressing India's 
concern more candidly, the Indian Foreign Minister, S.N Mishra argued that 'the 
Egypt-Israeli treaties have caused fears and misgivings which have led to the 
exacerbation of the situation particularly by dividing the Arab world. It is for Egypt 
to remove these misgivings"^^^. 
™ Hindu, October 7,1978 and Sunday Standard, October 8,1978. 
^^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record, No. 9, September 1979, pp. 173-180. 
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Another significant development of the period towards the commitment of 
the Palestine cause was the observation of the "International Day of Solidarity 
with the Palestine People" organized by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations 
and the PLO in New Delhi on 29*'' November 1979. Presiding over the function, 
the Minister of State for External Affairs, B Barua said, "Today when an 
increased number of people all over the world are coming to see and understand 
the justice of Palestinian demand, we Indians, not only feel a sense of 
gratification but also a sense of vindication for our long-standing and consistent 
policies"^^°. 
In 1980, Indira Gandhi returned to power with a thumping majority and 
continued her support to the Palestinian struggle. Her Foreign Minister P.V 
Narasimha Rao announced in Parliament on 26*'^  March 1980 that India had 
decided to accord full diplomatic recognition to the office of the PLO in New Delhi 
by upgrading its office to that of an embassy endowed with all diplomatic 
immunities and privileges^^\ As a follow up to this, Arafat paid a three-day official 
visit to India between 28"^  and 30**^  March 1980. At a dinner given in honour of 
him, Mrs. Gandhi said that sympathy for the Palestinians 'has been a part of 
independent India's foreign policy from its very inception'. She also reiterated that 
a just peace and a comprehensive solution to the Middle Eastern crisis could be 
found only with the "full participation of the PLO as an equal partner in any 
" ° Foreign Affairs Record, No. 9, November 1979, p. 213. 
^^^ l-iindustan Times, March 27, 1980. 
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settlement^^^ In turn, Arafat in his speech described India "as an eternal friend". 
In an interview, he expressed the hope that Palestinians are sure of success if a 
great country like India steadfastly supports the Palestine cause^^ .^ 
Though India's full diplomatic recognition of PLO in general was meant to 
strengthen Its diplomatic option, there were three considerations that prompted 
the Indian Government to resort to such step. First, India considered it in her 
interest to strengthen the radical elements in the Arab world to counterbalance 
the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalists who are trying to give a 'religious twist' 
to what was really a political struggle against Israeli administration. Second, India 
was impressed by the 'refreshing moderation' that Arafat himself had been 
displaying in promoting the Palestinian cause^^ "*. Third, India also thought it wise 
to clarify the Islamic world about the initial Indian position with regard to the 
« 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan^^^. 
India's Palestine policy was further strengthened when Arafat visited 
second time to India as Head of the State in exile in May 1982. This time, his visit 
was politically significant as it took place against the background of Israeli threat 
to invade Lebanon and the resurgence of Islamic fervour in the region as a 
consequence of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
During the occasion, at a dinner given in honour of Mr Arafat, Mrs Gandhi 
"^ Foreign Affairs Record, No. 3, March 1980, pp. 75-6. 
^^ ^ Hindustan Times, March 29,1980. 
^^^H//?dt;, March 29,1990. 
^^^rr/dune, March 31, 1986. 
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described him as 'the symbol of a people afire with the spirit of freedom'^ ^^. On 
the other hand, Arafat expressed his gratitude for the 'strong and very important 
support which you extended to our just cause and national struggle'^ '^'. Further, 
in the same meet, the two leaders issued a Joint Indo-PLO communique on 23'"'^  
May 1982. The communique expressed concern over the Israeli acts of violence 
and aggression against Palestinian people in the occupied territories and their 
continuous aggressive acts and threat of invasion of south Lebanon, aided by the 
regular flow of highly sophisticated imported weapons^^ .^ 
In June 1982, Israeli invaded Lebanon. Mrs Gandhi described it as "Israeli 
attempts to wipe out the Palestine movement"^^ .^ P.V Narasimha Rao, the 
Foreign Minister of India, referred to the invasion as the 'enactment of a savage 
drama involving the butchery of our Palestinian brothers and sisters'^ '*". In view of 
this sharp and harsh Indian response on Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli 
Consul, Mr Yosef Hasseen, made a public statement in 1982 that New Delhi's 
anti-Israeli position was 'unrepresentative of Indian popular opinion'^''^ 
^^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record, No. 5, May 1982, pp. 152-54. 
^^'' Ibid, pp. 154-56. 
^^^tocf, pp. 156-58. 
^^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record No. 7, July 1982, pp. 183-84. 
'^'° Foreign Affairs Record, No. 6, June 1982, pp. 163-4. 
^^^ In an interview, Mr Hasseen said "There was a strong Muslim Arab lobby in New Delhi and the 
Arab ambassador was making use of Indian Muslims to bring pressures to bear on the 
Government". He also opined that Israel was getting a bad Press in India because the Press was 
following the official line and that India was competing with Pakistan to impress the Arabs. For 
more see Times of India, April 3, 1982. 
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Subsequently, in September 1982, India declared the Israeli Consul persona 
non-grata and ordered him to leave the country. 
The Indian stand on Israeli invasion of Lebanon was gratefully 
acknowledged by Faisal Ahudav, the PLO Ambassador to India. Later in 
September 1982, Mrs. Gandhi further sent a message to Arafat in which she 
praised the PLO's spirited resistance to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon^ "*^ . Here 
one could see India's deliberate diplomacy and political strategy in West Asia in 
favour of the Palestinian cause and thus to nurture and strengthen the PLO as 
the sole crusader of the rights and interests of the Palestinians. 
In March 1983, the seventh NAM summit was held in New Delhi and 
the Movement's Chairmanship had passed to India. At the end of the 
summit, the NAM issued 'the New Delhi message'^ '*^ which besides 
expressing the customary support for the Palestine cause sent a message 
of solidarity to the Palestine people and condemned Israeli attempt 'to 
quell legitimate opposition by the Palestinians in the occupied territories'^ '*^. 
The summit also resolved to set up a NAM Committee on Palestine in 
order to monitor closely the developments in relation to the Palestine issue 
and initiate 'some action' in the face of rapidly deteriorating situating in the 
Middle East. The first meeting of the Committee was held at New Delhi in 
"^^  Foreign Affairs Record, No. 9, September 1982, p. 277. 
143 
144 
Foreign Affairs Record, No 3, March 1983, pp. 54-56. 
Ibid, p. 60. 
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October 1983 and it urged that a process of negotiation should be 
launched without delay. In another meeting in New Delhi in April 1985, the 
committee recommended the convening of an international conference 
under the aegis of the UN in order to obtain a 'comprehensive, just and 
durable peace in West Asia'""* .^ 
In April 1984, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Arafat's 
headquarters in Tunis after a state visit to Libya. When Mrs Gandhi was 
assassinated a few months later by her bodyguards in New Delhi, a 
shocked Arafat wept in public. 
By this time, there emerged factional crisis within the Palestinian 
movement. India realized that this new development would work against the very 
base of the Palestinian cause. Hence India stood for the unity of all factions and 
even deputed S.L Yadav, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha to attend the 
crucial 17'*^  session of the Palestinian National Council in Amman in November 
1984 which was to decide the fate of Arafat's leadership in the PLO. 
Notwithstanding this, India's sympathy was with Arafat. 
In June 1985, few months after assuming power, Rajiv Gandhi paid a 
state visit to Egypt and reaffirmed India's longstanding support for Arabs and the 
Palestinians. When Israeli air raided against the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 
1985, India strongly condemned it as "aggressive and expansionist" and 
"^^  Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report, 1985-86, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 20. 
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portrayed the act as a "threat to peace and security." It also sent messages of 
solidarity and support to both Arafat and the Prime Minister of Tunisia '^*®. 
However, India was not prepared to go along with the Arab states in expelling 
Israel from the United Nations. 
The outbreak of the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in December 1987 in 
Gaza and West Bank due to the 'iron fist' policies of Israel is counted as a major 
event in the history of Israel Palestine confllct^ '* .^ Given its historical disposition, 
India's sympathy and support for the Palestinians was inevitable. Another 
outcome of the intifada was the Algiers Declaration of November 15, 1988, in 
which the PLO declared its belated acceptance of the 1947 partition plan and 
proclaimed the "state of Palestine." India became one of the first countries to 
recognize the state of Palestine and received PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat as a 
head of state '^* .^ The intifada also influenced India's refusal to play the Davis Cup 
delegation playoff tennis match in Israel in April 1988. The PLO leader was very 
much conscious of India and her role. He expressed 'deep gratitude' and 
'appreciation' for the solid support of India for the cause of Palestinian self-
determination and independent statehood. Arafat, who became a frequent visitor 
to India and was received as a head of state after India's recognition of the newly 
proclaimed State of Palestine in November 1988, was presented the 'Jawaharlal 
'''Ibid 
'^'^  For a detail account of the 1987 intifada see Jawaid Iqbal, "Ttie Palestinian Uprising: Causes 
and Catalyst", Journal of West Asian Studies, 2004, pp. 20-34. 
"^ Bansidhar Pradhan, "India's Policy Towards the PLO", in Riyaz Punjabi and A.K Pasha eds. 
India and the Islamic World, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1998, p. 67. 
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Nehru Award for International Understanding' by tlie Indian Government in March 
1990. This award to Chairman Arafat was "a well deserved tribute to his wise and 
inspiring leadership of the Palestine people and was "symbolic of India's 
unequivocal and strong reassertion and reiteration of its unfailing and consistent 
support and abiding commitment to the Palestinian cause" '^* .^ 
Mudiam rightly emphasises three elements in India's approach to the 
Palestinian question in order to demonstrate that there have been fundamental 
differences between the Indian approach and that of the more extremist elements 
among the Arabs and the Palestinians to the issue from the very beginning, 
though these difference have been somewhat obscured by India's loud and 
consistent support for the Palestinian cause over the years. 
First, it is often overlooked that India never associated itself in any way 
with the extreme Arab demand for the liquidation of the state of Israel. Once India 
recognised the existence of Israel as an established fact, it implicitly accepted the 
position that any solution put fon/vard for solving the Palestinian refugee problem 
should address and take care of the legitimate security interests of the Jewish 
state. In other words, the Indian and Arab policies on Israel have differed 
radically as far as the fundamental issue of the existence versus the annihilation 
of Israel is concerned. 
Second, India was genuinely concerned about the plight of the displaced 
Palestinians, though at this stage India merely considered them as refugees and 
"^^  Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XXXVI, No 1, January, 1990 at: http;//mealib.nic.in/far/1990.pdf, p. 
42. 
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even thought it possible that some of them, at least, could be absorbed by 
various Arab countries. Hence India extended consistent support to all efforts 
aimed at providing immediate relief as well as long term rehabilitation of the 
Palestinian refugees. 
Third, India never endorsed the Arab position of refusing to negotiate with 
Israel. India, over the years, struck to the position that only direct negotiation 
between the Arabs and Israel would provide a way out of the Arab-Israel 
stalemate. Nehru himself time and again, "probed in his talks with the Arab 
leaders, especially Nasser, into whether there was an opening for reconciliation 
with Israel, but he had always come up against a wall of steel".^^° 
India's Palestine Policy: An Alternate View 
Though India has always extended full support to the Arabs on the 
Palestine issue, the Government of India's policy on the Arab Israel dispute 
remained a subject of deep dispute by the opposition political parties— the right 
wing Jan Sangh and the Swatantra Party and the middle of the road Praja-
Socialist Party (PSP) and the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP)-, the national 
media and the informed Indian citizens. The Congress party itself was divided on 
the issue and even senior cabinet ministers had been known to entertain serious 
resei'vations regarding the unqualified support extended by the Prime Minister 
and the External Minister to various moves made by the West Asian nations on 
different occasions. 
^^ ° Mudiam, op cit., No. 96, pp. 177-78. 
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During the mid and late fifties, opposition parties in India from the Left 
(Comimunists and Socialist parties of all hues) to the Right (Jan Sangh and 
Swantantra Party) had supported the Arab cause and had demanded the ending 
of West backed military grouping in West Asia. However the stand of the Arab 
states during India's armed engagement with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 
& 1971 had convinced these parties that India, in spite of its full support to the 
Arabs, had not been able and was not likely to ensure Arab neutrality in her 
disputes with its neighbours. So they raised strong objections to what they called 
as the "one-sided and self-destructive position" taken by the Government of India 
on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Moreover, the opposition was against any national 
commitment to Indian initiatives which were not backed by a national 
consensus^^\ However, since the Congress party led by Nehru, Shastri, and 
Mrs. Gandhi had always had a large majority in the Lok Sabha and remained in 
power for a long period of time, the opposition criticisms had usually not changed 
Government's policy. But by pressing questions, criticizing government positions 
and offering alternatives, the opposition had made the Lok Sabha a debating 
forum and had let the Congress know that there were other viewpoints in the 
country. 
Quite apart from the opposition reaction, the national press too did not 
endorse the style and content of the Government's West Asia policy. The Indian 
media which had been traditionally very supportive of the Arab cause had 
151 
For an excellent discussion on opposition parties viewpoint see R.K Srivastava, "India and the 
West Asian Crisis", Foreign Affairs Report, April, 1968. 
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criticised tiie official Indian position in the 1967 war. The news papers like Times 
of India, Indian Express, Statesman and Hindustan Times made some critical 
remarks on Indian policy vis-a-vis support for the Arabs^^^. Their embittered 
mood had been shaped against a double back-drop of pan-Islamic sentiments 
and consequent pro-Pakistani feelings of some of the West Asian nations and 
the belief of a large section of Indians in the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign 
state. 
As far as the public perception was concerned, a survey conducted in mid-
July 1967 by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion on the "West Asian Crisis" had 
revealed that two out of three respondents in the cities of Bombay, Calcutta, 
Delhi and Madras opposed India's extension of unqualified support to the "Arab 
cause" and maintained that India needed to take a "more objective and impartial 
stand" on the Arab Israel issue^^ .^ Similarly, some of occasional letters to the 
editor published in three important Indian newspapers-Hindustan Times, 
Statesman and Times of India—as of late July 1967, favoured the Israeli 
position ^ '^*. 
There are several reasons why the opposition parties, national media and 
informed Indian citizens criticised the Government of India's policy towards the 
Arabs. The first reason was that when the chips were down between India and 
^" To' know more on this aspect see Indian Opinion on the West Asian Crisis, Indo-lsraell 
Friendship League, Bombay, 1967. 
^^ ^ IVIonthly Public Opinion Sun/eys, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Opinion, July 1967, pp. 
3-19. 
^^"Richard J Kozichi, "Indian Policy towards the Middle East", Oitis, Fall, 1967, p.107. 
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Pakistan, all Arab countries supported the latter irrespective of the merits of the 
dispute because of religious considerations. That Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
supported Pakistan openly and that several other Arab countries did so only a 
little more discreetly at the time of the indo-Pakistan war in 1965 and 1971 had 
confirmed to this conviction. The Jan Sangh, for instance, argued that there was 
no reason why India should unnecessarily continue to alienate Israel for the sake 
of the undependable Arabs. It wanted New Delhi to establish full diplomatic 
relations with Tel Aviv so that the closest collaborations could develop between 
two non-Muslim countries in this pre-dominantly Muslim region^^ .^ 
Another reason for opposition was that India's 'one sided' policy on Arab 
Israel conflict was inconsistent with its avowed foreign policy of non-alignment. If 
non-alignment is defined as independence in foreign policy and judging every 
international event on its merits, then many argued that India's continuous and 
automatic support to the Arabs had made "screaming nonsense of its non-
alignment" policy^^ .^ Though Egypt and Syria had launched a coordinated attack 
on Israel in 1967, the Indian Government conveniently ignored certain 
155 
For more on this see Balraj Madhok, "India's Foreign Policy: The Jan Sangh View", India 
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, January-March 1967, p. 11. 
^^ ^ C Rajagopalachari, for instance, argued that "the non-alignment of India had become indeed a 
joke". He cited the Government of India's blind support to Nasser against Israel in regard to the 
Aqaba Gu\USwatantra, Newsletter, No. 61, July 1967, pp. 4-5. The Jana Sangh leader Balraj 
Madhok similarly said that government must pursue a policy of non-alignment in the Arab Israeli 
dispute as the Arabs pursued the policy of non-alignment vis-^-vis India's conflict with Pakistan 
and China- Madhok's statement in Parliament, Indian Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.6, No. 4, June 15, 
1967, cols. 12150-12162.The Swatantra Party called India's standing alignment against Israel as 
unfortunate and declared that India's role in the world as a crusader for peace and non-alignment 
has come to an end- Swantra Newsletter, No 61, July 1967, pp. 4-5. Swarajya, the party 
mouthpiece maintained that India's support for the Arabs stood against the principle of peaceful 
coexistence as these states were out to destroy Israe--. Swarajya, Vol 11, No 50,10 June 1967, 
p,2. 
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unpleasant facts^ '^' in relation to the conflict and blamed Israel for encouraging 
the Arab countries to attack it. The fact that Arabs had initiated the conflict was 
by-passed and no reference was made to the Arab refusal to negotiate. 
Moreover, India's stand at the UN seemed to suggest that the Arab had no option 
but to use of force to regain the lost territory. According to Mohammad Ayoob 
"instead of advising caution to Egypt, the Indian leadership seemed to have told 
Nasser only what he wanted to hear. Similarly, instead of advising its Arab 
friends on the realities of the situation after the 1967 war, India, nevertheless, 
steadfastly upheld the position of upholding the Arab stand of non-recognition of 
Israel" ^ ^^  
The third criticism hinged on the concept of reciprocity in international 
relations. This had wide appeal in the country in view of its unhappy experience 
with Mao's China, Sukarno's Indonesia and Nkrumah's Ghana. The contention in 
connection with West Asia was that since most Arab countries took up a 
neutralist stance at the time of the Chinese aggression in 1962 and tended to 
side with Rawalpindi at the time of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 & 1971, New 
Delhi was under no moral obligation to support them in their dispute with 
^" According to the Statesman, India did not discourage Nasser's demand for withdrawing the 
UNEF, did not disapprove Nasser's hostile act in closing the Gulf of Aqaba, impended an early 
cease-fire by insisting on the condition of returning to the lines held on June 4 and pressing for a 
resolution at the UN which took no account of Israel's need for security against a ring of encircling 
neighbours who declared that the war was not over and nothing had changed their purpose. See 
Statesman Editorial, June 12 & 13,1967. 
^^ ^ Mohammad Ayoob's comments on S.A.H Haqqi's article ("Israel and the West Asian Crisis", 
Mainstream, 29 July, 1967), Mainstream, 26 August, 1967. 
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IsraeP^^ President Nasser undoubtedly played a helpful role at the Colombo 
Power's conference^^°, but his role during the Indo-Chinese war in 1962 had 
saddened many in lndia^^\ Similarly his Prime Minister All Sabry took up a 
blatantly pro-China line and Heykal, a close confidante and editor of Al-Ahram, 
indulged in cheap criticism of India^^ .^ The response of other Arab states to the 
Sino-lndian conflict was also disappointing. In a resolution on Kashmir at the UN 
in 1962, several Arab countries endorsed Pakistan's position. During the 1965 
Indo-Pakistani war, Jordan served as Rawalpindi's mouthpiece In the Security 
Council and Saudi Arabia reportedly provided funds for the purchase of arms^^ .^ 
At the Casablanca Conference of the Heads of Arab States in September 1965, 
several Arab states endorsed the Pakistani position. They also voted against 
India in the UN Security Council election in 1966 as Syria was a candidate. The 
huge disappointment encountered by India at the Rabat Conference of 1969 left 
'^ ^ Girilal Jain, "India's West Asia Policy", Times of India, November 22,1967. 
™^ At the Colombo Conference which was held on 10 December 1962, Nasser was instrumental 
in preventing the conference from adopting an anti-Indian and pro-Chinese stance. For more see 
Peter Lyon, Roots of Modem Conflict: Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An 
Encyclopaedia, ABC CLIO INC, California, 2008, p. 46. 
^^^ Indians expected Nasser to come out more openly and empathetically on India's side just as 
India had supported Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Instead of just offering to mediate, 
Nasser should have condemned China for its aggression against India. 
^^ ^ Girilal Jain, "Disillusionment with the Arabs; A Shift in Indian Opinion", Round Table, July 
1967, pp. 433-8. 
'''Ibid. 
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a bitter taste and the opposition parties tool< it up to flog tine government for its 
pro-Arab stance vis-a-vis Israel '^^. 
There were many voices in the Arab world carelessly pouring scorn at 
Indian leaders and suggesting that India was already, or was on the way to 
becoming an American colony. Pictures of India disintegrating into chaos under 
the weight of obscurantism and incompetence were gleefully drawn by some 
Arab commentators^^^. Similarly, during the Indo-Pak war in November 1971 that 
eventually led to Pakistan's dismemberment and the rise of an independent 
Bangladesh nation, countries like Egypt and Syria took a neutral stand while 
nations like Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia condemned India^^ .^ 
In contrast to this Arab record, Israel never hesitated to come to India's 
defence, publicly and vigorously, in most of India's major conflicts with its 
neighbours. For instance, during national crises such as the Sino-lndian conflict 
in 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani wars in 1965 and 1971, India sought and obtained 
'®'' The Rabat Conference of Islamic leaders was convened on September 23 and 24, 1969, to 
condemn Israel for the burning and destruction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. When the 
Indian delegation led by Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed reached Rabat to attend the conference, the 
information Minister of Rabat conveyed that Pakistan and a few other countries had objected to 
the Government of India's participation in the conference and pleaded that they—either 
voluntarily withdraw from the conference or accept the status of observer or remain physically 
absent from the conference without withdrawing from it. They were even refused entry to the 
conference hall. The conference met without any representation of India and adopted a final 
declaration which made a reference in its preamble to the representatives of the Muslim 
conimunity in India being present at the conference which w/as contrary to the facts. Expressing 
his displeasure Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed said: "The Government and people of India deplore the 
discourtesy shown by the Conference in not honouring its own invitation which had been 
extended unanimously to the Government of India". For More see A. Appadorai, Select 
Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947- 72, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, 
New Delhi, 1985), p.371-72. 
^^ ^ Jain, op cit No. 162. 
®^^  Arthur G. Rubinoff, "Normalisation of India-Israel Relations: Stillborn for Forty Years", Asian 
Survey, Vol.35, No.5, May 1995, p.498. 
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a limited quantity of mortars and ammunition from Israel^ '^'. Similarly, Israel took 
a pro-India stand by criticizing Pakistan during its war with India in 1965 & 1971 
and backed India's stand that the 1972 Shimla agreement between India and 
Pakistan could be the only basis for a final settlement of the Kashmir issue. In 
view of this, a section among Indians thought that an Indian policy of all-out 
support to Arabs against Israel was not only needless but also unjustified. 
The fourth reason for criticism was that if India clearly identified with one 
side in a conflict, it could hardly have any leverage in helping to bring about a 
settlement in the Arab Israel conflict. In a joint letter to the Prime Minister, the 
Jana Sangh, PSP, SSP, Swatantra Party and DMK appealed to adopt an 
"objective attitude" towards the 1967 conflict and "abstain from taking sides or 
apportioning blame at this stage"^^ .^ Such an attitude, they stated, would not be 
conducive to India's playing an honourable part in resolving peace in West Asia. 
Similarly the Jana Sangh in a resolution at its All India Working Committee 
meeting at Rajkot said that "by taking sides in a most blatant manner, India has 
ruled itself out of any mediatory role in an area crucial to our vital national 
interest. By going more Arabian than Arabs, New Delhi has neither served 
national interests nor promoted the cause of peace". New Delhi's West Asia 
^^ ^ P.R Kumarswami, "Israel India Relations: Seel!;ing Balance and Realism" in Efraim Karsh ed. 
Israel: The First Hundred Years, Vol. IV, Frank Cass, London, 2004, p. 263.Also see Ramananda 
Sengupta," India Walks a Tightrope in its Relations with Israel, Arab Nations", Al-Jazeera Centre 
for Studies, July 2010, 
^^ ^ As quoted by M.R Masani in his statement in Parliament, Indian Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.6, 
No. 40, July 15, 1967, cols. 12132-38. 
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I / ,. po' 
policy, it alleged, was conditioned by the ruling party's obsession with the 
communal vote^^ .^ 
The fifth reason for opposing India's West Asia policy arose from the 
misplaced 'fear of the Government that if India displeased the Arabs, the latter 
would take the side of Pakistan and will eventually support Pakistan's demand for 
Kashmir '^'". Finally, it was argued that the Arabs and the Palestinians had made 
a historic 'mistake' in rejecting the 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181, 
which paved the way for the partition of the British-ruled mandate Palestine. This 
was admitted none other than Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian 
Authority in a recent interview to an Israeli TV channel^^\ That rejection was 
meant a Jewish state was created while the Palestinians were left without a 
state. Palestinian and Arab leaders had then called for resisting Resolution 181; 
with Arab neighbours invading Israel at the declaration of the latter's 
independence in May 1948, threatening to occupy the entire Mandate territory. At 
the end of that war, the Arab armies stood defeated and Israel had increased its 
land area by half as much as its original allotment. Thereafter, the Arabs had 
^^ ^ As quoted in Gopal and Sharma, op.cit., No. 75, pp. 200-01. 
™ See Janata, Vol 12, No 21,11 June 1967, p. 1 and Vol. 12, No 33,25 June 1967, p. 14. Also 
Organiser, Vol. 19, No. 33, 3 April 1966, p. 3. 
"^ "State of Recall: Why Mahmoud Abbas's Regret on Palestinian's 1947 Stand is Historic", 
Indian Express editorial, November 1, 2011. 
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aggravated the situation in tine IVIiddle East by following a policy of "no 
recognition, no negotiation and no peace with Israel" '^'^  
Although it is difficult to dismiss all the points mentioned above, now the 
question is had India not followed a pro-Arab policy as it did over the years what 
would have been the consequences? According to Girilal Jain, the consequences 
of a change of policy would have been highly adverse for India. It would have 
earned the hostility of all Arab countries irrespective of their internal differences 
including India's trade relationship and oil imports from the region, confirmed the 
unhappy and erroneous impression in the Soviet bloc that India had for all 
practical purposes abandoned the policy of non-alignment, facilitated the task of 
Pakistani and Chinese diplomacy in isolating India in the Third World, created an 
anti-Soviet alliance of the Muslim countries of West Asia by the West with 
Pakistan cast in a leading role which would have acquired strong religious and 
therefore anti-India overtones and alienated the Muslim intelligentsia at home^^ .^ 
Even if it is conceded in numerous instances that the Arabs had been 
unfriendly, policy makers in New Delhi cannot afford to withdraw into their shell 
and sulk. India is inextricably tied to the Muslim world and cannot be 
disinterested in its fortunes. It would be highly unrealistic for India to expect the 
Arabs to choose between New Delhi and Beijing and New Delhi and Islamabad. 
The Arabs have ties of religion and culture with Pakistan which they cannot be 
™ K.R Singh, The Arab League and Israel, Melkolte Ram ed. Regional Organisations: A Ttiird 
Woild Perspective, Sterling, New Delhi, 1990, p.1.59. 
^" Girilal Jain, Times of India, op cit, No. 159. 
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expected to ignore. The pro-West Arab governments also tend to be pro-
Pakistan. It is instructive to note that all Arab countries sided with India on 
various issues relating to the abortive second Afro-Asian summit at Algiers in the 
summer of 1965^^ ^ 
However, the situation in West Asian witnessed a sea change 
when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. It was during this period the 
Soviet Union was disappearing from the world map marking the era of 
unipolar world dominated by the United States, the remaining Super 
Power. In the meantime, the P.L.O. lost its political leverage on account of 
its support to Saddam Hussain. The United States took the initiative of 
holding international Middle East Peace Conference immediately after 
expelling Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. This marked new era in West Asia 
due to different varieties of diplomatic manoeuvring. As a consequence to 
these developments, India also made drastic changes in its policy towards 
West Asia. It established full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 
1992, after 40 years it recognized that country. 
From the above analysis, it is evident that India's posture towards 
Palestine had gone through several phases. First, India considered the 
Palestine problem as a continuation of the colonial question and sought its 
elimination by way of ending British mandate and the creation of an 
''' Ibid. 
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independent state of Palestine, as a major and fundamental issue. At the 
same time, India considered the Jewish question as a minority problem 
and as such sought its settlement by providing minority rights and 
safeguards to the Jews. Hence in the first phase, India's opposition was 
against the imperialist forces and their evil designs. This is mainly because 
India had identified the British motive of exploiting the Arab-Israel 
differences to perpetuate its hegemony over Palestine. Here, India's 
opposition was backed by her sentimental problems and historical 
background, which also turned against Israel. 
The second stage began with the large scale migration of Jews from 
central and Eastern Europe to Palestine between 1935 and 1947. In this 
phase, though India was sympathetic to the plight of the Jews, she had 
opposed to the Jewish claim of a separate state in Palestine. Hence, in the 
moral and ideological ground, India stood for the Palestinians, which in 
effect, was politically against the Zionists interests. 
The third phase started with the formation of the state of Israel in 
1948 and India's recognition of it in 1950. From the very time of 
recognition, India's approach to the Palestine cause was conditioned to the 
reality of the existence of Israel. No doubt, India endorsed Israel's right to 
exist as a free and independent state. However, right from the Suez crisis 
of 1956, the expansionist and aggressive tendencies of Israel prevented 
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India from coming closer to the Jewish state which indirectly cemented the 
political and diplomatic understanding with the Arab world. Even then, during this 
phase, India's Israel policy was something different from that of the Arab states, 
which never recognized Israel as a state and resorted to extreme options to 
liquidate the Jewish state. India was against this and stood for a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute between the Jews and the Palestinians. However, the 
absence of an Arab consensus towards the role and status of the PLO led India 
to support Arab countries on Palestine rather than to directly deal with the PLO. 
In the fourth phase, especially after the 1973 Arab Israel war, India 
gradually moved away from the policy of supporting individual Arab countries on 
Palestine to back the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by its 
Chairman Yasser Arafat in its struggles for an independent homeland. This was 
mainly because the PLO was recognised as the 'sole representative of the 
Palestine people' by the 1974 Rabat pan-Arab summit. Such an Indian posture 
has been proved right in the context of the Oslo Peace Treaty (1993) and the 
ongoing peace initiatives between Israel and Palestinians. 
In the fifth phase, the India had accorded diplomatic recognition to Israel in 
1992. This policy shift of the Indian government was heralded by major changes 
in international political scenario and its due reflection in her policy priorities and 
interests. This development has created new doubts on India's commitment to 
the Palestine cause which is analysed in the third chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
India's Diplomatic Relationship with Israel: Impact on 
Palestine 
India formally announced its decision to establish full diplomatic 
relations with Israel on January 29, 1992 under the Prime Ministership of 
P.V. Narasimha Rao. The move in this direction was undertaken in mid-
1980 when Rajiv Gandhi, known for his non-ideological approach to 
foreign policy, assumed office In October 1984 following the assassination 
of his mother Indira Gandhi. In September 1985, for instance, Rajiv Gandhi 
met his Israeli counterpart Shimon Pares during the annual UN General 
Assembly session '^'^ . A few months later Israel was allowed to post a 
regular vice consul in Bombay to replace Yossef Hasseen who had been 
expelled in June 1982 for his controversial interview to the Indian media. In 
1988, after a gap of six years, the Israeli representation was elevated to 
the pre-1982 position of consul. 
Rajiv Gandhi and tlie Normalisation of Relationsiiip with Israel 
During Rajiv's tenure both countries also played the quarter-final of the 
Davis Cup Tennis Tournament in July 1987. The match generated a lively 
public debate in India on the question of normalisation of relationship with 
"^ PR Kumarswami, "Israel- India Relations", op cit, No. 167, p. 264. 
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Israel^ ''®. The nascent normalisation gained momentum in June 1988 when 
during his visit to the US, Rajiv Gandhi met a group of Jewish leaders to 
discuss the issue. Towards the end of that year, India formally extended 
the jurisdiction of the Israel consul to the south Indian state of Kerala which 
has a significant number of Jewish populations '^^ ''. During the special 
session convened in Geneva, the Indian Minister of State for External 
Affairs, K.K Tiwari, headed the Indian delegation. Despite the event of the 
Palestinian uprising and the denial of a visa by the US to the PLO 
Chairman, Yasser Arafat to address the General Assembly in New York, 
Tiwari refrained from denouncing Israel. Earlier, condemning Israel and 
holding it responsible for escalating tension in West Asia had been the 
conventional part of Indian speech in the UN. Not only that, India also 
recognised Israel's right to exist "in peace and security within 
internationally recognised boundaries''^ ^®. In January 1989, India hosted 
an-Anti Defamation League delegation as well as US Congressman 
Stephen Solarz. The question of normalisation figured prominently during 
™ C. Subramaniam, a former Cabinet Minister under Indira Gandhi, joined for instance witli 
Israel's traditional supporters. He sought to break the popular tendency of linking Israel with 
apartheid South Africa and publicly asked: "[Do] we need to be more Arab than Egypt?" The issue 
dominated the front pages of Indian newspapers for well over four months. Rajiv Gandhi 
eventually gave the games the green light. For more see P.R Kumarswami, India's Israel Policy, 
Columbia University Press, 2010 available at http://cup.coiumbia.edu/book/978-0-231-15204-
4/indias-israel-policy/excerpt 
^^ ^ Kumarswami, "Israel- India Relations", op cit. No. 167. 
^''^ National Herald, December 18,1988. 
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their discussions with Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao and other senior 
government offlcials '^'^ . 
However, a number of impediments prevented Rajiv Gandhi from 
normalising relationship with Israel. The outbreak of the intifada in 
December 1987 significantly eroded Israel's international standing and 
India was not immune to that process^®". Moreover, Israel's involvement in 
the Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, especially its military-intelligence 
cooperation, was viewed with suspicion and anger in India. It was feared 
that Israel's involvement in the conflict would strengthen Colombo's 
determination to impose a military solution on the ethnic conflict and 
thereby undermine India's interests in the region^^\ Furthermore, other 
factors such as rapid erosion in his domestic popularity especially due to 
the allegations of bribery in arms deals followed by the electoral reversals 
of the Congress party in 1989 Lok Sabha elections, the era of political 
uncertainty resulting in two minority governments in quick succession 
which were preoccupied with their survival rather than offering any 
substantive foreign policy initiatives and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
himself by the LITE guerrillas in 1991 prevented normalisation of 
relationship with Israel. 
"® They included Alfred Gonsalves, Secretary and P.K Singh, Joint Secretary, MEA. For more 
see Hindu, January 6,1989, 
^^ ° Kumarswami "Israel- India Relations", op cit,. No. 167. 
^^^ For a detail account see P.R Kumarswami, "The Israeli Connections of Sri Lanka", Strategic 
Analyses, Vol. 11, No. 11, February 1987, pp. 141-55. 
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P.V Narasimha Rao became India's new Prime Minister on June 21, 
1991. Witiiin days after Rao's assumption of office, a group of Israeli 
tourists were kidnapped and attacked by the terrorists (The Jammu-
Kashmir Liberation Front) in Jammu and Kashmir^ ® .^ Following this, the 
government declared that normal consular restrictions would not impede 
the handling of a humanitarian problem. Prime Minister Rao agreed to the 
visit of a senior Israeli diplomat, Moshe Yegar, to coordinate the release of 
the Israeli nationals with Consul Giora Becher. After days of hectic behind-
the-scenes negotiations, the militants released the Israeli tourists^® .^ On 16 
December 1991, India voted with the majority of UN members in repealing 
the 1975 General Assembly Resolutions equating Zionism with racism^^. 
As one of the original supporter of the resolution, this marked a significant 
departure from the past and the voting was considered as a sign of 
pragmatism in India's foreign policy. 
Domestic Discourse and the Normalisation of Relationship 
During this time, the Indian media, both electronic and print, started 
what could be termed as a concerted campaign for normalization of 
^^ ^ Bernard Weinraub "Kashmir Rebels Kill Israeli Tourist, Marking New Phase in Conflict", New 
York Times, June 28, 1991 at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/28/world/kashmir-rebels-kill-
israeli-tourist-marking-new-phase-in-conflict.html 
^^ ^ Kumarswami, "Israel- India Relations: Seeking Balance and Realism" op cit. 
^^ ^ Bansidhar Pradhan, "Establishing Ties with Israel: Prudence or Pressure?", Link, Vol.34, No. 
23, January 19,1992, p. 29. 
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relationship with Israel^ ^ .^ Spearheaded by the well-known strategic 
expert-turned-academic C. Raja Mohan, the pragmatists saw 
normalization within the context of the emerging post-Cold War global 
order^ ^^ . They argued that the earlier justifications for an anti-Israeli policy 
had crumbled and urged India to recognize and capitalize the new Middle 
Eastern reality opened up by the 1991 Gulf War that dispelled any doubts 
as to where the loyalties of the oil-rich Arab monarchies laid, in spite of 
their many grievances against the United States and the Madrid Peace 
Conference. The country's opposition parties also maintained a pro-Israeli 
stand and kept a constant pressure on the government to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel. From the BJP side. Framed Mahajan 
spearheaded this demand. He was supported by Yashwant Sinha 
(Samajwadi Janata Farty) while Subramanyam Swamy (Janata Party) and 
R.K. Karanja (nominated) wanted a more humane approach towards 
Israel. Pramod Mahajan pointed out that both China and Pakistan had 
occupied large parts of Indian territory yet there were full diplomatic links 
with them^ '^'. Yashwant Sinha similarly maintained that India's foreign 
policy should be based on national interest. By being pro Arab all these 
^^ ^ In November 1991, the Indian Television network Doordarshan (which reaches 87% of the 
Indian population), for instance, dedicated an entire program to the Middle East peace process 
and Indo-lsraei relations. Most of the interviewees on the program (mostly opponents of the ruling 
Congress party) likewise favoured full diplomatic relations. 
^^ ^ For more on this debate see Kumarswami, India's Israel Policy op cit., No. 167. 
^" Statesman, November 26,1991. 
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years, India was not able to get the support of the Arab countries during 
critical tinnes and that most of these countries had been consistently pro-
Pakistani^^^ 
The pragmatists and the pro-Israeli elements put forward three main 
arguments in support of their view^^ .^ First, by establishing diplomatic 
relations with Israel, India would be in a better position to engage itself in 
the West Asian peace process and thereby influence the Israel policy in 
favour of the Palestinians. The continued refusal to establish diplomatic 
relationship with Israel limited India's role as a possible peace-maker 
between the Arabs and the lsraelis^^°. 
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Financial Express, November 28, 1991. 
^^ ^ It is a cardinal principle of the "realist" theory of International Relations that the foreign policy 
of a sovereign nation state ought to be in pursuit of the "national interest" (Hans Morgenthau, "in 
Defence of the National Interest", 1951). Any deviation from this course in response, for instance, 
to the pressures of domestic religious or ethnic minority groups, is fraught with peril and may lead 
to the defeat and even extinction of the state. For excellent arguments in the Indian context, see 
C. Rajamohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy, Delhi: 
Penguin, 2003 and his paper "Rethinking India's Grand Strategy" in N. S. Sisodia and C. Uday 
Bhaskar (eds.), Emerging India, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, 2005. 
^^° Prime Minister Rao, for instance said "India would play a constructive, even-handed role in the 
peace process"; According to Ali Khan, contacts between India and Israel would have an 
influence on Israel's policy towards the Palestinians, making it more accommodating of 
Palestinian aspirations. Moshe Yegar, former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry stated that Israel made it quite clear that countries who refused to have normal 
diplomatic relations with her while having such relations with the Arab countries would be barred 
from the Madrid conference. It seemed that the Ministry of External Affairs of India did not like the 
idea of staying out, especially when the PRC, Russia, the United States, and even Syria would be 
in. Itzhak Gerberg argued that in the absence of.diplomatic relations with Israel it could not be a. 
fully active player in UN activity in general and the Middle East peace process in particular. For 
more on this see Itzhak Gerberg, India-Israel Relations: Strategic Interests, Politics and 
Diplomatic Pragmatism, Israel National Defence College, IDF, February 2010. See also Times of 
India, January 25, 1992, "Israeli Terms on India's Role"; Hindustan Times, January 22,1992; also 
see Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "The Indo-lsrael Nexus", Regional Studies, Vol. X I I , No. 3, Summer 
1994, p. 10. 
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Second it was argued that in concrete terms, there were many 
advantages for India in establishing ties with Israel in specific areas like 
military modernisation, agricultural innovation and global Jewish 
investment. J.N Dixit, for instance argued that Israel's agricultural 
experiences in dry farming, desert irrigation, agro-industries and 
agricultural cooperatives could prove beneficial to india^^^ All Khan 
similarly argued "India could set the ball rolling for transfer of technology 
for agricultural and other purposes""*^ .^ 
India could also benefit in combating terrorism in the states of 
Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir from the Israeli experience and expertise 
in this regard^^ .^ The type of terrorism that both India and Israel faced 
came not only from disaffected groups within their territories but it was also 
aided and abetted by the neighbouring states, mostly under non-
democratic regimes, increasingly capable of transferring weapons of mass 
destruction to the terrorist organizations. States such as Pakistan in South 
Asia, or Iran and Syria in Middle East, had long used terror as an 
'^ ^ J. N Dixit, My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary, UBSPD, New Delhi, 1996. 
^^ ^ Cited in Gerberg, India-Israel Relations op cit. No. 190, p,16. Also see C. Raja Mohan, "A 
Source of High Technology," The Hindu, 22 July 1997. 
®^^  J. N Dixit for instance argued that Israel's knowledge and experience in countering terrorism 
would be of an immediate relevance to India and dealing with secessionist movements in different 
parts of the country. For more see his book My South Block Year op cit. Similarly, on 23 February 
1992, less than one month after the Indian announcement on diplomatic relations with Israel, the 
then Indian Defence Minister, Sharad Pawar, openly stated that normalization paved the way to 
drawing on Israel's successful experience to curb terrorism. 
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instrument of their foreign policies. Moreover, the tactics used by the Israeli 
Defence Forces [IDF] in the guerrilla and urban warfare could be fruitfully 
adopted by the Indian security forces in countering insurgency. These 
tactics have even been found useful by the U.S. forces in Iraq who had to 
learn IDF strategy of urban warfare to tackle growing insurgency there. 
There were, thus, distinct structural similarities in the kind of threat that 
India and Israel faced from terrorism. It is also important to note that when 
the extremist mullahs call upon their followers to take up arms in support of 
an Islamic jihad, their topmost exhortations have always been the 
"liberation" of all of mandatory Palestine, Kashmir, and the annihilation of 
the United States^^^ Third, the emergence of an Islamic bloc in world 
politics made it essential for India to move closer to Israel^ ^ .^ Martin 
Sherman, for instance argued that "An alliance between India and Israel 
openly endorsed by the U.S. would create a potent stabilizing force in the 
^^^ Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, Indo-lsrael Relation Is Blessing for Botti", Times of Assam, 
November 9-10, 2011. 
®^^  For this line of argument see Gerberg, India-Israel Relations op cit, p.62. Also see Richard L. 
Benkin, "An India-Israel-United States Alliance: The Last Great Hope for Humanity." Arvind 
Ghosh Memorial Lecture, Chicago November 1, 2008 at: 
http://www.freechoudhury.com/Arvind%20Ghosh%20Memoriar/o20Lecture.pdf; Richard L. 
Benkin, "India-Israel Relations: The Imperative and the Challenge", Foreign Policy Research 
Centre Journal special issue on India Israel Relations at: http://www.fprc.in/J-5.pdf, No. 5, 2011 ; 
Mike Marqusee, "Fateful Triangle: India, Israel and the US", Palestine News, July 2006; Address 
by Brajesh Mishra, National Security Adviser of India at the American Jewish Committee Annual 
Dinner, Embassy of India, Washington, DC, 8 May 2003 at: 
http://www.indianembassy.or9/inews/2003/summer.pdf; "Unwritten, Abstract US-lndia-lsrael Axis 
to Fight Terror", Indian Express, September 11, 2003 and B. Gautam, "India, Israel Ally against 
islamic Terror", Japan Times, Sept. 18, 2003. 
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region, which together with like-minded regimes such as Turkey, could 
contribute significantly towards facing down the force of radical extremism 
so hostile to American interests in Western and Central Asia"^ ^^ . Finally, it 
was argued that there were a.lot of commonalities that hanged these two 
countries together - both shared a historical background as ancient 
civilizations, administered as colonies by Great Britain, established less 
than a year apart (India in August 1947 and Israel in May 1948), became 
democracies and survived in a sea of hostility, surrounded by implacable 
adversaries and a heavily militarized security environment. In addition, 
both nations fought wars in nearly every decade of their existence and 
suffered too much at the hands of state-sponsored Islamic jihadi 
terrorism^^ .^ Finally, despite what conspiracy theorists might say, neither 
country had a quarrel with Islam—both house Muslim populations that 
enjoy more rights than their co-religionists in many other places^^ .^ 
The traditionalists who strongly opposed any diplomatic move 
towards Israel and favoured status quo on moral and humanitarian 
grounds put forward equally powerful counter-arguments in this regard. 
Challenging the realist contention that by establishing diplomatic relations 
'^ ^ Martin Sherman, "From Conflict to Convergence: India and Israel Forge a Solid Strategic 
Alliance", Jerusalem Post, February 28, 2003. 
^" Gerberg, India-Israel Relations op cit, No. 190, pp. 14-15. 
^^ ^ Sadanand Dhume, "India Fumbles on Palestine", Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2011 at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203914304576628572684660598.html. 
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with Israel, India would be in a better position to involve itself in the West 
Asian peace process, Bansidhar Pradhan argued that these people were 
probably living in a make believe world. He is of the view that to what 
extent India has been playing this role in this regard ever since its full 
diplomatic relations with Israel is there for everyone to see. Even if one 
accepts this argument, there are other ways and means by which India 
could have been involved in the peace process. Moreover, it may not be 
an exaggeration to say that even the US which has been a constant 
source of support—diplomatic, political, military and economic—to the 
continued existence of Israel from the beginning at times found it difficult to 
influence the Israel government beyond a point. This is for a country from 
which Israel receives billions of dollars in foreign aid annually. In view if 
this, it sounded ridiculous to expect that India could influence Israel's policy 
even nominally^^l Sreekantan Nair similarly argued that the justifications 
and reasons advanced by India in not making relationship with Israel, at 
the time of recognition, could be seen and felt in the present context as 
well. Therefore, the linking of India's diplomatic relation with Israel to the 
developments in West Asian peace process sounds futile in essence^°°. 
As for the concrete benefits, the traditionalists noted that had this 
been the case, India could have established diplomatic relations with Israel 
^^ ^ Pradhan, "India's Policy Towards the PLO", No. 148, pp. 74-75. 
™ Nair, Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed op cit, No. 31, p. 119. 
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and benefited from its expertise in combating terrorism when the problem 
was at its peak during the 1980's. The claims about the gains of Indo-
Israeli cooperation against terrorism seemed to be over stated because of 
the following reasons. First, at the conceptual level, there are fundamental 
differences between the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the Palestine 
issue. India is fighting against Pakistan which is not only occupying almost 
one third of Jammu and Kashmir but also using the territory as a 
springboard for terrorist operations to subvert international acclaimed 
democratic process there. Israel on the contrary, is in occupation of 
Palestinian land and the Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza are resisting 
the illegal occupation^°\ Second, the Israeli success in combating 
terrorism is at best dubious. The fact that the Israelis today are more 
insecure than ever before speaks enough about the effectiveness of the 
Israeli approach to terrorism. As Harsh Pant argues, "Israel's tough policy 
toward contentious neighbours and the Palestinians has not brought peace 
and security, but has rather served to entrench hatred in the Arab world". 
This is not to deny that Israel can be of some help to India in terms of 
sullying sophisticated weaponry to fight terrorism. Third, India has handled 
its counter-insurgency operations in a much restrained manner than lsraeP°^ . 
Finally, at the policy level, India's so called common cause with Israel in 
°^^  Pradhan, "Changing Dynamics of India's West Asia Policy", op cit, No. 5, pp. 81-83. 
^°^ Salman Haider's interview with Onkar Singh at RediffNews, September 9, 2003 available at 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/09inter.htm 
92 
fighting terrorism may send a wrong message to other important allies in 
the region with which India has substantial relations in diverse fields. Iran 
is one such country which is concerned with the growing Indo-lsraeli 
strategic cooperation. Similarly Pakistan is sure to exploit the anti-terrorism 
front between India and Israel by giving it a religious colour. As A.K Pasha 
has rightly remarked "India has both the capacity and the experience to 
overcome all threats from Pakistan without outside help and 'to give an 
impression that India would tackle this threat with (Israel's) expertise or 
experience sends the wrong signal to many people both at home and 
abroad"^°^ 
Third, the pragmatists argued that the emergence of an Islamic bloc 
in world politics made it essential for India to move closer to Israel. 
According to Bansidhar Pradhan, the talk of the emergence of an 
'aggressive Islamic bloc' is basically an American projected new horror in 
the post-Cold War politics^"'*. After the unexpected disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the American Military-Industrial complex was looking for a 
rationale to preserve its predominant role in US foreign policy making and 
203 
A.K Pasha, India and OIC: Strategy and Diplomacy, Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi, 
1995, p. 42. Nabil Sha'ath, the Palestinian Foreign Minister, in an interview to The Hindu on the 
eve of Prime Minister Sharon's visit to India similarly argued that "Israel would like to make it look 
as if all Palestinian resistance was terrorism. Identifying with that puts you (India) in a position of 
being anti-Palestinian when there is no need to do so." 
"^^  Pradhan, "India's Policy Towards the PLO" op cit., No. 148, pp.77-81. 
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a talk of a new source of threat serves its interest well. Moreover, the 
American threat perception had been deliberately blown out of proportion 
which is not in tune with the ground realities. The Muslim world has never 
been a monolithic bloc nor is it in the process of becoming one. It is too 
diverse, both in terms of systemic and economic indicators, to reject it as a 
coherent, unified group so as to command decisive leverage in 
international politics. The eight year Iran-Iraq war had shown that the 
Muslim countries like any other modern state are guided more by their 
national interests and domestic political considerations at a given time than 
by religious considerations. Finally, it is absurd to think that the entire 
Islamic bloc will gang up against India on Pakistan's plea simply because 
they are Muslim countries. Pakistan has been trying this ever since 1947 
but only with limited success. India has been able to maintain fairly cordial 
relationship with the Muslim countries over the years^° .^ 
As far the commonalities between India and Israel are concerned, 
the traditionalists argued that India is a pluralist secular democracy while 
Israel prides itself on being an exclusivist and semi-theocratic Jewish 
state °^^ . In other words, while Israel "unabashedly defends the rights of 
'''Ibid. 
'°^ For more see Hindu, "India's Stake in the Palestine Cause" available at 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/04/05/stories/2002040501151000.htm 
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Jews over all others, India (as a state) has never claimed religious 
exclusivism for its Hindu citizens. 
However, with the change of the international scenario caused by 
the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 
called pragmatists got an upper hand in the foreign policy debate as the 
Government began negotiations with Israel over normalisation of ties with 
the Jewish state. Within days of the UN vote, 'preliminary discussions were 
held between a senior Indian diplomat in Washington and the visiting head 
of the Israeli foreign Ministry^"''. On 29 January 1992, India formally 
announced its decision to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel, 
considered by some as one of the most important steps in Indian 
diplomacy^°^ 
Factors That Contributed to Normalisation 
Since it is widely accepted that India's decision to normalise 
relations with Israel was taken against the backdrop of sweeping changes 
at the international, regional and national levels, it would be appropriate to 
briefly focus on those changes and these impacted India's decision. 
The first was the end of the Cold War which dealt a severe blow to 
ideological opposition towards Israel. Even though India's anti-Israeli policy 
°^^  Kumarswami, ""Israel- India Relations", op cit, No. 167, p. 265. 
™^ J. N Dixit considered India's establishnnent of diplomatic relations with South Africa and then 
with Israel as the most significant among developments in its foreign policy, which occurred 
during his tenure as Foreign Secretary. For more see his book My South Block Years op cit, No. 
191. 
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had not evolved in the Cold War, the East West divide provided a strong 
ideological basis for it. Israel's exclusion and isolation from the Third 
World, NAM, G-77 and a host of other such forums were the result of 
perceived Israeli identification with the West as well as due to the 
ideological opposition of the East^ °^ . Now the end of the Cold war 
weakened the Non-Aligned Movement and reduced the ideological hostility 
towards Israel. This exerted a direct influence on the change of the Indian 
attitude to Israel in 1992. 
The demise of Soviet Union in 1991 not only changed the world 
strategic balance and power structure in favour of the US but also created 
a security crisis for India. This is because India and the Soviet Union had 
been close allies for several decades and above all, the Soviet Union was 
meeting nearly 80 percent of India's military needs^^°. Now with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it became imperative for India to find itself 
new partners and most importantly, new military suppliers. Improving 
relations with Israel seemed to be a convinient option, especially in the 
field of defence since the Jewish country had emerged as a growing 
source of advanced military technology and hardware in the world and 
possessed excellent relations with the USA. Moreover, the shared Indian 
^°^ Gopal and Sharma, India and Israel, op cit, No. 75, pp. 264-65. 
^^ ° For more on Soviet Union's arms supply to India see Upendra Choudhury, Security in a Period 
of Strategic Uncertainty: A Study of India's Ballistic Missile Programme, Unpublished Ph D 
Thesis, CPS/SSS, JNU, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 56-60. 
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and Soviet security and geopolitical outlook coincided with the anti-Israel 
policy of both until 1991. Cold War politics and Soviet anti-Israel policy, 
among the chief factors keeping India distant from Israel in the past, 
ceased to be relevant, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Russia's active participation in the Middle East peace process. This 
also led India to reconsider its policy towards Israel. 
With the collapse of socialist system of economy led by the Soviet 
Union in Eastern Europe, globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation 
became the triple slogans of change in the global economic scenario. 
Unlike the Cold War period where 'divisions were created and alliances 
formed along ideological lines", during the post-Cold War era, 'economic 
competition" drove 'international relations" leading to an intensification of 
competition over access to "vital economic assets" like oil and natural 
gas^^\ The Rao government faced critical choices. On the one hand, there 
were the Congress traditions of Nehruvian socialism (mixed economy), 
non-alignment and anti-imperialist thrust in foreign policy. On the other 
hand, there was the "dramatic worldwide trend towards market reforms" 
and the necessity to integrate with the world economy. India had to either 
adapt to the new reality by embarking on the path of economic 
^" Michael T. Klare, "The New Geography of Conflict", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.3, May June 
2001, p. 50. 
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2 liberalisation and moving closer to the US or risk being isolated^^ 
Dithering in a deep economic crisis and acute foreign exchange 
shortage^^ ,^ the Rao government preferred the first option. Thus, the 
compulsions of globalisation and India's subsequent acceptance of the 
path of economic liberalisation made it more dependent on the US as the 
latter exercised a decisive say in international financial agencies like the 
IMF and the WB. The success of the market economy depended heavily 
upon financial investments and technological cooperation from the West, 
especially the USA. So the US factor has played a major role in influencing 
India's foreign policy orientation in the post-Cold War era^^^ Second and 
no less important, the majority of India's political establishment understood 
in the immediate post-Cold War period that it was imperative for India to 
build sound relations with the United States, the sole hegemonic power in 
the changed international system for a number reasons including to 
overcome the propaganda unleashed by Pakistan on Kashmir situation. 
Indian leaders came to assume that normalization with Israel would 
facilitate India's rapprochement with the United States, since they believed 
^^ ^ Bansidhar Pradhan, "Globalisation and the Shift in India's Palestine Policy" in Anwar Ala ed. 
India and West Asia in ttie Era of Globalisation, New Century Publications, New Delhi, 2008, p. 
288. 
^^ ^ During this period, GDP growth was sluggish, inflation had reached double digits, the 
budgetary deficit was surging upward, and the economy was in tatters. Foreign exchange 
reserves had fallen to little more than US$1 billion, a mere two weeks' worth of imports, and the 
foreign debt had climbed to more than US$70 billion. 
^^ '^  Pradhan, "Globalisation and the Shift in India's Palestine Policy" op cit. No. 212, p. 289. 
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that the American Jewish lobby had a very significant influence on the 
foreign policy decisions of Washington^^ .^ As Mohammed Ali Khan argued, 
"Normal relations with Israel could help turn pro-Israeli lobbies in the US to 
show at least a modicum of leaning towards India"^ ^^ . Indian Prime Minister 
Rao, in particular, was convinced that normalization with Israel was 
necessary to improve India's standing vis-a-vis the American Jewish 
community and the U.S. political establishment^ ^ .^ It is to be noted that 
India announced its decision to formally establish relations with Israel on 
the eve of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit to the US. 
The PLO's policy had also changed. Its decision at the Arab League 
meeting in Cairo on August 10, 1990 of siding with Iraq^ ®^ undermined the 
unity of the PLO as an entit/^^ and alienated Arafat from the principal 
^^ ^ The Jewish minority in the United States, which is just 2% of the total population, has enjoyed 
unparalled economic mobility coupled with disproportionate academic and media influence during 
the past two generations. This has enabled it to organize the most powerful lobby in Washington: 
AIPAC (American Israel Political Action Committee). For more on this see John Mearsheimer and 
Stephen Walt, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 
2007, 
^^ ^ Mohammed Ali Khan cited in Gerberg, India Israel Relations, op cit., No. 190, p. 24. 
^" Arielle Kandel, "India Israel Relations in the Post-Cold War Period", The Weekly Blitz, 
February 21, 2010 available at http://www.weeklyblitz.net/535/indo-israeli-relations-in-the-post-
cold-war-period 
^^ ^ Rashid I. Khalidi, "The Palestinians and the Crisis", Cun-ent History, Vol. 90, No. 552, January 
"1991, p. 18 and Mitchell Bard, "The Gulf War" available at: 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Gulf_War.html 
^^ ^ Salah Khalaf, a PLO leader and many others argued that the Palestinians were vulnerable and 
as such should not take side in inter-Arab conflicts because Kuwait was always the supporter of 
the Palestinian cause and was always ready to absorb Palestinian labours. Khalaf was 
assassinated at the start of the Gulf war. The extreme HAMAS and Islamic Jihad too demanded 
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players in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. This led to 
the marginalization of the Palestinian issue in Middle Eastern politics and 
severe erosion of the PLO's economic base since the PLO depended on 
the Arab world's diplomatic, financial, and military support to survive and to 
fight against lsraeP^°. These developments compelled the PLO to 
abandon its strategy of armed struggle against Israel and seek a 
negotiated political settlement with the Jewish state. 
The PLO recognised Israel's existence and made a plea for Initiating 
the peace process. The USA's recognition of PLO on the eve of Madrid 
Conference accentuated the latter's status. The Israeli Parliament Knesset 
responded to this change by adopting a 'new peace initiative' with the 
Palestinians^^\ Within the PLO, there were groups who advocated for 
change of policy in tune with the changing world. The aspiration of this 
group was reflected in the Palestine National Council programme of 
September 1991 to participate in the USA-USSR sponsored peace 
process which was held on October 30,1991 at Madrid^^ .^ The conference 
the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. For more see Muhammad Muslih, "The Shift in 
Palestinian Thinking", Current History, Vol. 91, No. 561, January 1992, pp.23-24. 
220 
Barry Rubin Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the Arab States Mideast Security and Policy 
Studies, No. 36, January 1998 available at: http://www.biu.ac.ii/Besa/books/36pub.html and 
Daniel Lieberfeid, "Secrecy and "Two-Level Games" in the Oslo Accord: What the Primary 
Sources Tell Us", International Negotiation 13 (2008) 133-146 available at: 
http://www.duq.edu/policy-center/jDdf/lieberfeld-inter-neg.pdf 
^^ ^ Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, Boulder; Westview Press, 1990, p. 153. 
^^ ^ Muslih,"The Shift in Palestinian Thinking" op cit. No. 219, p. 27. 
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was attended by delegations from Israeli, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. There 
was also a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation comprising Palestinian 
delegation and Jordan delegation^^l The conference did not yield any 
tangible result. But it was not without significance. The conference 
symbolised the desire of both parties to seek a political solution to the 
protracted Arab Israeli conflict through direct negotiations^ '^*. In certain 
ways, the Palestinian willingness to coexist with Israel vindicated India's 
desire for a peaceful and amicable resolution of the conflict. Moreover, the 
Arabs, who did not recognise Israel, sat with the Israelis for negotiation. 
This was a de facto recognition of Israel as a state by them. 
Furthermore, as a precondition for co-hosting the Madrid 
conference, the USSR restored full diplomatic ties with Israel on 18 
October 1991. Even China discovered the virtues of the Jewish state and 
began moving towards normalization on 24 January, 1992. These 
developments in the Middle East forced India to recognise a new reality: 
that the Israeli-Palestine conflict was not a zero-sum game and it was 
^" G. Harms and T. Ferry, The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction Canada: Pluto 
Press, 2005, p 153. Also see "The Madrid Peace Conference", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 
21,No. 2,Winter1992, p. 117. 
^^^ Thomas R. Mattair, "The Arab Israeli Conflict: The Madrid Conference and Beyond", American 
Arab Affairs, No. 37, Summer 1991. 
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possible to maintain close and cordial relations with both the parties to the 
conflict^ ^^ 
India's decision to normalise relationship with Israel was made 
possible due to another development: India delinking Pakistan from its 
Middle East policy. Since the time of Nehru, India feared that Pakistan 
would make political capital out of ties with Israel. This could be one 
reason preventing New Delhi from establishing full diplomatic ties Tel Aviv 
soon after its recognition in 1952. However, the post-Madrid developments 
in favour of Israel greatly nullified Pakistan's ability to score 'brownie 
points'. Arab endorsement of a political settlement through direct 
negotiations with Israel weakened any arguments against India talking to 
Israel, especially when there were no bilateral disputes between the two 
countries to settle^^ .^ India recognised that excessive focus on Pakistan or 
demanding its interlocutors to choose between the two South Asian 
neighbours was not always effective. Demanding third parties to minimise 
their commitments to Islamabad might even impede these countries from 
taking India seriously. 
Apart from the Pakistan factor, the terrorism factor also played an 
important role in normalising Indo-lsrael relations. The 'Islamisation of 
^^ ^ P.R Kumarswami, "Looking West 2; Beyond the Gulf in David Scott ed. Handbook of India's 
International Relations, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 186. 
'''Ibid. 
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Palestine resistance movement with the rise of Hammas and Hezbollah 
compelled India to reconsider its West Asian policy. Being a country worst 
affected by Pak sponsored cross-border terrorism, India saw Israel and the 
US as viable partners to tackle the Islamic fundamentalist threat 
generating from West Asian, North African and some Central Asian 
states^^ .^ India viewed that experience of Israel in handling the cross-
border terrorist incursions would be greatly helpful to her. 
India's domestic politics also played a role. The Indian National 
Congress lost the 1989 elections and did not form a coalition government 
until after the June 1991 national elections. Like their counterparts in other 
parts of the world, the Indian Left was used to taking 'inspiration' from 
Moscow in their reading and assessment of international developments. 
The willingness of Moscow to normalize relations with Israel just days 
before the inauguration of the Madrid Peace conference in October 1991 
and the sudden disappearance of the USSR left them rudderless. This was 
important because the Indian left had close relationship with the Congress 
party and provided a strong ideological foundation for its pro-Palestinian 
policy^ ^^ . On the contrary, the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) as a powerful force in Indian politics in early 1990s removed some 
hesitations about Israel. To the BJP, with its nationalist Hindu outlook, the 
^" Vincent, "Cultural Determinants of India-Israel Relations", op cit, No. 86, p. 172. 
^^ ^ Gopal and Sharma, India and Israel op cit, No. 75, p. 265. 
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Jewish state was not so much a diplomatic burden as a potential ally 
against Pakistan and radical Islam and it demanded establishment of full 
relations with Israel. There was also a realisation in India that India's 
largely pro-Arab stance in the Middle East had not been adequately 
rewarded by the Arab world. India had received no worthwhile backing 
from the Arab countries in the resolution of problems it faced in its 
neighbourhood, especially Kashmir. There had been no serious attempts 
by the Arab world to put pressure on Pakistan to reign in the cross-border 
insurgency in Kashmir. On the contrary, the Arab world had firmly stood by 
Pakistan using the Organisation of Islamic Conference to build support for 
Islamabad and the jihadi groups in Kashmir^^^ 
Thus, a host of international, regional and domestic factors influenced 
India's decision to establish full diplomatic relationship with Israel in January 
1992. Summing up the whole issue, J.N Dixit, the former Foreign Secretary, who 
was involved in the entire process of India's decision to establish diplomatic 
relationship with Israel wrote in his memoirs that "three important developments 
^^® The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was founded in 1971. Traditionally the OIC 
was critical of India's international politics, in particular regarding Kashmir. In 1991 a conference 
of the Foreign Ministers of the OIC member-states in Karachi set up a fact finding mission and 
proposed that it be sent to Jammu and Kashmir to report on the situation there. India's refusal to 
allow the mission into the country earned it condemnation by the OIC summit conference for 
violation of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir; this encouraged Pakistan to engage in a more 
active Islamic anti-Indian foreign policy. The OIC consistently supported Pakistan against India 
over the Kashmir issue. India's frustration with the Arab countries was described by Dixit at a 
briefing with Arab Ambassadors at New Delhi (after the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Israel). In his memoirs J.N Dixit says that he decided to take the bull by its horns. He told the 
assembled envoys that "India had not received any reciprocity on the Kashmir issue despite our 
long standing support to several Islamic countries". For more see Dixit, My South Block Years op 
cit, No. 191. 
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caused India to establish diplomatic ties with Israel: first - the Gulf War of 1991; 
second - the general attitude of the Arab states toward the problem of Kashmir; 
and, third - the conclusion of a peace agreement between the PLO and 
lsrael"^ °^. However, it is pertinent to mention here that although India established 
diplomatic relationship with Israel, the Iridian embassy is in Tel Aviv and not in 
Jerusalem because it considers the status of the city as disputed. 
International & Domestic Reactions 
However, the response and reaction to this decision was different in 
different quarters. The commencement of diplomatic relationship was 
greeted both by the US and Israel. Stephen Soiarz, the former Democratic 
Congressman, described India as 'the largest democracy' and Israel as 
'the most stable democracy in West Asia' which have much in common^^^ 
In Israel, the news made headlines for the whole day on radio, 
television and in all the major newspapers which wrote lead editorials 
welcoming the move. Commenting on the ties, Israeli Prime Minister, 
Shimon Pares said "For us India is not a country but a culture in which 
many of our children were educated from Tagore to Gandhi. We have 
been waiting for the moment to meet India diplomatically, economically 
and otherwise and we shall cooperate as friends at all possible levels"^^ .^ 
" " J. N. Dixit, My South Block Years, op cit. No. 191, pp. 309-312. 
^^ ^ Times of India, January 31,1992. 
Hindustan Times, September 24, 1992. 
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Benjamin Netanyahu, a Cabinet minister in the Yitzhak Shamir's 
Government said "It will benefit both countries. We have much to offer 
India in the fields of agricultural technologies, irrigation of drought-prone 
areas and health programmes. Similarly, India has a vast and advanced 
pool of scientists and the two countries can cooperate in numerous 
projects of mutual interests"^ ^ .^ Moshe Yegar, former Deputy Director-
General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, wrote "The establishment of 
diplomatic relations with two huge countries - China and India, which 
together are home to about half of the earth's population- within one week, 
is no mean achievement. It is doubtful if any similar development has 
taken place in the annals of Israel's diplomacy, except for the events of the 
first days after the achievement of statehood, when the United States, the 
Soviet Union and other countries announced their recognition of Israel one 
after the other^^. 
The premier English daily Jerusalem Post in an editorial "India Joins 
the World" wrote "The argument that the Islamic world would side with 
Pakistan if India moves closer to Israel does not carry much weight. 
Islamic countries would naturally favour Pakistan under any 
"^ Cited in Shel<har Gupta, "Indo-lsraeli Relations: A Pragmatic Peace", India Today, February 
29, 1992, p. 168. 
^^^ Moshe Yegar, "The Normalization of Relations between India and Israel: 11", November 16, 
2010 available at: 
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/The-normalization-of-relations-between-lndia-
and-lsrael-ll.html 
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circumstances"^^l David Gross, the Editor of the Jerusalem Post, wrote 
'the progress in Indo-lsrael relation was the result of developments in 
Kashmir during the last six months when an Israeli tourist was killed and 
others were kidnapped by Kashmir militants'^ ^ .^ 
In an article appeared in the Jerusalem Post, Yaacov Shimoni, 
Director General for Asian Affairs in the Israeli Foreign Office wrote 'the 
Indian decision to carry out diplomatic business with Israel was 44 years 
late' which he thought was not an important flaw. He however felt that the 
important flaw of the Indian policy on Israel was that it did not stem from a 
'change of heart towards Israel' but from the compulsion of the changed 
world scene. The primary Indian motivation in his view was to 'improve 
relation with the US and join the Middle East peace process instead of 
leaving the initiative to China'^ ^ .^ In addition, many Jewish governmental 
and academic circles attributed to the change in India's attitude to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the advice of the US and quiet persuasion of 
some West European Powers together with the sophisticated diplomacy 
persuaded by the Israeli Foreign Ministry^^ .^ 
235 
Quoted in Gopal and Sharma, India and Israel op cit, No. 75, p. 273. 
^^ ^ Cited in L.K Shamna, "US Influenced India's Move", Times of India, January 31, 1992. 
"^ Quoted in Telegraph, May 29,1992. 
^^ ^ Sharma, "US Influenced India's Move" op cit.. No. 236. 
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The Arab press greeted the news with a mute reaction mentioning 
that it was not 'unexpected and dramatic' since efforts had been building 
up in that direction over the last few months. Almost all newspapers in the 
region carried the news in the front page without making any specific 
comments. But, no Arab country had openly criticised India's move. There 
could be two reasons for this. First, the changed behaviour of the Arab 
states on the eve of Madrid Conference does not provide any scope for 
criticising India. When they themselves were willing to accept Israel's 
existence and conduct negotiations with the Zionist state, how could they 
criticise India. Second, most of them must be suffering from the guilt 
conscience because of their pro-Pakistani stance on Kashmir as was 
evident from the proceedings of the QIC conferences on a number of 
occasions . 
^^ ^ Mustafa El-Feki, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Egyptian Parliament, and a 
former Egyptian ambassador to India, in an article in Al-Ahram Weekly, for instance wrote. "First, 
we have made the error of viewing the Indian-Pakistani conflict from an Islamic perspective. We 
have tried to "Islamise" the ongoing conflict in South Asia, posing as protectors of islam and 
custodians of the international community. And we have overlooked the regional role of India, 
with Arab leaders showing up in New Delhi much less frequently than before. Second was the 
rejection of India's application for membership of the 010, "A country with 120 million Muslim 
citizens applied for membership and what happened? Islamic countries, in typical naivete, 
rejected the Indian application, imagining this would please Pakistan and teach India a lesson," 
he said. Making a strong case for an even-handed Arab approach towards India and Pakistan, 
the fonner ambassador to India recalled that during his time in India, the Palestinian ambassador 
to New Delhi enjoyed the privilege of meeting the Indian prime minister at any time he wished to 
do so. But as the Islamic phenomenon spread and some Arab policies acquired a religious tint, 
India "grew visibly suspicious of the Arab and Islamic worlds. To make things worse, Arab 
diplomacy in India was lackadaisical over the past two decades... We have lost India so far for no 
good reason, I should say... It is time we mend this error. It is time to bring Arab countries closer 
to both India and Pakistan, rather than take one side or keep our distance altogether. I believe the 
Arabs have only themselves to blame for India's change of heart on the Palestinian question". For 
similar critique of the Arab world's policies towards India, see Abdullah Al Madani, "Indo-lsraeli 
Ties; Arabs have None but Themselves to Blame," Gulf News, September 14, 2003 and Sudha 
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However, in India, the reaction was mixed. The External Affairs 
Minister, Madhav Singh Solanki defended India's upgradation of ties with 
Israel and said it formed the culmination" of the recognition extended in 
1950 and in no way constituted a reversal of its foreign policy '^*°. The BJP 
leader A.B Vajpayee welcomed the decision and hoped that India would 
now play a more meaningful role in solving the West Asian crisis and begin 
the process of close cooperation between the two countries '^*^ The party 
president, Murii Manohar Joshi, welcoming the decision, observed that 
there was no reason for withholding the decision given the fact that even 
Egypt had accepted and accorded full diplomatic recognition to Israel 15 
years back and argued that the real reason for the delay 'was the 
apprehension of Muslim votes In India'^ "*^ . In an article to Indian Express, 
L.K Advani wrote, "We in the BJP have long been of the view that India's 
attitude towards Israel has been unrealistic and not having diplomatic 
relations with that country does not serve any purpose. We kept putting 
pressure to establish full-fledged relations with Israel" '^*^ Likewise Shiv 
Sareen, President of All India Hindu Mahasabha hailed the decision and 
Ramachandran, "India Straddles Middle East Divide" Asia Times, March 30, 2007 available at: 
http://www.lebanonwire,com/0703MLN/07033023AT.asp 
"^^  l-lindustan Times, February 5,1992. 
"^^  Statesman, January 31, 1992. 
'"'ibid. 
'^'^  L.K Advani, "Should Indo-lsrael Ties be Strengthened? A Defence Tie Up Will Benefit India", 
Indian Express, May 24, 1993. 
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said that it was necessary to counter {he influence of Islamic bloc on 
India^ ^^ . The Indian Jews were similarly jubilant and their various 
associations hailed the decision. 
Majority of the national dailies also hailed the move^ "*^ . In an editorial 
"Shalom Israel", Times of India for instance wrote "Though it is infuriatingly 
belated, India's decision to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel is 
all the same of a truly historic import. It fees New Delhi's West Asia policy 
from the clutches of dogma and fear. The dogma, deriving from India's 
close rapport with the former Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, led 
New Delhi to espouse the Palestinian cause with a zeal not shared even 
by some Arab countries. The fear related to the possible loss of Arab 
support for New Delhi's stand on Kashmir and to the alienation of Muslim 
opinion at home. Given the Western and especially American tilt in favour 
of Pakistan, the attitude towards Israel was by no means without merit. It 
appeared to be all the more credible in view of Israel's occupation of Arab 
territories, its policy of creating Jewish settlements on them and its brutal 
suppression of Palestinian dissent. All this however, did not explain and 
much less to justify, ostracising.Israel" especially after the end of the Cold 
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. "New Delhi's reluctance to 
make the move seemed quite bizarre, especially after China had done so. 
'^"' statesman op cit.. No. 241. 
^^^ For the response of some leading Newspapers see National Herald, January 31,1992, 
Hindustan Times, January 31,1992. 
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none other than Saudi Arabia was willing to consider a similar step and not 
the least, after Mr Arafat, had given the nod"^ "*®. 
Welcoming the decision, K Subramanyam, a prominent member of 
India's strategic community and former Director of the New Delhi-based 
IDSA observed that the decision did not reflect any change in India's West 
Asia policy. The decision was in fact long overdue as the existence of 
Israel had been accepted by India in 1950. He also said that it was a 
question of extending full diplomatic recognition, the absence of which was 
a handicap for India in espousing the Palestinian cause. India had no first-
hand knowledge of what was happening in the Israeli-occupied 
territories '^*'^ . According to Shyam Saran, the shift in India's position with 
the changing international environment was a 'prudent act'^ '*^ . To 
Gursharan S. Dhaujal, it was a step that was inevitable "^*^ . 
However, a section of India's population was highly critical of the 
move. Senior Cabinet Minister Arjun Singh warned that this decision would 
affect Muslim support for the Congress party and would be a departure 
"^^  Times of India, January 31,1992. 
"^^  Statesman, January 31, 1992. 
248 
Remarks made at IDSA Book Discussion Forum on India's Israel Policy on March 9, 2011, 
New Delhi available at: http://www.idsa.in/event/lndiaslsraelPoiicy 
"^^  Gulshan S. Dhaujal, "Indo-lsraeli Ties: Is the Honeymoon Over"? Financial Express, August 
16, 1992. 
from the Nehruvian framework of India's foreign policy^^°. Partly due to 
similar concerns, the former Prime Minister V.P Singh also registered his 
opposition to normalisation. Chaturannan Mishra, the CPI National 
Secretary and M.P commented that it was 'a step in haste'^^\ The Janata 
Dal MP, Syed Shahabuddin, said the decision at this juncture was 'neither 
morally nor politically defensible'^ ^ .^ 
Prominent Muslim leaders also criticised the decision. Maulana Syed 
Mohammed Musavi, Naib Imam of Jama Masjid and Syed Ahmed Bukhari 
flayed the Indian Government for establishing full diplomatic relationship 
with Israel and declared it as 'ill timed and hasty'^ ^ .^ Again, Jawed Habeeb, 
a member of All India Babri Masjid Committee said that all aspects should 
have been taken into consideration before making the decision and that 
the US also should recognise PLO in return^^. The Student Union of the 
Aligarh Muslim University also criticised the Rao Government's decision^^ .^ 
Members of the academia also criticised the move but they were not 
unanimous in their stand. For some, the move to normalise relations with 
Israel was a hasty, unnecessary and avoidable exercise. Bansidhar 
^^° Dixit, My South Block Years, op cit, No. 191. 
^^ ^ Nair, Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed op cit, 31, p. 132. 
^^ ^ Statesman, January-31,1992. 
^^ ^ Indian Express, January 31, 1992. 
'''Ibid. 
'^^ Statesman, February 3, 1992. 
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Pradhan, for instance argued India 'should have followed a cautious and 
go slow policy in establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel. It should have 
waited till the ground realities in the West Asian theatre changed 
substantially so as to remove the very basis of its decades-old anti-Israeli 
policy. Israel's mere attendance of the Madrid Peace Conference in no 
way reflected a substantial policy change on its part towards the occupied 
territories and the Palestinians living under military occupation, in gross 
violation of established international law^^. 
Krishan Gopal and Sarabjit Sharma similarly argued 'If India were to 
make a decision primarily on the criterion of Israel's West Asia attitude, 
there was and there still is no case at all for establishing diplomatic ties. 
True, all of them have begun talking but Israel continues to hold out and is 
in illegal occupation of an entire country and parts of others. It is getting 
what was denied to it without an inch or an ounce of concession^^ .^ 
According to Shamir Hasan, "the establishment of diplomatic relations has 
diluted India's commitment to the high ideals of non-alignment, which had 
been the guiding force of our foreign policy. Israel represented all that was 
anathema to NAM, and a betrayal of NAM'S ..struggle against imperialism, 
neo-colonialism, racism and for the rights of small countries to determine 
and shape their own destiny. For him, the establishment of ties with Israel 
^^® Bansidhar Pradhan, "India's Policy Towards the PLO" op cit. No. 148, p. 73. 
^ " Gopal and Sharma, India and Israel op cit. No. 75, p. 272. 
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meant that India was now distancing itself from NAM, instead of reinforcing 
the movement to cope with the emerging international order"^ ^^ 
Many criticised the Government's move for its 'improper', 
'undemocratic' and 'immature' way of arriving at a significant political 
decision. They were especially sceptical on the way India took a decisive 
decision, which was done not by the Foreign Minister but by the Foreign 
Secretary, that too on the eve of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit to 
the US^^ .^ in their view, instead of making a 'secret' 'hide and seek' and 
covert manner of making decision and declaration, the Government of 
India should have taken the Parliament into confidence and gone into a 
bold manner of open declaration and decision to establish ties with 
lsrael''°. 
Others criticised the move because it was taken under USA 
pressure. M.S Agwani, for instance, remarked that although the 
establishment of 'full diplomatic relations with Israel was a correct decision 
[...] to do so under American pressure was unwise'^ ®\ To Ramtanu Maitra, 
'^^  Shamir Hasan, "The Evolution of India's Palestine Policy: A Fall from the Heights?" Social 
Scientist, Vol. 36, No. 1-2, January February, 2008, p. 88. 
^^ ^ See for Instance A.P Venkatesswaran, Hindustan Times, January 31,1992. 
''°lbid. 
^^^ M. Agwani, 'Inaugural remarks', in K.R. Singh (ed.), Post-War Gulf Implications for India, New 
Delhi, 1993, p.3. 
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New Delhi's decision on the Israel-Palestine issue was made in the US, 
though not necessarily by the Bush Administration^® .^ 
Some others saw the decision as 'opportunistic'. According to 
Punyapriya Das Gupta, there took place 'slippage from the vaulted moral 
foundation of India's Foreign Policy' where the gap v;as filled by the 
motives of real politik'^ ®^ To Sajad Ibrahim, the traders and business lobby 
in India and Israel played a crucial role in fostering the ties between the 
two countries for promoting mutual interests. The Indian business lobby 
was not interested any matters regarding the case of Palestinians since 
Palestine has little to offer financially or technologically, while Israel can 
sell to India what the US refuses to it^^. Shamir Hasan regretted that 
India's course of action was guided by a peculiar perception of self interest 
rather than any sense of sympathy for Palestine^® .^ 
^^ ^ Ramtanu Maitra (2003), "Palestinians Pay for Indian Ambitions", Asran Times Online, 
September 10, 2003 available at: http;/Awm.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EI10Di03.html, 
retrieved on 25-09-2008. 
'^ ^ Punya Priya Dasgupta, "Betrayal of India's'lsrael Policy" op oil, No. 92. 
®^' K M Sajad Ibrahim, "India's Collaboration with Israel: A Policy of Opportunism", FPRC Journal 
(New/ Delhi) No.5, 2011, pp.139-151 
^^ ^ Shamir Hasan, "The Evolution of India's Palestine Policy", op cit. No. 258, p. 91. 
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others viewed normalisation as a betrayal of the traditional Indian 
commitment to the Palestine cause^^ .^ Some portrayed the decision as an 
anti-Muslim alliance, if not a conspiracy^^ .^ 
Although noteveryone was happy with normalization, it had ceased 
to be a contentious issue in India and even parties which initially opposed 
normalisation such as the Communist Parties and Janafa Dal, slowly 
recognised the need to engage and cooperate with Israel. The veteran 
Communist leaders such as the then Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti 
Basu and Somnath Chatterjee even visited Israel in the summer of 
Impact of India Israel Relationship on India's Support to Palestine 
Although India's relation with Israel started at a low profile during the 
Congress regime, the relations between the two countries reached new 
heights during the BJP led National Democratic Alliance regime of Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee (1998-2004). During the Kargil War of 1999 when 
^^ ^ Punyapriya Dasgupta, "Betrayal of India's Israel Policy" op cit. No. 92, pp. 767-72; Mani 
Shankar Aiyar, 'Chutzpah', Sunday, (Calcutta), 6 June 1993, pp.14-17 and 'Betrayal of the 
Palestinian cause', Editorial, People's Democracy, (New Delhi), 13 January 2002 available at: 
http://pd.cpim.org/2002/jan13/01132002_edit.htm. 
^^ ^ Indian left parties depicted Indo-lsraeli ties as a conspiracy against Muslims. Also see 
Bansidhar Pradhan, "India's Policy Towards the PLO" op cit. No. 148, p. 81. 
®^^  In summer 2000, the Chairperson of the India Israel Parliamentary Friendship League, 
Somnath Chatterjee, a leader of the Communist party in India (CPI) who became the Speaker of 
Lok Sabha in 2004, visited Israel, accompanied by the former Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti 
Basu. This visit was interpreted that even the Indian Left wing and Communist Parties were no 
longer opposed to ties with Israel. For more this visit see Subodh Ghildiya, 'Jyoti, Somnath visited 
Israel', The Pioneer, (New Delhi), 9 June 2004. 
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Pakistani intruders had taken up positions on the higher reaches of the 
Kargil mountains, Israel responded quickly to India's requests for arms and 
sent Heron and Searcher unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, to locate 
and identify the Pakistani-held positions. It also supplied ammunition for 
the Bofors field guns and night vision equipment, both of which played key 
roles in the conflict^ ^ .^ Thereafter, the Indian Home Minister, L.K.Advani 
and External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh visited Israel in quick 
succession in May 2000 and June 2000 respectably followed by the state 
visit of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 '^^ °. In addition to 
this, India's National Security Advisor, Brijesh Mishra and Services Chiefs 
had also visited the Jewish country underlining the growing strategic 
269 
Ramananda Sengupta, "India Walks a Tightrope in its Relations with Israel, Arab Nations", Al-
Jazeera Centre for Studies, July 2010. 
™^ A series of bilateral visits between Indian and Israeli political leaders took place starting in 
1992. This included: The Israeli Finance Minister Shimon Peres in May 1993; President Ezer 
Weizman in January 1997; Finance Minister Shimon Peres in January 2002; Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon in September 2003; Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom in 
February 2004; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade, Industry and Labor Eliyahu (Eli) 
Yishai in December 2006; Minister of Transport and Road Safety Shaul Mofaz in March 2007; 
Interior Minister Meir Sheetrit in November 2007; and Minister of Agriculture and Rural 
Development Shalom Sihnchon in January 2008. 
Significant visits by Indian leaders included the following: Home Minister L. K. Advani in June 
2000; Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh in July 2000; Minister of State of Science and Technology 
and Minister of Earth Sciences Kapil Sibal in May 2005; Minister of State for Housing and 
Tourism Kumari Seija in September 2005; Minister of Agriculture Sharad Pawar in November 
2005; Minister of Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath in November 2005; Minister of Agriculture 
Sharad Pawar in May 2006; Minister of State of IndJstry Ashwani Kumar in August 2007; Minister 
of State for Railways R. Velu in December 2007; former Indian President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam in 
February 2008; Chief Justice K. G. Balakrishnan in December 2008; Chief Minister of Punjab 
Parkash Singh Badal and the Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh Shh Prem Kumar Dhumal in 
November 2009; Minister of Commerce Jyotiraditya Scindia (to discuss a free trade agreement) 
in February 2010. For more see Embassy of India, Tel Aviv website at 
http://www.indembassy.co.il/lndia-lsrael%20Bilateral%20relations.htm 
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cooperation between the two countries^^^ When the United Progressive 
Alliance Government under the Congress leadership came to power in 
mid-2004, it decided to follow the same line of the policy adopted by the 
earlier NDA regime but without compromising India's traditional support to 
Palestine^^ .^ 
At present, India is Israel's closest ally with strategic, defence and 
intelligence cooperation growing rapidly between the two countries. India 
has become the biggest market for Israeli arms. Israel provides India with 
missile radar, border monitoring equipment and other similar high-tech 
military hardwires. In addition, several thousand Indian soldiers have been 
provided with "anti-insurgency training in Israel" '^'^ . These growing ties 
between India and Israel which some have dubbed as a 'strategic 
'^^  Subhash Kapila, "India - Israel Relations: The Imperatives For Enhanced Strategic 
Cooperation" South Asia Analysis Group Paper available at: 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers2%5Cpaper131.html 
The new UPA coalition Government was formed by the Congress party in May 2004, the 
following proclamation, as part of the Common Minimal Program of the UPA, was made: "The 
UPA Government reiterated India's decades-old commitment to the cause of the Palestinian 
people for a homeland of their own". {The Pioneer, 21 June 2004) Natwar K. Singh the new 
Minister of External Affairs summarized this policy in a newspaper interview in New Delhi: "We 
greatly value our relationship with Israel but this will not and should not affect our relations with 
Palestine" (Times of India, 12 July 2004), 
273 ' 
For an excellent piece on this see "Indo-lsrael Military Relations" available at: 
http;//www.stopthewall.org/downloads/pdf/lndo-lsrael-D.pdf. Also see Ahmed Abdel Halim, "The 
lado-lsrael Military Relationship and its Impact On the Arab World", Middle East Round Table, 
Edition 18 Volume 1 - November 20, 2003 available at: http://www.bitterlemons-
internatio.nal.org/previous.php?opt=1 &id=18#72 
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partnership'^ "^* and its consequent effect on New Delhi's posture towards 
Palestine have generated another lively debate in the country. There are 
two different viewpoints on this issue. According to one view, India's 
growing ties with Israeli has neutralised its traditional support to the 
Palestine issue. The other view argues that India's friendship with Israel 
has not affected its support to the Palestinian cause. 
Those who subscribe to the first viewpoint argue that there has been 
a discernible shift in India's Palestine policy since 1992. They charge the 
Government for injecting a serious distortion to India's position on West 
Asian crisis by ignoring the beleaguered Palestinians and their just cause 
for building up a 'special relationship' with Israel. This they believe is a 
negation of national sentiment and a shameful interlude in India's 
longstanding traditional relations with West Asian countries. The new 
approach they think has reduced India's stand on Israel-Palestinian conflict 
to a state of voiceless impotence. 
The Indian response to the PLO after the commencement of the 
diplomatic relation with Israel is cited to validate this argument. In this 
regard, it is argued that while there are hectic activities for strengthening of 
relationship between India and Israel, the same is not done with regard to 
^^ '* P.R. Kumaraswamy is one of them. See his policy paper for more, India and Israel: Evolving 
Strategic Partnership, IVIideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 40, September 1998 available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/publications/40pub.html 
1Q , <; ^^ V •M? 
Palestine. It is also pointed out that in the light of the emerging tempo of 
relationship between India and Israel, the Indian policy makers have failed 
to keep themselves in tune with the negative developments in the Israeli-
PLO negotiations. The Hebron massacre, the inordinate delay in starting 
autonomy process, frequent and long time closure of Israeli borders, non-
release of the Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails and reluctance in 
starting election process in the occupied territories, are instances of Israeli 
non-compliances with the letter and spirit of the Oslo Peace Accord signed 
in September 1993. India's non-response to these developments is 
contrary to its earlier activist stand on Palestine. Hence, India's Palestine 
policy, in its present phase, has turned to be, in effect, a 'no policy' at all. 
Mani Shankar Aiyar, a senior Congress leader and a Member of 
Parliament thinks that a strong relationship with Israel deviates from the 
Nehruvian foreign policy of un-stinted support to the Palestinians. He 
argues that in 1947, India was the only country which stood against the 
partition of Palestine. Yet, today's Indian establishment is opposed to what 
India has historically stood for, vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue '^'^ . The 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Harkishan 
Singh Surjeet, thought that the government had reversed the national 
consensus that characterised India's foreign policy. The Communist Party 
'"^ Ravish Tiwari and D.K. Singh, "Aiyar's Latest Revolt: UPA Depends on Israel, Is Ignoring 
Palestine Justice," Indian Express, September 25, 2010 
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of India leader A.B. Bardhan regretted that "the Government of India had 
let down an old friend" (Palesline)^'^. According to Prakash Karat, the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) who 
succeeded Surjeet, India's deep military ties with Israel has undermined its 
pro-Palestine policy. In his view, 'We have to break the strong 
collaboration with Israel, stop the tilt, reverse the ties and restore India's 
independent foreign policy." "Ties with Israel, which are harmful, have to 
be reviewed," he mentioned, calling on the government to "come clean" 
and "spell out its stand on Palestine"^"''. 
Jayati Ghosh lamented there was a time when India was seen, 
internationally, as an originator and major force in the Non-Aligned 
Movement, a leader of the developing world, and generally a bulwark 
against imperialism. Much has changed since then '^'^ . 
According to Bansidhar Pradhan 'even though it would be an 
extreme statement to maintain that India has totally abandoned the 
^^ ^ Cited in John Cherian,"lnclia's Changing Stand", Frontline, Volume 17, Issue 22, Oct. 28 - Nov. 
10, 2000. 
" ' ' Prakash Karat, 'Palestine: The Bush-Sharon axis of evil, People's Democracy. 12, May 2002, 
http://pd.cpim.org/2002/nnay12/05122002_palestine.htm and Prakash Karat's iaterview to 
Frontline, 1-14 March 2003, 
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2005/stories/20030314007001600.htm. 
^^ ^ Jayati Ghosh, The Dubious New Alliance', Frontline, 7-20 June 2003 available at: 
http://wvw.frontlineonnet.com/fl2012/stories/20030620005411900.htm. 
121 
Palestine cause subsequent to the high profile and fast developing robust 
partnership between Israel and India, there has been an evident dilution in 
India's traditional consistent, unequivocal and strong political support for 
the Palestine struggle against Israel. From one of total identification with 
the Palestinian struggle for their legitimate rights to an independent 
statehood by unequivocally opposing Israeli policies against the 
Palestinians at every multilateral for a during the Cold War period, India 
has come to adopt the so called policy of equidistance in the Israel 
Palestine conflict during the post-Cold War era. Even this policy has often 
been marked by a subtle tilt towards Israel especially during the BJP-led 
NDA regime on the grounds of internal security and anti-terrorism 
cooperation. In a way the dilution of India's Palestine policy has been built 
into the very logic of the growing strategic relationship between India and 
Israel'^ ^ .^ 
Malik Tauqir Ahmad Khan is of the view that India has managed a 
comfort level with Israel which signifies the substantive recession in India's 
interest in the Palestine question. Indian vocal posturing on Palestine issue 
during pre-independence and post-independence Nehruvian period has 
virtually ceased after the end of Cold War with official pronouncements 
™^ Bansidhar Pradhan," Globalisation and the Shift in India's Palestine Policy" op cit. No. 148, p. 
291. 
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leaning more towards the restoration of peace in the region than an active 
call for recognizing Palestinian rights^ °^. 
Aijaz Ahmed points out how the position of the leadership of the 
Indian National Congress on Palestine has changed over the decades. 
Gandhi had unambiguously recognised the rights of Palestinian people on 
their land, a view which was later championed by Nehru and his followers 
in the Non-Aligned Movement. However, the official Indian position has 
shifted since the 1990s towards closer ties with Israel. He linked the shift 
with the emergence of Hindutva and neo-liberalism and fall of the socialist 
block^ V^ 
Shamir Hasan blames the NDA Government for breaking free 
from all the earlier constraints, including the earlier close ties with the 
Palestinian movement, in pursuing its close friendship with Israel. He 
accused India's policy on Palestine as 'deceptive' and the UPA 
Government's commitment to Palestine cause as a 'paper commitment'^ ^ .^ 
Syed Sultan Mohiddin argues that having been in the forefront of 
support for Palestinians' freedom fight for decades, India's lukewarm 
response to Israel's massive Gaza offensive is an indication of strategic 
^^ ° Malik Tauqir Ahmad Khan "Palestine Question and India's Israel Policy" Journal of Research 
(Humanities) Vol. 27, 2007, p.31. 
^^ ^ Remarks at the Conference on "A Just Peace for Palestine" 22nd and 23"^  September, 2010 at 
New Delhi available at 
http://www.cpimwb.org.in/documentJmages/archiveJnternational/Conference.pdf 
^^ ^ Shamir Hasan, "The Evolution of India's Palestine Policy" op cit. No. 258, p. 90. 
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shift in the country's foreign policy. He blames India's 'enlightened self-
interest' with Israel as the main reason for this shift^ l^ 
Sushil J. Aaron is of the view that India has moved from a very 
publicly orchestrated pro-Arab, pro-Palestine policy during the Cold War to 
a translation of backchannel interactions with Israelis Into an unstated but 
discernible alliance. That India has attained a comfort level with Israel to 
contemplate inviting Sharon for a visit, despite its negative symbolic import 
for proponents of a free Palestine in the region signifies the substantive 
recession in India's interest on the Palestine question. He alleged that 
Indian posturing on the Palestinian question has virtually ceased, with 
official pronouncements leaning more towards the restoration of peace in 
the region than an active call for recognizing Palestinian rights, with the 
latter being a rhetorical fallback position rather than a notion that 
permeates official discourse as was the case during the Cold War^ ®^ . 
C Rajamohan writes, "for nearly four decades, India could find 
nothing right about Israel. Now it seems New Delhi cannot say anything 
^°^ Syed Sultan Mohiddin, "Palestine Conflict and India's Response", Radiance Views Weekly, 
November 14, 2010. 
^^* Sushil J. Aaron, Straddling Fautlines: India's Foreign Policy toward the Greater Middle East, 
Centre De Sciences Humaines (CSH) Occasional Paper, July 2003 available at: 
http://www.csh-delhi.com/publications/downloads/ops/OP7.pdf 
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critical about Tel Aviv"^ ® .^ K.M.Sajad Ibrahim states that India's changed 
policy since 1992 is a blatant contradiction to its avowed policy of 
supporting the Palestinian cause. To him, the current phase of India's 
relation with Israel goes beyond the level of normalcy and reached a stage 
of much clandestine cooperation for defence and strategic purposes. He 
concludes that the new diplomatic initiatives of India target only its vested 
interest against the traditional principle of solidarity with the third world 
countries^^ .^ 
According to Sunaina Maira, India and Israel's new honeymoon reversed 
India's historical stand of support for the Palestinians who were still living under 
occupation and apartheid and ignored India's own experience with colonization. 
This is despite the fact that Israel continues to maintain its military, political, and 
economic stranglehold on Palestinians who still do not live in a fully sovereign 
state in the West Bank and Gaza, or in a truly democratic nation in Israel.^ '^' 
Pointing to the shift in the Indian policy on Palestine, Zafarul Islam Khan, 
the editor of Mille Gazette says that India's commitment to the struggle of the 
Palestinians had now remained confined to paying just lip service. Commenting 
on the increasing business and military ties between India and Israel, he 
285 c. Raja Mohan, "India's West Asian stal<es", Hindu, October 16, 2000. 
^^ ^ "India's Collaboration with Israel: A Policy of Opportunism" available at: 
http://sajaddomain.sulekha.com/blog/post/2008/11/impact-of-india-s-partnership-with-israel-
major-implications.htm#_edn29 
^^ ^ Sunaina Maira, "India Loses Her Palestinian Heart and Gains a Calculating Israeli Mind" 
available at": http://wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/8522 
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mentions that nobody is averse to the procurement of military supplies for 
country's defence but having Israel as a supplier is a morally incorrect choice^® .^ 
According to Kapil Komireddi, India was once considered as a bastion of 
pro-Palestinian sentiment. Now there has been a dramatic shift in Its policy from 
Palestine to Israel. He cites three principal reasons behind the shift in India's 
attitude. The first is the belated realisation that no amount of deference to Arab 
sentiment could alter Muslim opinion in the Middle East in India's favour: when it 
came to Kashmir, Shia and Sunni united in supporting Pakistan's position. The 
second owes itself to the collapse of the old world order: the death of the Soviet 
Union meant that India had to seek out new allies. The third factor that 
contributed to the deepening of Indo-lsraeli ties is less well-known: the rise of 
Hindu nationalism in India^^ .^ The Indian chapter of the Asian People's Solidarity 
for Palestine (APSP) is disappointed because there have been a marked shift in 
India's approach to the Palestinian issue in the last several years as it moves 
closer to Israel. Though India's official position still supports the Palestinians' 
^^ ° "Indian Muslims Observe Quds Day" article available at: 
http://www.jamaateislamihind.org/index.php?do=category&id=40&blockid=40&pageid=140 
^^ ^ Kapil Komireddi, "India and Israel: a friendship deepened by prejudice", Guardian, October 
25, 2011 at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/oct/25/india-israel-friendship-
prejudice-muslim?newsfeed=true 
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cause, the alliance claimed the India's policies were favouring the Israelis with 
their "strategic partnership" specially in defence and security deals^^°. 
CPI Deputy General Secretary, S Sudhakar Reddy thinks that the Indian 
government run by Manmohan Singh departed from the path of non-alignment 
policies and started toeing the pro-American policies, which is a complete 
deviation of India's foreign policies founded by their own leader Jawaharlal 
Nehru. The CPI leader D Raja deplores the dual role played by Indian 
government by saying, "One side it is supporting the Palestine cause but on the 
other side it is promoting ties with Israel. India should follow an independent 
foreign policy. The government must display a positive political role In finding a 
solution to the conflict in the region, which has deprived independence of 
Palestine"^^\ 
The above perception is, however, not shared by many others. 
Congress President and the ruling UPA Chairperson, Sonia Gandhi during 
a speech at Oxford University in November 2002, for instance, stated that 
"growing economic and strategic cooperation between India and Israel 
does not make (the party) insensitive" to "the reality of the legitimate 
^^ ° "in Solidarity for Palestine, Asian Activists Announce Aaravan to Gaza", The Milli Gazette, 
October 9, 2010 at: http://www.nniiligazette.com/news/112-in-solidarity-for-palestine-asian-
activists-announce-caravan-to-gaza 
"^ Quoted in C Adhil<esavan, "CPI Hails Palestinian Cause", New Age Weekly, December 2, 
2011 at: http://www.newageweekly.com/2011/12/cpi-hails-palestinian-cause.htmi 
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concerns of the Palestinian peopie"^ ^ .^ Outlining the policy of the new UPA 
Government, President A P J Abdul Kalam in his address to the joint 
session of the Indian Parliament said, 'Our relations with Israel, which 
have developed on the basis of mutually beneficial cooperation, are 
important, but this in no way dilutes our principled support for the legitimate 
aspirations of the Palestinian people^^ .^ 
Indian officials similarly insist that the relationship with Israel and the 
symbolic neglect of Palestine will not affect relations with the Arab world. 
One official confidently affirms that "The Arab world also knows that 
national interest is supreme. Our close ties with Israel do not affect our 
equally warm relations with the Arab world"^ "^^ . Pointedly, Ministry of 
External Affairs officials make the comparison with China's engagement of 
the Middle East. "The Arabs have had no problem with China's defence 
fies with Israel". In the words of one analyst, "India sees China's Middle 
East strategy of close ties with the Arabs and the Israelis as an approach 
from which it can learn"^^ .^ 
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"Conflict and Coexistence in Our Age" speech by Smt. Sonia Gandhi at the Oxford Centre for 
Islamic Studies Oxford University, on Friday, 29th November, 2002 available at: 
http://www.congresssandesh.eom/november-2002/speech/3.html 
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President Abdul Kalam's address to the Joint Session of Parliament, 7 June 2004, Office of 
the President of India, New Delhi available at: 
http://presidentofindia.nic.in/scripts/palatest1.jsp?id=6. 
^^* "Israel 'gifts' India infantry weapons," Indian Express, July 5, 2002. 
^^ ^ Sudha Ramachandran, "India and Israel United in Defence," Asia Times, June 26, 2002, 
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DF26Df02.htmi 
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According to Yashwant Sinha, the former Indian Foreign Minister, 
Palestinians are not In any doubt about Indian policy. "The problem arises 
only with those people inside India and outside India who are more 
Palestinian than the Palestinian themselves"^ ^®. 
Muchkund Dubey, the former Foreign Secretary, advocates that 
"India has over the years established a very meaningful relationship with 
Israel, which is admirably serving its interests. Israel has been more than 
forthcoming in response to India's several requests for cooperation and 
has not always sought strict or instant reciprocity. He suggests that India 
should take a nuanced position on issues affecting Israel and take 
positions after judging issues on merits. Its reaction needs not be 
automatic or on the same pattern all the time on all issues".^ ®'' 
According to Kumarswami, the Indo-lsraeli relations have not 
undermined the traditional Indian support for the Palestinians. It is still 
committed to the full realization of the political rights of the Palestinians 
and endorses their demand for full statehood and sovereignty. It views the 
formation of two sovereign states in the erstwhile Mandate Palestine as the 
only just and viable solution to the problem. It disapproves of any unilateral 
moves or solution and urges both parties to seek a comprehensive peace 
®^® Cited in Ramananda Sengupta, "India Walks a Tightrope in its Relations with Israel, Arab 
Nations", Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, July 2010. 
^^ ^ Muchkund Dubey, "West Asia: India's Neighbouring Region", Journal of West Asian Studies, 
Vol.15, 2001, pp. 1-11. 
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through negotiation. On a number of key issues such as border, refugees, 
security fence, settlements, water or Jerusalem, India's positions are at 
variance with Israel. It has publicly disapproved harsh Israeli measures 
such as targeted killings, civilian casualties, prolonged border closures, 
house demolitions and land confiscations directed against the Palestinians. 
Even while criticizing terror attacks against Israeli civilians, India was 
equally critical of Israeli actions against the Palestinians during the Gaza 
conflict (2008-09). At the bilateral level, India continues to recognize the 
PLO and the Palestinian National Authority as the legitimate Palestinian 
representatives. Since the late 1980s it had accorded the honours of a 
head of state to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Following his death it 
bestowed similar treatment to his successor Mahmoud Abbas. It maintains 
a diplomatic mission in the Palestinian territories. Its limited political 
leverage does not prevent New Delhi from offering medical, material and 
education-related aid and assistance to the Palestinians. Thus, he 
concludes that India's bourgeoning ties with Israel has not come at the 
cost of its support for Palestinians^^ .^ 
Shalu Malik maintains that India's relations with the people of 
Palestine and their just cause to regain their lost territories remains an 
^^ ° P R Kumaraswamy, "The Friendship with Israel: India Squares the Circle", Middle East 
institute, New Delhi, Occasional Paper, Issue No. 12, 26 July 2010 at: 
http;//www.mei.org.in/front/cms/publicationsDetail.php?id=MTl1&cid=Ng== 
Also see his "Looking West 2: Beyond the Gulf op cit. No. 225, p. 185. 
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everlasting aspect of India's foreign policy. Changes may be perceived in 
her foreign policy postures in view of the fast changing global environment 
and international scenario, however, these changes are mere aberrations 
and purely temporary. The spirit of anti - imperialism, fight against 
exploitation and voluntary discrimination is completely ingrained in the 
bone and marrow of Indian body politic: as such any deviation from the just 
cause of Palestinian peoples will be a negation of the fundamentals of 
India's governing culture^^ .^ 
According to Shashank, a former Foreign Secretary of India, India's 
position on Palestine has not undergone any significant change in the 
wake of growing India-Israel relationship. He argues that although India-
Israel had recognized each other for a long time yet there was no 
diplomatic relationship between the two countries for a long time, so it is 
only natural that their relationship would catch up. So while the growing 
India-Israel relationship is there, there is no change in India's dialogue or 
relationship with Palestine. India has a representative in the Palestinian 
territories and now that it is also member of the UN Security Council, its 
views are welcomed by all the Arab counties and the Israelis also. So, he 
thinks that India's position perhaps has become a little bit more normal 
because now India can interact with the Palestinians, with the Arab 
^^ ^ Shalu Malik, Continuity And Change In IndoQ Arab Relations: A Study Of Israel As A Factor, 
Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, 2008 
available at; http://old.jmi.ac.in/2000/Research/ab2008_pol_sc_shalu.pdf 
131 
countries as well as lsraeP°°. Palestinian Ambassador to India, Osama 
Musa is of the opinion that India's ties with Israel benefits Palestine in 
some cases. "India sent aid worth USD 2 million to Palestine. It's not easy 
to get the medicines across to Palestine, because India has to take them 
through Israel. They can't do it if they don't have good relationship with 
Israel" he added^°\ 
A careful examination of the whole discussion makes two things 
clear: First, since the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the world has changed dramatically and so also the 
perception and attitude of Arab countries towards Israel. This is evident in 
their recognition of Israel and participation in the Middle East peace 
process. India's changed posture towards Israel was the result of these 
altered circumstances. Second, there is a tendency to interpret everything 
through a zero-sum approach i.e., Palestine's gain is Israel's loss and vice 
versa. Palestinians would not get anything if India condemns Israel all the 
time and completely disengages the Jewish State. What is actually 
important is to use India's leverage vis-a-vis Israel and work towards a just 
and fair solution of the Palestine problem. Moreover, it is also important for 
India to politically and economically help the Palestine people in their quest 
for a separate homeland. 
Interview with Foreign Policy Researcii Centre Journal, New Delhi, Volume-5 at: 
http://www.fprc.in/fprcJoumal5.php 
^^ "India's Ties with Israel Benefits Us in Some Cases: Palestine", Zee News, February 12, 2007 
http://www.zeenews.com/news353767.html 
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Chapter Four 
INDIA PALESTINE RELATIONSHIP, 1992-2012 
After establishing diplomatic relationship with Israel in 1992, India 
continued to support the cause of Palestine and undertook necessary steps 
towards the attainment of this objective. India's policy towards Palestine since 
1992 can be discussed at two different levels: political and economic. While at 
the political and diplomatic level, India provided strong support to the people of 
Palestinian in their quest for a sovereign, independent and viable state, 
economically India provided both material and technical support to the 
Palestinian government and its people in their search for nation-building. 
Political & Diplomatic Support Through Bilateral Visits 
India continued to extend its consistent and unwavering support to the 
Palestinian cause from time to time. This was evident from the high-level political 
contacts between the Indian and Palestinian leadership from time to time. 
On January 19-20, 1992, the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat paid an 
official visit to India. Welcoming Arafat, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao reiterated 
India's consistent and unequivocal support for Palestine and the inalienable right 
of its people to self determination. The Prime Minister assured Arafat of 
extending all support to the Palestinians in whatever way possible to achieve the 
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twin objective of establishing peace In the region and 'helping our Palestinian 
friends'^°l 
Welcoming the initiation of the peace process In the Middle East, Rao 
hoped that the peace process would be a suitable means of achieving the aims 
and objectives of the Palestinian people as well as the means of restoring 
stability to the Middle East. He further underlined that as a neighbouring region, 
India had a vital Interest In the success of this process, as the security and 
stability of the region impinged directly on Its own security environment. 
Arafat on his part gave a brief assessment of the peace talks. He 
expressed his strong conviction that India's participation in the third round of 
West Asia peace talks, scheduled to be held In Moscow towards the end of 
January 1992, was essential. Eduardo Faleiro, the Minister of State for External 
Affairs also met the Palestinian President. During the meeting, Arafat discussed 
the continuing expansion and establishment of new settlements in the occupied 
territories which could vitiate the peace process. Faleiro emphasised that India 
had consistently expressed its flrni opposition to the building or expansion of 
settlements In the occupied territories^"^. 
On the question of India's diplomatic relationship with Israel, Arafat In his 
press conference in New Delhi stated that 'Exchange of Ambassadors and 
recognition (of Israel) are acts of sovereignty in which I cannot interfere". "I 
^°^ Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XXXVIIl, No. 1 January, 1992 at http://mealib.nic.in/far/1992.pdf, 
p. 31 
'°'lbid. 
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respect any choice of the Indian government"^°'* he further added hoping that 
such a change would not affect Indo-Palestine relationship which was so 
strong^°^ 
India's sympathy and support to the Palestinian people were reiterated by 
Prime Minister when he met President Yasser Arafat during his one day stopover 
in Tunis on 20 November 1992 on his way to Dakar to attend the G-15 Summit. 
President Yasser Arafat briefed Prime Minister on progress in the Middle East 
Peace Process, especially in the Israel-Palestinian dialogue. Solidarity with the 
Palestinian people was expressed at a function organized by the ICCR to 
commemorate the International Day of Solidarity. The Minister of State for 
External Affairs, Shri Eduardo Faleiro, who was the Chief Guest, reiterated 
India's consistent and unequivocal support to the Palestinian cause °^®. 
Arafat's Foreign Minister, Farouq KaddoumI, visited India from April 5 to 7, 
1993. He briefed the Prime Minister Rao on the expulsion of 415 Palestinians by 
the Israeli authorities as well as the outcome of the rounds of discussions held in 
Washington. The Prime Minister expressed deep concern at the expulsion and 
urged the Government of Israel to withdraw the expulsion order and implement 
^°^ Times of India, January 22, 1992. Also see Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report, 1992-93 
{hereafter Annual Report), Government of India, New Delhi at: http://mealib.nic.in/72020, p.6. 
^°^ Zikrur Rahman, the Indian Representative to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, told the 
London-based Al-Haqeq Newspaper on 12 May 2007 that "When we recognized Israel and 
normalized relations with her, we did that after taking the approval of the Palestinian leadership; 
we said, after you agree we'll recognize (Israel)... The Palestinian leadership told us: There are 
signed accords between us (and Israel) and we are now talking to the Israelis; your establishing 
relations with Israel help us. For more see Ramananda Sengupta, "India Walks a Tightrope in its 
Relations with Israel, Arab Nations", Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, July 2010. 
'°%icl. 
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Resolution 799 of the Security Council. He also recalled India's traditional 
support for the Palestinian cause and reiterated that India would continue to 
stand by the Palestinians. Kaddoumi also met External Affairs Minister, Dinesh 
Singh, and Minister of State for External Affairs R. L. Bhatia and briefed them on 
bilateral matters and the developments in West Asia & the Gulf^°^. 
In October 1994, Yasser Arafat was jointly awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize along with Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, for their efforts to create 
peace in the Middle East^ °®. Congratulating Arafat for the Peace Prize, the Indian 
Prime Minister stated "This was well deserved re-cognition of the initiatives taken 
by you and your bold leadership in the peace process which had been launched 
for the cause of the just and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people"^°^. 
In a major policy decision, the Ministry of External Affairs informed the 
Palestinian National Authority on July 11,1995 that the Government of India had 
decided to recognise the passport/ travel documents issued by the PNA. This 
was also conveyed to the Embassy of the State of Palestine in New Delhi^ ^°. 
Yasser Arafat, the President of the State of Palestine was elected as the 
Ra'ees (Chairman) of the Executive Authority of the Palestinian Council in first 
^°^ Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 January, 1993 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1993.pdf, p 
167. 
^°^ See the press release "The Nobel Peace Prize 1994" at: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/press.html 
^^ Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XL No. 1 January, 1994 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1994.pdf, p. 
316. 
^^ ° Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XL!, No. 1 January, 1995 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1995.pdf, p. 
285 
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democratic elections in January 1996^^^ Congratulating Arafat, Prime Minister 
Rao said that India's unequivocal commitment and support for the Palestinian 
people remained firm. He further stated that "India strongly supported the Middle 
East Peace Process and was ready to provide moral, material and technical 
support for furthering the economic development of the region"^^ .^ 
Following the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Washington 
between Israel and the PLO in 1993, India established a Representative Office to 
the Palestine National Authority which was opened on 24 June 1996 with the 
arrival of the Acting Representative, T. S. Tirumurti, First Secretary, along with 
his team. India hoped that this Office would contribute to further strengthening 
the close friendly relations between India and the Palestinians, and help promote, 
expand, and diversify these relations in economic, commercial, cultural, and 
other fields^^l This office was later shifted to Ramallah in the West Bank in 2003. 
It is important to mention that the Indian Mission to the Palestinian Authority 
reports directly to the foreign office in New Delhi and not to the Indian embassy in 
Israel located in Tel-Aviv. 
President Arafat attended and addressed the 12th Ministerial Conference 
of Non-Aligned Movement at New Delhi on 6-8 April, 1997. During his visit, he 
called on the Indian President, Vice President, Prime Minister, and External 
^^ -^ For more on this election see Global Security online article "Palestine Liberation Organisation" 
at: http7/www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/plo.htm. 
^^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XLII, No. 1 January, 1996 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1996.pdf, p.26 
^^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record Vol XLII, No. 1 January, 1996 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1996.pdf, 
p,163 
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Affairs Minister. The Indian leaders expressed deep concern at the developments 
in West Asia, maintaining that "unilateral steps not in conformity with the 
agreements and understandings hindered the peace process and vitiated the 
atmosphere of mutual confidence essential to progress the peace process 
further"^ '^^ . An Indian official delegation visited the Palestinian self-rule areas in 
May, 1997 and called on President Arafat in Gaza. Important bilateral and 
regional issues were figured in the discussion. 
India's traditional friendly relation with Palestine was given a new 
momentum by the state visit of President Yasser Arafat to India from 19-22 
November 1997. Arafat held discussions with President K.R Narayanan, Prime 
Minister I.K Gujral, and others. On the occasion, a Memorandum of 
Understanding in Bilateral Economic Cooperation was signed between the two 
sides. The MoU provided a structured framework for cooperation in diverse areas 
like commerce, trade, science, technology, industrial collaboration, information 
and broadcasting. Arafat also laid down the foundation stone of an auditorium to 
be built by the Arab League in Hyderabad^^ .^ 
The PLCs Executive Committee member, Sulaiman Najjab, visited India 
to participate in a seminar on "Prospects for Peace in the Middle East," 
organised by the United Nations' Department of Information on 3-4 February 
1998. The Director General of the Palestine Election Commission also visited 
^^ * Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XLIII, No 1 JANUARY 1997 at; http://mealib.nic.in/far/1997.pdf, p. 
84. 
^^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XLIII, No. 1 JANUARY 1997 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1997.pdf, p. 
185. 
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India in February, 1998 to get a first-hand experience of the election process in 
India. The Palestinian Minister of Housing and Energy, Abdel Rahman Hamad, 
visited India in April, 1998 to attend another seminar organised by the Council of 
Arab Ambassadors. During the visit, he called on the Minister of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas and the Minister of External Affairs. A Member of the Executive 
Committee of Al-Fateh, in charge of foreign relations and a member of the 
Palestine National Council, Hani Al-Hasan, also visited India as a representative 
of the PLO to attend the 17h Congress of the Communist Party of India (CPI) 
held at Chennai from 18-20 September 1998. He also met the Minister of 
Extemal Affairs^^^ 
India's solidarity with the Palestinian people was further expressed by her 
gesture in organising a special function in New Delhi by the Indian Council for 
Cultural Relations on 18*" December 1997 to commemorate the International Day 
of Solidarity with Palestinian people. 
In December 11, 1998, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalam and Preacher of Al 
Aqsa Mosque, Sheikh Ekrima Sa'id Sabri visited India on a goodwill mission. He 
met the Prime Minister and the Vice President and discussed the situation in the 
region and developments in the peace process. The Mufti was assured of India's 
^^ ^ Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia article on "India-Palestine relations" at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wil<i/india%E2%80%93Palestine_relations 
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consistent moral, political and economic support to the brotherly people of 
Palestine^^ .^ 
President Yassir Arafat arrived in India on an official visit from 9-10 April 
1999. He was accompanied by Palestine National Authority Minister for Planning 
and International Cooperation, Nabeel Shaath, Chief Palestinian negotiator, 
Saab Ereket and Advisor to the President, Nabeel Abu Radneih. During the 
visit, President Arafat called on the Indian President and held detailed 
discussions with the Prime Minister Vajpayee. During these meetings, the Indian 
leadership underlined the country's consistent and unwavering support to the 
Palestinian cause and emphasized that "a just, comprehensive and lasting peace 
in the region could only be based on relevant UN resolutions and the principle of 
"Land for Peace"^^ .^ The two sides also discussed broader prospects of Indo-
Palestinian cooperation and agreed to intensify their bilateral ties in diverse 
fields. 
Additional Secretary (Foreign Affairs) and Joint Secretary (WANA) visited 
Gaza in May 1999 for a review meeting of Indian aided projects. Advisor to 
President Arafat on Human Rights, Advocate Ibrahim Abu Dagga, visited India 
from 2-7 November 1999 in connection with an International Conference on 
^^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record, 1998, Vol. 1995 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1998.pdf p. 275. 
^^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XLV, No. 1, January 1999 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1999.pdf p. 
62. 
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Human Rights. He had also a meeting with Member, National Human Rights 
Commission Virendra Dayal^ ^®. 
A function was organised at Tagore Hall of Indian Council of Cultural 
Relations (ICCR) to mark the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian 
People on 7 December 1999. Nareshwar Dayal, Secretary (E), Ministry of 
External Affairs, Khalid El Sheikh, Ambassador of the State of Palestine, Abdul 
Halim, the Speaker of West Bengal Legislative Assembly and President, World 
Federation of United Nations Association (WFUNA) were the distinguished 
persons who spoke on the occasion^^°. 
Lai Krishna Advani, the Union Home Minister, visited Palestine in June 
2000. During his meeting with Yasser Arafat, he assured the Palestinian leader 
that the decade's old friendship between India and Palestine would continue and 
hoped that the Palestinian leader would succeed in his struggle for peace^^^ 
Arafat stated to the visiting Indian leader that his relationship with India was 
stronger than friendship. In his own words, "It is not friendship, it is brotherhood, 
it is very old"^^^. 
Within few days after Advani, Jaswant Singh, the External Affairs Minister, 
paid an official visit to Palestine in July 2000. Inaugurating the Mahatma Gandhi 
Library and Jawaharlal Nehru Library in the Gaza City, he said "the best way that 
319 
320 
MEA Annual Report 1999-2000 at http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?ici=50045719, p. 44. 
Ibid, p. 129. 
^^ ^ Hindu, June 14, 2000. 
^^ ^ Times of India, June 19, 2000. 
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India could do to the friendly people of Palestine was to help them in the field of 
education. This was the best investment for future that could be made and there 
was no greater cooperation than cooperation in the field of learning". Speaking 
on the West Asia peace process, he said "New Delhi's position toward the 
Palestine was clear and explicit and India would not alter its stated position 
supportive of the rights of the Palestine people for them to have a settled and 
internationally recognised territory". He also mentioned India's desire to open up 
its fast emerging information technology and knowledge-based industry to the 
people of Palestine to help them achieve economic and political aspirations^^^. 
In August 2000, the Palestinian leader Arafat and the Israeli Leader 
Shimon Pares (then Israel's Minister for Regional Development) visited New 
Delhi in quick succession. The ostensible reason behind their visits was to 
appraise the Indian leaders of the developments about the West Asian peace 
process. But the real issue was the Palestinian ultimatum to unilaterally declare 
Palestine an independent state on September 13, 2000 if peace talks with Israel 
continued to remain deadlocked. Arafat sought India's support in favour of such a 
step while Pares tried to Impress upon India about the dangers involved In such a 
declaration. 
Ariel Sharon's (the then Likud Party opposition leader) controversial visit 
to Al-Aqsa, the holiest Muslim shrine In Palestine (known to the Jewish people as 
^^ ^ Tribune. July 2, 2000. 
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Temple Mount) led to the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000^ '^*. 
This Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule in the occupied territories was much 
more violent than the First Intifada of December 1987. Within days after the 
outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the 
largest of the Left parties, demanded that India should seek a meeting of the UN 
Security Council where Israel should be condemned for 'sponsoring' violence in 
the occupied territories^^^. Joining the chorus against the 'silence' of the NDA 
government, the Congress, the principal opposition party, also criticized Israel for 
its 'unwarranted and deplorable' actions against the Palestinians^^^. CPI-M 
General Secretary, Harkishan Singh Surjeet castigated the Indian government for 
'reversing' the national consensus on the Palestinian issue and condemned the 
government for letting 'down an old friend'^ ^^. In December that year, at meeting 
organized by various Left parties and groups the leaders wanted the Vajpayee 
government to 'take a clear and forthright stand condemning Israel's latest 
atrocities and antihuman actions.' It also called for a halt to 'harmful policy' of 
security cooperation with Israel and demanded that the government adopt a 
'clear, forthright and measurable practical support to the Palestinian cause^^^.' 
^^^ For more on this see Aijaz Ahmad, "Israel's Killing Fields", Frontline, Vol. 17, Issue 23, 
November 11 - 24, 2000 at; http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl1723/17231080.htm 
^^ ^ "India Should Condemn Israel for Violence: CPI (M)", Hindu, October 15, 2000. 
'''Ibid. • . 
^" Quoted in John Cherian, 'India's Changing Stand', Frontline (Chennai), 28 October-10 
November 2000, http://www.Fro/7f//neonnet.com/fl1722/17220140.htm 
^^ ^ V Sridhar, 'An Expression of Solidarity, Frontline, 23 December 2000-5 January 2001 at: 
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fi1726/17260600.htm. 
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External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh during a visit to Cairo in February 
2001 met Arab League Secretary-General, Esmat Abdel Meguid and reiterated 
India's historical comnnitment to the Palestinian cause and the U.N. resolutions 
for an independent Palestinian homeland within recognized international borders. 
The Arab League official thanked the Indian Foreign Minister for supporting the 
Palestinian and Arab causes^^ .^ 
President Arafat came to Delhi on a working visit on 23 August 2001. He 
called on the Prime Minister and briefed him on the security situation in the 
region. He sought India's help to get the peace process re-started. As New Delhi 
had good relations with both Israel and Palestine, the Palestinian leader felt India 
could play a useful role in getting the peace process on track. Later, the 
Palestine leader also called on Congress President Sonia Gandhi and 
exchanged views on ties between the two countries and the West Asia 
situation^^°. 
Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh spoke to President Arafat in 
August and December 2001 to enquire about the situation in the region and to 
convey Indian Government's solidarity with the people of Palestine^^^ 
Special Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs visited 
"Jaswant Singh Reiterates Support for Palfestinian Homeland", Times of India, February 3, 
2001. 
^^° "Arafat, Vajpayee discuss West Asia situation", Times of India, August 23, 2001. 
^^ ^ MEA Annual Report, 2001-02 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50046684, p. 42-43. 
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Ramallah on 5 January 2002. He called on President Arafat and delivered to him 
a letter from the Prime Minister^ ^ .^ 
In September 2003, the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon paid an official 
visit to India. The Sharon visit was highly controversial in India. Editorials in 
leading newspapers criticized it and political parties as well as private 
organizations held rallies in protest^ ^ .^ The Indian government, while welcoming 
Sharon, made it clear that it would neither dilute its traditional support for the 
Palestinian cause nor abandon Yasser Arafat as the leader of the Palestinians^^^. 
In May 2004, the United Progressive Alliance led by the Congress party 
came to power. The new government expressed its will to maintain India's 
relations with Israel, especially military cooperation, but at the same time made it 
'''Ibid. 
333 
The opposition parties which protested against the visit include: the Communist Parties, the 
Samajwadi Party, the Rashtriya Janata Dal and the Janata Dal (S). The opposition Congress 
party had not joined in the protests but made it clear that the party's position of supporting the 
Palestine cause and an independent state of Palestine remained undiluted. However, Sonia 
Gandhi as the Leader of the Opposition called on the Israeli Prime Minister Similarly, the All-India 
Muslim Personal Law Board, the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Hind, the All-India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawart, 
the All-India Milli Council, the Jamaat-e-lslami Hind and the Jamiat Ahle Hadith also protested 
against Mr. Sharon's visit. Demonstrations were held near Sharon's hotel and in other parts of the 
capital. They were also held in Calcutta and cities in the deep south, areas that Sharon not even 
visited. For more on this see "Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's India Visit Receives Nationwide 
Protests and Condemnation", Alternatives International, 10 September 2003 at: 
http://journal.alternatives.ca/eng/our-organisation/our-publications/analysis-and-
articles/article/israeli-prime-minister-sharon-
s?%3F!ang=en&debut_articles_rubrique=210&lang=fr; K. Gajendra Singh," Israeli Prime Minister 
Sharon's Indian Visit: Historical Perspective, SAAG Paper, No 782, September 9, 2003 at; 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers8%5Cpaper782.html, "Imam leads Muslims in 
Protest against Sharon's visit," Times of India, September 9, 2003.lt may be mentioned that the 
opposition was not so much to the visit of the Israeli prime minister per se, but to the visit of Mr. 
Sharon, whose name is forever associated with the massacres of Sabra and Shatilla and who, in 
more recent times, had incarcerated Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in his quarters in Ramallah. 
To know more about this, see "Why Protest the First Ever Visit of Israeli Prime Minister?" 
Janshakti Bt http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Janshakti/message/217. 
'''' Harsh V. Pant, "India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints", SAAG Paper, No. 
1279, March 4, 2005 at: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers13%5Cpaper1279.htmi 
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clear that India's ties with Israel would not affect its relations with the Arab world 
and Its traditional support for the Palestinian cause. In September 2004, the 
Manmohan Singh Government, in a symbolic gesture, sent Minister of State for 
External Affairs, E. Ahamed to visit the Palestinian Authority, as well as Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan. Ahamed met Yasser Arafat in his Ramallah headquarters and 
warned Israel against harming the Palestinian leader^ ^ .^ India also called for 
measures to lift the siege imposed by Israel around the headquarters of Yasser 
Arafat. 
Following the sad demise of President Arafat on 11 November 2004, a 
multiparty official Indian delegation headed by the Minister of External Affairs, 
Natwar Singh, attended the funeral ceremony which was held at Cairo on 12 
November 2004^^ .^ Condolence messages were sent from President, PM and 
External Affairs Minister to their counterparts in the Palestinian National 
Authority. The Parliament of India also adopted a long obituary honouring 
President Arafat. In a message, the Government described Arafat as a "towering 
and highly respected international personality who fought selflessly and 
courageously, at great personal sacrifice, for the Palestinian cause and an 
independent homeland for the Palestinian people, to which he dedicated his 
whole life". It further stated that "Arafat enjoyed great respect and admiration 
among the people and leaders of India, and would always be remembered as a 
^^ ^ "Indian Minister Warns Israel Against Removing Arafat", The Daily Star (Beirut), September 
18, 2004. 
^^ ^ The delegation consisted of External Affairs Minister, K. Natwar Singh, Railway Minister, Lalu 
Prasad Yadav, the Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Ghulam Nabi Azad, and the CPM leader 
Sitaram Yechuri. 
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sincere and steadfast friend of India"^ '^'. At a separate condolence meeting for 
Arafat, the Left parties demanded that the government sever the military ties with 
Israel that were 'forged by the previous NDA government'^ ^®. 
As a mark of support to the cause of democracy in Palestine and as the 
world's largest democracy, India had sent, at the invitation of the Palestinian 
National Authority, a team of Election Observers to observe the Palestinian 
Presidential elections in January 2005.— the first to be held since 1996 — in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Voters elected PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas as 
the new President of the Palestinian Authority in a keenly contested election. 
India welcomed Mahmoud Abbas as the new President of the Palestinian 
National Authority and Arafat's successor, who died in November 2004^^ .^ 
In February 2005, Ambassador Chinmay R. Gharekhan was appointed 
India's special envoy to West Asia and the Middle East Peace Process^". This 
post was devised by the UPA government in its desire to improve its relationship 
with the Arab world. The new Government also wanted to be portrayed as a true 
supporter of the Palestinian cause as well as the Palestinian quest for an 
independent state, in contrast with the previous Vajpayee led NDA government. 
^" MEA Annual Report, 2004-05 at: htfp://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500410405, p. 59. 
^^ ^ "Sever Military Ties with Israel: Left', Hindu, 24 November 2004. 
^^^ MEA Annual Report, 2004-05 at http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500410405, p.59. 
^° "Gharel^iian is Special Envoy for West Asia", Tribune, February 4, 2005 at: 
http://www.tribuneindia.eom/2005/20050204/nation.htm#2 
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As the new envoy, Gharekhan visited Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) in February 2005. In Israel he met Vice-Prime Minister Shimon Peres and 
Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom; in Palestine, he met the newly elected President 
Abbas as well as the Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei. Since his appointment, 
Gharekhan used to regularly meet Mahmud Abbas, as well as many other top-
level Palestinian officials. 
On 19-20 May 2005, the new elected Palestinian President, Mahmoud 
Abbas, accompanied by Foreign Minister, Nasser Al Kidwa, paid an official visit 
to New Delhi and met President Abdul Kalam, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
and the Congress President Sonia Gandhi. The Prime Minister conveyed to 
Abbas India's continued support to the Palestinian cause and promised to "do 
whatever could be to help the Palestinian people and the state". He also felt that 
the cycle of violence in occupied territories should end as it would be "counter-
productive" for peace in the region. Winding up his first-ever visit here as 
President of Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas told reporters at 
Delhi Airport that the relationship between India and Palestine was "very close 
and very strong"^'*\ 
^"^. "Mahmud Abbas Meets Manmohan", Hindu, May 20, 2005.Also see "India Gives Rs 65 Crore 
Aid to Palestine", Times of India, May 20, 2005 at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-
05-20/india/27838694_1_palestinian-embassy-india-and-palestine-crore-aid 
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In August 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from settlements in Gaza and 
the northern West Bank '^*^ The Government of India in a statement described it 
as a positive development and the beginning of a process that would culminate in 
a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement in accordance with the roadmap 
and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. India hoped that this window of 
opportunity would be used by all sides in taking forward the negotiations that 
would lead, within a reasonable time frame, to the creation of a truly sovereign, 
independent and viable Palestinian State within well-defined and secure borders, 
living side by side at peace with Israel^^. 
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah militants attacked and killed three Israeli 
soldiers and kidnapped two others to Lebanon. This precipitated a major crisis in 
^^ Israel's unilateral disengagement plan also known as the "Disengagement plan", was a 
proposal by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, adopted by the government on June 6, 2004 and 
enacted in August 2005, to evict ail Israelis from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the 
northern West Bank. "Israel's Unilateral Disengagement Plan", Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia 
at:http;//en.wikipedia:org/wiki/lsrael%27s_unilateral_disengagement_plan 
^^ MEA Statement, New Delhi, September 13, 2005. Also see "Speech by Ambassador 
Chinmaya Gharekhan" on 4th December 2005 at the international Institute of Strategic Studies, 
London at: 
http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-iiss-regional-security-summit/manama-diaiogue-archive/gulf-
dialogue-2005/plenary-sessions-and-speeches/day-two-plenary-sessions/ambassador-chinmaya-
gharekhans-speech/ 
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the region and led to the Israel-Hezbollah War^. Within hours after the crisis 
broke, India expressed its condemnation of 'the abduction of the two Israeli 
soldiers and called for their immediate release.' It also condemned the 'excessive 
and disproportionate' Israeli military response "^*^ . 
On July 31, 2006, the Lok Sabha passed a unanimous 246-worded 
government backed resolution that was highly critical of Israel. Without making 
any reference to the kidnapping, it 'unequivocally condemned the large-scale and 
indiscriminate Israeli bombing of Lebanon' and 'killing and suffering of large 
number of innocent civilians including women and children'^ '*^. 
^* The conflict began when militants from the group Hezbollah fired rockets at Israeli border 
towns as a diversion for an anti-tank missile attack on two armoured Humvees patrolling the 
Israeli side of the border fence. The ambush left three soldiers dead. Two additional soldiers, 
believed to have been killed outright or mortally wounded, were taken by Hezbollah to Lebanon. 
Five more were killed in a failed rescue attempt. Israel responded with airstrikes and artillery fire 
on targets in Lebanon that damaged Lebanese civilian infrastructure, including Beirut's Rafic 
Hariri International Airport , an air and naval blockade, and a ground invasion of southern 
Lebanon. Hezbollah then launched more rockets into northern Israel and engaged the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) in guerrilla warfare from hardened positions. The conflict killed at least 
1,200 people, mostly Lebanese citizens, severely damaged Lebanese civil infrastructure, and 
displaced approximately one million Lebanese and 300,000-500,000 Israelis. After the ceasefire, 
some parts of southern Lebanon remained uninhabitable due to Israeli unexploded cluster 
bombiets. For details see "2006 Lebanon War" Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza%E2%80%93lsrael_conflict 
^^ Statement of Official Spokesperson on the Tension at the Israel-Lebanon Border, 13 July 
2006, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 
http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2006/07/13pr01.htm. 
Also see MEA Annual Report, 2006-07 at: http://www.mea. gov. in/mystart.php?id=500412689, 
p.52. 
^^ Resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) on 31st July, 2006 
on Situation in West Asia, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi at: 
http://meaindia.nic.in/pressreiease/2006/07/31pr02.htm. Also see "LS Condemns Israeli Attack on 
Lebanon", Tribune, August 1, 2006 at: http://www.tribuneindia.eom/2006/20060801/nation.htm#1 
and P R Kumaraswamy, "India Sidesteps the Thorny Issue of Hezbollah", Asian Tribune, August 
8, 2006. 
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A few days after the crisis, ttie Prime Minister's special envoy to West 
Asia, Chinmaya Gharekhan went to the region to shore up support for the fragile 
ceasefire. He visited and met leaders of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and while in 
Amman, he also met Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas. Speaking from 
Amman, he declared that his visit to the region was aimed at expressing 
'solidarity with the Lebanese and Palestinian masses in their hour of crisis and 
also to get first hand impression and assessment of the situation'^^. 
During February 20 and March 6, 2007, India issued two official 
statements supporting the agreement on the formation of the National Unity 
Government in the PA (the Mecca Agreement)^^. Despite Israel's strong protest 
an Indian diplomatic representative to the Palestinian Authority met with Hamas 
leader Ismail Haniya. In May 26, 2007, India expressed concern over the 
escalating violence in Palestine and Israel, as well as the arrest of elected 
representatives of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) '^'^ . 
^^ Harinder Mishra, "Mideast Peace Does Not Exist Anymore: India", PTI Features, 24 August 
2006 at: http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=409483. 
'^'^  Hamas & Fatah Mecca Agreement is an agreement between Fatah and Hamas signed In the 
city of Mecca on February 8, 2007 after eight days of talks, agreeing to stop the military clashes 
in Gaza and form a government of national unity. Representatives from the Fatah side included 
the President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas and parliament member Mohammed 
Dahlan. The Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniya and Khaled Mashal represented Hamas. 
"Hamas-Fatah Mecca Agreement" Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas-Fatah_Mecca_Agreement 
For Govt, of India's official statements see MEA website, archival section: "Statement by Official 
Spokesperson on the Agreement in lUecca for the fonvation of the National Unity Government in 
Palestine", New Delhi, February 20, 2007 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290012408 
and "In response to a question on the Mecca Agreement", March 06, 2007, New Delhi, 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290012437 
^^ See MEA statement "In Response to a Question on Developments in Palestine and Israel", 
May 26, 2007, New Delhi at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290012862 
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N. Ravi, Secretary (East) and Director (WANA), visited Palestine on 16 
IVlay 2007 and had a meeting with President Mahmoud Abbas and Deputy Prime 
IVIinister Azzam Ahmad. He also held delegation level meetings with the Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Ahmed Soboh on Indian support to the Palestinian institution 
building^^°. Within the framework of India's commitment to extend political, 
material and technical support to Palestine, Minister of State for External Affairs, 
E. Ahamed visited Palestine on 27 - 28 September 2007 and held talks with 
Ahmad Soboh, the Palestinian Deputy Foreign Minister, Rafiq Husseini, Chief of 
Staff of Presidency, Nimer Hamad, Chief Political Advisor to President, Shaikh 
Ahmad Hussein, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Holy land of Palestine^^\ 
In September 2007, India's Minister of External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee met 
Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu-Mazen), the Palestinian President, in New 
York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly summit. Special Envoy to the 
Middle East Peace Process, C. R. Gharekhan also visited the region twice during 
February and September 2007^^^ 
Mahmoud Abbas, the President of Palestinian National Authority paid a 
state visit to India from 6-9 October, 2008. During his three day visit, he met 
President, Pratibha Devisingh Patil, Vice President, M. Hamid Ansari, Prime 
Minister, Manmohan Singh and the Chairperson of the United Progressive 
^^° MEA, Annual Report, 2007-08 at http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500413902, pp. 52-
53. 
^^ ^ Representative Office of India in Palestine website article on "India Palestine Relationship" at: 
http://www.roi-ramallah.org.ps/2010/india-palestine.html 
^^ ^ MEA Annual Report, 2007-08 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500413902 pp.52-53. 
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Alliance, Sonia Gandhi, the External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, and the 
Minister of State for External Affairs, E. Ahamed. In the presence of the Prime 
Minister, Manmohan Singh, President Mahmoud Abbas laid the foundation stone 
of the Chancery-cum-Residences Complex of the Embassy of Palestine, built in 
New Delhi as a gift of the Government and people of India. The construction of 
the building was entirely funded by the Government of India as a gesture of 
Indian goodwill and friendship for the people of Palestine and as a proof of 
India's "unwavering solidarity and commitment to an independent Palestine"^^^. 
Appreciating India's gesture, President Abbas said: "relations between India and 
Palestine had always been good and that the two countries were making efforts 
to improve such relations". He also stated that "India was giving us support 
without us asking it"^ '^'. Singh and Abbas held wide-ranging talks, during which 
they discussed West Asia peace process, among other issues^^ .^ While talking 
about India's growing engagement with Israel, particularly in the field of defence, 
Abbas said, "India's relations with Israel are its sovereign decision. We are not 
going to interfere. We know very well that India is supportive of the Palestinian 
struggle for achieving its own independence"^^. President Pratibha Patil hosted 
^^ ^ MEA, Annual Report, 2008-09 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500415091, pp. SD-
SL 
^^* Nilofar Suhrawardy, "India Stands Committed To Palestinian Cause", Muslim Observer, 
October 16, 2008 at: http://musiimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=3049. 
^^ ^ "Palestine Authority President Meets PM", Thaindian News, October 7, 2008 at: 
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/india-news/palestine-authority-president-meets-
pm_100104477.html Also see "Palestine President Hails India's Role in West Asia Peace 
Process", One India News, October 7, 2008; "Abbas Lands, May Seel< Larger India Role in Peace 
Process", Indian Express, Oct 07 2008. 
^^ ^ Nilofar Suhrawardy, "India Stands Committed to Palestinian Cause" op cit.. No. 354. 
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a banquet in honour of Abbas^^ .^ In her speech, she recalled India's position on 
the Palestinian question and said its solidarity with the Palestine people had 
been unambiguously articulated since the days of its freedom struggle. "For 
India, commitment to the Palestinian cause has been an important part of foreign 
policy and has been manifested in the continuous and consistent support to its 
issues in the Non-Aligned Movement, in the United Nations and on other 
international fora"^ ^®, she said. A Memorandum of Understanding regarding 
construction and equipping of the Jawaharlal Nehru High School at Abu Dees 
((near Jerusalem) was signed during the visit^ ^ .^ In a joint statement issued 
towards the end of the visit, India "called for an end to the expansion of Israeli 
settlements in occupied Palestine and for an early and significant easing of 
restrictions on the free movement of persons and goods within Palestine"^^°. 
Following Israel's massive and brutal attack against the Hamas in Gaza 
Strip (Dec 2008 - Jan 2009, Operation Cast Lead)^ ^^  which killed thousands of 
^" "Palestinian President Meets President Pratibha Patil", Thaindian News, 08 October 2008 
http://www.thaindian.com/newspoi1al/india-news/palestinian-president-meets-liis-president-
pratibha-patil_100104708. html 
^^ ^ Speech by The President of India, Smt. Pratibha Devisingh Patil at The Banquet in Honour of 
the President of The Palestinian National Authority, H.E. Mahmoud Abbas on October 7, 2008 at: 
http://presidentofindia.nic.in/banq_speeches.html 
^^® Niiofar Suhrawardy, "India Stands Committed to Palestinian Cause" op cit, No. 354. 
''° Ibid. 
^^ ^ The Gaza War, known as Operation Cast Lead in Israel and as the Gaza Massacre in the 
Arab world, was a three-week bombing and invasion of the Gaza Strip by Israel, and hundreds of 
rocket attacks on south of Israel which started on December 27, 2008 with a surprise air strike 
from Israel. Israel's stated aim was to stop rocket fire into Israel and arms import into the Gaza 
strip. Israeli forces attacked police stations and other Hamas government buildings in the opening 
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Palestinian civilians, a statement was issued by the Indian Government on the 
situation in Gaza on 27 December 2008. The statement admitted that India was 
aware of the cross-border provocations in the form of Palestinian rocket attacks 
against targets in southern Israel and urged an immediate end to the use of force 
against Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip that had resulted in large numbers 
of casualties^^^. In a second statement on 29 December, India expressed its 
hope that the military action by Israel would abate and indicated that the 
continued use of disproportionate and indiscriminate force was unwarranted and 
condemnable^^l On 2 January 2009, India urged an immediate end to the 
violence witnessed in Gaza and its environs; so that further casualties amongst 
civilians averted and an atmosphere for the peace process resumed^ "^*. On 4 
January, it condemned the ongoing incursion into Gaza by Israel and urged an 
immediate end to military actions by all concerned^^^. On 9 January, India issued 
yet another statement on the situation in Gaza, calling for an early end to the 
assault, striking in the densely populated cities of Gaza, Khan Younis and Rafah. For details see 
"Gaza War" Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_War 
^" "Statement by Official Spol<esperson on the Situation in Gaza", MEA, New Delhi, December 
27, 2008 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014593 
^^ ^ "Official Spokesperson's Statement on Situation in Gaza", MEA, New Delhi, December 29, 
2008, at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014596 
^^ ^ "Statement by Official Spokesperson about Assistance from Government of India in Response 
to Gaza Flash Appeal", MEA, New Delhi, January 2, 2009 at: 
http://www.mea,9ov.in/mystart.php?id=290014603 
^^ "Statement by Official Spokesperson on Situation in Gaza", MEA, New Delhi, January 4, 2009 
at: January 04, 2009 http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014609 
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suffering of the people of Gaza and a return to a dialogue and resumption of the 
peace process^^ .^ 
The Communist parties and the regional parties in India singled out the 
Israeli operation in Gaza for criticism, as did Prime Minister Singh, who strongly 
condemned Israel's operation in Gaza, which, he said, had led to the needless 
loss of many innocent lives. These five official statements and the Indian media 
criticism were centred on the heavy destruction and civilian casualties In Gaza. 
According to Itzhak Gerberg, the Indian stand can be considered sober and 
balanced for two reasons: first, for New Delhi, there was only one Palestinian 
leadership, that of Mahmud Abbas, who remained silent when the Gaza Strip 
was literally on fire. Second, the Indian left-wing parties had generally weakened 
and their withdrawal of support for the UPA government over the Indo-US 
nuclear agreement diminished their political influence^ '^'. 
The Prime Minister in his message on the occasion of the International 
Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People stated that concerted and all round 
action was necessary to invigorate the peace process with the objective 
of achieving a durable, comprehensive and just settlement^ ^ .^ 
President Mahmoud Abbas visited India in February 2010. Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh met the visiting President on 11 February 2010 to exchange 
^^^"Official Spokesperson's Statement on Gaza Situation" MEA, New Delhi, January 9, 2009 at: 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014621. Also see MEA, Annual Report, 2008-09 at: 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500415091 p 50-51. 
^" Gerberg, India-Israel Relations op oil, No. 190, pp.79-80. Also see P.R. Kumaraswamy, 
"India and Israel Evolving Strategic Partnership," Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-
llan University, Israel, September 1998. 
^^ ^ MEA, Annual Report, 2009-10 al http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500415660, p. 111. 
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views on the fresh efforts at initiating a peace process in the troubled region. 
The Russian proposal for the meeting of the 'Quartet' (the European Union, 
Russia, the United Nations and the U.S.) was also discussed. Later Shashi 
Tharoor, Minister of State for External Affairs met President Mahmoud Abbas 
and reassured the visiting dignitary of New Delhi's support for peace and 
development in the Middle East^ ^ .^ 
At a function at the Indian Council for World Affairs (ICWA) to mark the 
'International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People' which is observed on 
November 29, Minister of State for External Affairs, Shashi Tharoor remarked 
that "Palestine had always occupied a special place in the hearts of my 
countrymen". He went on to add that "India's solidarity with the Palestinian 
people and its approach to the Palestinian question were guided by that apostle 
of peace, Mahatma Gandhi, and the struggle that he inspired for our 
independence"^^°. 
On 31®* May, 2010, ten peace activists aboard the Flottila carrying 
humanitarian aid for people trapped in Gaza were shot dead and many more 
injured by the Israeli forces^^\ As usual, India criticised the Israeli action. The 
'Tharoor Meets Abbas, Assures India's Support to Palestine" February 13, 2010 at: 
http.7/www.ummid.com/news/2010/February/13.02.2010/tharoor_meets_abbas_palestine.htm 
^^° "India Seeks Revive! of Peace Process in West Asia", Hindu, December 2, 2009. 
^^ ^ The Gaza flotilla raid was a military operation by Israel against six ships of the "Gaza Freedom 
Flotilla" on 31 May 2010 in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea. The flotilla, organized 
by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief (iHH), was carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials, with the 
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External Affairs spokesman Vishnu Prakash told reporters that "India deplored 
the tragic loss of life and the reports of killings and injuries to people on the boats 
carrying supplies for Gaza. There can be no justification for such indiscriminate 
use offeree, which we condemn"^''^ 
Nabeel Shaath, former Foreign Minister of Palestine visited India 
from 23-25 August 2011 as Special Envoy of the Palestine National Authority 
President Mahmoud Abbas. He called on External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna 
and also met Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahamed. He handed over 
messages from PNA President addressed to President and Prime Minister of 
India. He sought India's support for the Palestinian cause especially during the 
UN General Assembly session in September 2011. The External Affairs Minister 
reiterated India's strong and unwavering support to the Palestinian cause and 
assured that India would continue to adhere to its principled stand on 
Palestine^^^ 
The Prime Minister in his message on the occasion of International Day of 
Solidarity with the Palestinian People reiterated India's unwavering support for 
the Palestinian people's struggle for a sovereign, independent, viable and united 
State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital living within secure and 
intention of breaking the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the Gaza Strip. For details see "Gaza Flotilla 
Raid", Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ga2a_fl0tilia_raid 
372 
''Statement on Incident Involving Boats Carrying Supplies for Gaza", MEA, New Delhi, May 31, 
2010 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290015819. Also see Ninan Koshy, "India: Israel 
and Palestine", Foreign Policy Research Council Journal, (New Delhi) No.5, 2011, pp.139-151. 
For a different view see Nitin Pal, "The Palestinian Card", Yahoo News India, June 08, 2010. 
373 
"Palestine Seeks India's Support for Statehood", Thaindian News, 24 August 2011 at: 
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategori2ed/paiestine-seeks-indias-support-for-
statehood 100558934.html 
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recognized borders, side by side and at peace with Israel as endorsed In the 
Arab Peace initiative, Quartet Road map and relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions^''^ 
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna visited Palestine on January 11, 
2012, the first ever visit by an Indian Foreign Minister in over a decade after 
Jaswant Singh. He met Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and 
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and reiterated India's strong support to the 
Palestinian cause. The Minister also held bilateral talks with his Palestinian 
counterpart Riyad al-MaIki and attended a wreath laying ceremony on the 
Mausoleum of Yasser Arafat '^'^ . On the conclusion of his visit, he said Israel and 
Palestine should continue with their talks and come out with a permanent 
solution to the long pending issue^^ .^ 
Support at the International Forums 
Besides supporting the cause of Palestine through bilateral visits, India 
also tried to build international opinion in favour of Palestine at various 
international forums such as the United Nations and NAM. India regretted the 
expulsion by Israel of more than 400 Palestinians from the occupied territories 
and urged Israel to rescind the expulsion order. India as President of the Security 
Council was instrumental in having UN Security Council Resolution No 799 of 18 
^^ "^  MEA Annual Report 2010-11 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500417371, p.107. 
"^ "Krishna Arrives in Ramaliah; To Meet Palestinian Leadership", Hindu, January 11, 2012. 
^^® "Negotiated Settlement of Palestinian Issue", Indian Express, January 12, 2012. 
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December 1992 passed, which inter alia condemned Israel for the expulsions '^'^ . 
Moreover, India also maintained its consistent support for the peace process in 
West Asia. India's Permanent Representative to the UN, C R Gharekhan was 
appointed by the UNSG as his Special Representative for West Asia beginning 
1993. This appointment was welcomed by all the States in the Middle East 
Peace Process '^'^ .lndia repeatedly expressed its concern at the continued 
escalation of violence which derailed the peace process and strongly condemned 
the Israeli attacks against the offices of President Arafat and other Palestinian 
institutions '^'^ . India stressed that nothing should be done to undermine the 
authority of President Arafat, who in his person embodied the Palestinian 
struggle which India had supported for decades as a cardinal principle of foreign 
policy. Minister of State for External Affairs U.V Krisnam Raju represented India 
at the NAM Ministerial Conference on Palestine held in Pretoria on May 3, 2001. 
During his stay, Raju called on President Arafat and reiterated to him India's 
consistent and unwavering support to the Palestinian cause^®°. 
^" MEA Annual Report 1992-93 at: http://mealib.nic.in/72020, p.45. 
"^ Ibid, p. 84. 
379 
Israeli ground forces attacked Yasir Arafat's compound in Ramallah on June 6, 2006, 
surrounding his offices with tanl<s, after 17 Israelis, including 13 soldiers, were killed in a 
Palestinian suicide attack on a bus in northern Israel. James Bennet, "Mideast Turmoil: The 
Overview; Israel Attacks Arafat Compound in Swift Response After Palestinian Suicide Bombing 
Kills 17 in Bus", New York Times, June 06, 2002 at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/06/world/mideast-turmoil-overview-israel-attacks-arafat-
compound-swift-response-after,html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
^^ ° MEA Annual Report, 2001-02 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50046684, pp. 42-43 
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In the recent past, India co-sponsored the draft resolution on "the Right 
of Palestinians to Self-Determination" during the 53"^ ^ session of the UN General 
Assembly (8 September to 18 December 1998 at New York) and voted in favour 
of it. India also voted in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution in October 
2003 against construction of the security wall by Israel and supported 
subsequent resolutions of the UNGA in this regard^^\ At this time, there was 
media report that the Israeli government was contemplating for expelling or 
physically liquidating Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. India's Permanent 
Representative in the United Nations, Vijay Nambiar, told an open meeting of the 
U.N. Security Council in September, 2003 that removing Arafat from the scene 
"would be indefensible in international law. It represents an affront to the 
Palestinian people and the international community at large and must attract the 
severest condemnation worldwide." Nambiar also emphasised that India 
"condemns all acts of terrorist violence and reiterates its position that there is no 
justification whatsoever for attacks against unarmed civilians, women and 
children"^^^. 
India participated at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAM Committee on 
Palestine held at Putrajaya, Malaysia on 13 May 2004 which decided to establish 
a Ministerial delegation to be led by the Malaysian chair, to interact with the 
^^ ^ Representative Office of India in Palestine website article on "India Palestine Relationstiip" at: 
http://www.roi-ramallah.org.ps/2010/india-palestine.html 
^^ ^ John Cherian, "A Visit and its Aftermath". Frontline, Volume 20 - Issue 20, September 27 
October 10, 2003 
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Quartet (UN, EU, US and Russia) and the P-5, to facilitate forward movement in 
the IVliddie East peace process. Reiterating its solidarity with the Palestinian 
cause and expressing concern at the grave political and humanitarian situation in 
the occupied territories and the unravelling of the peace process, the meeting 
also urged the U.N. Security Council to authorize an international presence and 
establish a UN Peacekeeping Mission in the occupied territories; convene a 
special meeting on Palestine on the sidelines of the next UNGA and further 
mobilize international public opinion and civil society. India also supported 
adoption, by the General Assembly, of the NAM resolution entitled "Reaffirming 
the Central Role of the United Nations in the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security and Promotion of International Cooperation" on 5 August 
2004^^1 
The situation in the Middle East was a matter of continued debate in the 
UN in 2004. The Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on 
the Situation in the Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory was reconvened on 16-20 July 2004 to consider the item on 
the "Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory". India made a statement at the meeting and voted in favour of the 
resolution which, inter alia, acknowledged the advisory opinion of the 
international Court of Justice. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 150 votes' 
in favour, 6 against and 10 abstentions. Consideration of Agenda Items on the 
situation in the Middle East and the Question of Palestine was taken up at the 
^" MEA Annual Report, 2004-05 at; http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500410405, p.110. 
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General Assembly on 29-30 November 2004. Several countries, including India, 
participated in the debate on these items. While expressing regret and 
condolences over the death of President Arafat, most speakers called upon the 
parties concerned to put an end to violence and resume political dialogue 
through implementation of the "Quartet" Roadmap^^. Many delegations were 
of the view that elections scheduled in the Palestinian Authority and Israel's 
disengagement plan offered new opportunities to fulfill the vision of two States 
living side by side within secure and recognised borders. India voted in favour of 
the traditional resolutions under the above agenda items. India also participated 
in an open debate of the Security Council on the item 'The situation in the Middle 
East'^ ^^ 
Anand Sharma, IVIinister of State, led the Indian delegation to the first 
Human Rights Council's session held in Geneva from 19-30 June 2006. The 
Council, inter alia, adopted a Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous People 
as well as Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. 
India participated actively in deliberations of the Council, including in the 
Special Sessions convened in July, October, November and December, 2006 to 
*^* The Roadmap, which is a performance-based plan for a permanent two-state solution - Israel 
and Palestine - to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, was presented by US President George W. 
Bush and officially published by the USA, Russia, the EU and the UN ("The Quartet") in April 
2003 as an outline to renew the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The first phase of the roadmap 
refers to the end of terror and violence against Israel and the normalization of the situation on the 
Palestinian side, which will be followed by Israel's withdrawal from the Palestinian territories taken 
over since the beginning of the second Intifada (September 2000) and a freeze of all Israeli 
settlement activities on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Phase two focuses on efforts to 
establish a Palestinian state with provisional borders. Phase three includes an international 
conference to discuss and work out a permanent status agreement between the two countries 
(Reuters, 30 April 2003). 
^^ ^ MEA Annual Report, 2004-05 op cit, No. 383. 
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discuss issues relating to crisis in Palestine, Lebanon and Darfur. The UNGA 
adopted by consensus two Conventions entitled 'International Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (13 December 2006) and 'International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance' (20 
December 2006)^^ .^ 
The Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh led the Indian delegation to the 14'^  
Summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Havana from 11-16 
September 2006. Stressing the need for a durable peace in West Asia, Prime 
Minister said "I would recommend that we constitute a suitable high level group 
for West Asia. The group could undertake a sustained mission to promote 
understanding in the region and assist in the implementation of the agreed 
roadmap towards a comprehensive peace. The international community must 
address more fully its responsibility to resolve this issue and bring to an end once 
and for all the long years of suffering, of the Palestinian people^^ .^ 
India remained engaged in the UN's consideration of the Middle East 
issue in the UN General Assembly, and where feasible, at the Security Council. 
India's views on the need for a return to the process of dialogue, and for an early 
end to the cycle of violence and counter-violence had been underlined repeatedly 
at various fora. Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahamed made a 
statement on agenda item: 17 and 18 'The Situation in the Middle East' and 
^^ MEA Annual Report, 2006-07 op cit., No. 345, p. 108. 
^" "Statement by ttie Prime Minister of India Dr Manmohan Singti at Tlie XlVtti Summit Of The 
Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba", MEA, New Delhi, September 15, 2006 at: 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290011851. Also see MEA, Annual Report 2006-07 at 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500412689, p.114. 
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'Question of Palestine' at the 62nd Session of UNGA on 30 November 2007. 
Statements were also made by the Indian delegation during consideration of 
issues relating to the Middle East in the Fourth Committee^^^. Meanwhile, the 
External Affairs Minister also participated in the NAM Ministerial Committee on 
Palestine, held on 25 September 2007 on the margins of the UN General 
Assembly session^^ .^ 
India participated in the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership Ministerial 
Conference on Capacity Building for Palestine at Jakarta in July 2008^^°. In July 
2008, at the ministerial meeting in Tehran of the NAM Committee on Palestine, 
India's Minister of External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee pledged to continue to 
work with other members of the committee in an endeavour to collectively 
support the Palestinian cause^^\ 
India remained engaged in the consideration in the UN of the Middle East 
issue in the UN General Assembly (both in the Fourth Committee and at the 
Plenary). India underscored its belief in the need for progress to be made in the 
bilateral Israel-Palestine dialogue process that was resumed by the Annapolis 
Conference in November 2007. Following Israel's military operations in Gaza 
between December 2008 and January 2009, the President of the 63rd UNGA 
called for the resumption of the Tenth Emergency Session of the UNGA in the 
third week of January 2009 which was suspended since December 2006, to 
^^® MEA, Annual Report 2007-08 at http.7/www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?ici=500413902, p. 90. 
^^ ^ Ibid, p. 96. 
^^° MEA Annual Report, 2008-09 at http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500415091, pp.50-51. 
''' Ibid. 
165 
press for an immediate ceasefire by Israel in line with the UNSCR 1860 of 
January 2009. India's statements continued to reflect the balanced position of the 
Government of India on the larger situation in the Middle East, and on the 
primacy of humanitarian concerns in the immediate context of the conflict in 
Gaza. India's long-standing, historic and consistent affirmation of support for the 
inalienable rights of the Palestinian people was underlined at all occasions, while 
reiterating its resolute opposition to all acts of terror and violence^^^. 
External Affairs Minister, S. M. Krishna led the Indian delegation to the 
NAM Ministerial meeting held from 13-14 July, 2009 just before the NAM 
Summit. He also participated in the Ministerial Meeting of the NAM Committee on 
Palestine held on 13 July, 2009^^^ Similarly, the Indian Prime Minister Singh 
raised the issue of Palestine in his address at the 15th summit of the NAM (11-16 
July) at Sharm al-Sheikh in July 2009. He stated that "Meeting as we do on Arab 
soil, my thoughts turn to the people of Palestine, who have endured great 
suffering and hardship. Our Movement must do more to facilitate a 
comprehensive, just, lasting and peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue"^^. 
India remained engaged in the consideration of the Middle East issue in 
the Fourth Committee as well as the Plenary of the 64**^  UNGA (September 
2009). India's statements on the Palestinian issue reiterated its long-standing, 
historic and steadfast support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people 
^^^MEA Annual Report, 2008-09 op cit, No. 390, pp.50-51. 
393 MEA, Annual Report, 2009-10 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?icl=500415660, p. 112. 
®^* "Statement by the Prime Minister at the XV Summit of the Non Aligned Movement. MEA, New 
Delhi, July 15, 2009 at: http://w\ww.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?icl=290015039. 
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including their right to live in a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of 
Palestine within secure and recognized borders, side by side at peace with Israel 
as endorsed in the Quartet Roadmap and UNSC Resolutions1397 & 1515. 
India's statements also underscored its commitment to support Palestinian 
people in pursuit of their legitimate goals and their efforts aimed at economic and 
social development with dignity and self-reliance while reiterating its resolute 
opposition to all acts of terror and violence. Stressing on the primacy of 
humanitarian concerns in the Gaza Strip, India called for an end to Israeli 
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory and easing restrictions on free 
movement of goods and persons within Palestine^^ .^ 
India had voted in favour of a UN resolution (drafted by Arab and NAM 
nations) that was put to vote in the General Assembly on November 5, 2009 
endorsing the Goldstone Report (also known as the UN Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Gaza Conflict) which required Israel and Palestine to investigate war crimes 
in the Gaza Strip^^ .^ Expressing support for the resolution, the Indian deputy 
envoy to the United Nations, Manjeev Singh Purl, said, "Our commitment to the 
Palestinian cause is complete"^^ .^ Meanwhile, India also expressed its 
^^ ^ MEA Annual Report 2009-10 opcit. No. 393, p. 111. 
^^ ^ Prepared by the UN Fact Finding IVIission and headed by South African judge Richard 
Goldstone, the report accused both Hamas and Israeli forces of war crimes in the Gaza strip from 
December 2008 to January 2009. The Commission stated that Israel had used disproportionate 
force, targeted Palestinian civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure. It was also critical of 
Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups for mounting rocket attacl<s against Israeli civilian 
targets. The non-binding UN Resolution called for independent investigations by Israel and the 
"Palestinian side" on allegations of war crimes raised in the Goldstone report. Both Israel and 
Hamas rejected the allegations. 
^^ ^ "India Backs UN Report on War Crimes in Gaza", November 6th, 2009 at liveLeak.com. Also 
see "India Expresses Reservations on Goldstone Report", November 05, 2009 atzeenews.com 
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reservations on the report, including on involvement of the International 
Criminal Court and the UN Security Council as well as on some of the 
procedures adopted by the Goldstone Report^ ^ .^ 
Minister of External Affairs Shri S. M. Krishna participated in the NAM 
Ministerial as well as IBSA+lndonesia+ Palestine on 'Palestine' in New York on 
the sidelines of 65th UNGA In September 2010 during which India welcomed 
"direct talks" between Israel and Palestine^^ .^ 
India co-sponsored and voted in favour of a draft resolution at the United 
Nations on February 18, 2011 that termed Israeli settlement policies 'illegal.' 
India's Explanation of Vote affirmed that India's decision was 'consistent with its 
long-standing position of solidarity with the Palestinian people and its position 
that the settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are illegal under 
international law...' That resolution was, however, vetoed by the United States -
the first such veto by the Obama administration^"". 
Frustrated at a two-year deadlock with Israeli negotiators, the Palestine 
President Mahmoud Abbas had submitted an application to the UN to be 
recognized as a state. Supporting the Palestinian bid, Prime Minister in his 
speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2011, stated that "The 
Palestinian question still remained unresolved and a source of great instability 
and violence. India is steadfast in its support for the Palestinian people's struggle 
^^® MEA Annual Report 2009-10, op cit No. 393. p.111. 
^^® MEA Annual Report 2010-11 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500417371, p.107. 
''°° S. Samuel C. Rajiv, "Palestine's Strongest Ally", The Diplomat, September 21, 2011. 
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for a sovereign, independent, viable and united state of Palestine with East 
Jerusalem as its capital, living within secure and recognizable borders side by 
side and at peace with Israel". The Prime Minister also added that India looked 
forward to welcoming Palestine as an equal member of the United Nations and 
thought that the time was not far when Palestinians would realize their dream to 
have a state of their own and an honourable member of the international 
community'*"^ 
Clarifying India's support of the Palestinians' statehood bid, India's 
Permanent Representative, Hardeep Singh Puri said that the Palestinians' 
membership application of the UN 'was not incompatible with, nor did it exclude, 
direct negotiations between the parties to resolve the final status issues"*°^. It 
may be noted, direct talks between Israel and Palestine have been stalled since 
September 2010. While Palestine is not against talks with Israel, it is against 
pursuing them without a freeze on Jewish settlements. 
In a significant advance for the Palestine cause, the General Conference 
of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
""^  "Statement by the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Generai Debate of the 66th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly", MEA, New Delhi, September 24, 2011 at: 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290018311 
""^  "India Backs Palestinian Bid for UN Membership", Indo Asian News Sen/ice, September 30, 
2011.Also see S. Samuel C. Rajiv, "India and the Palestinian Bid for Statehood at the UN", IDSA 
Comment, November 19, 2011 at: 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/indiaandthePaiestinianBidforStatehoodattheUN_sscrajiv_19091 
1 
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despite strong opposition by the US and Israel had voted by 107 to 14 with 52 
abstentions and 21 absentees to admit Palestine as a full nnember'*°^ . India along 
with Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa, and France voted in favour'*" .^ 
Minister of State, E. Ahamed visited Palestine from November 1 8 - 1 9 , 
2011 for participating in the handing over ceremony of IBSA (India, Brazil and 
South Africa) Multipurpose Sports Centre at Ramallah. The Sports Centre is the 
first project completed with IBSA funding for the Palestinian National Authority 
and two more IBSA-funded projects are being proactively pursued: the 
rehabilitation of the 'Al-Quds Hospital' in Gaza; and construction of a 'Centre for 
People with Special Needs' in Nablus. During his inaugural speech, the Minister 
stated that "It is a gift of people of IBSA countries to the people of Palestine. The 
Government and the People of India remain committed to assist the Palestinian 
people in their exercise of nation building in all sectors, including areas of niche 
expertise"'*°^.The Palestinian leadership expressed appreciation for the 
developmental and humanitarian assistance provided by the IBSA countries, as 
well as, for their support for Palestinian membership of UN and UNESCO. Along 
^°^ The US voted against the move saying tliat the proposal was 'regrettable' and would 
undermine a just and lasting peace in the region. Directly after the vote, the US acted on a 1990s 
law requiring it end payments to any UN body that admitted Palestine. UNESCO would lose 
about $ 70 million a month or some 22 per cent of its budget. Israel has stopped its 3 per cent 
contribution to the organisation and is accelerating settlement construction in the illegally 
occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. It has also frozen customs and other revenues of about 
$ 100 million a month which it collects for the Palestinian Authority, as the latter has no control 
over its own borders. For more see "Punishing Palestinians". Editorial, Hindu, 10 November, 
2011. 
^°'' "UNESCO Membership for Palestine", Hindu, November 1, 2011. 
""^  "Speech by MOS (EA) at tlie inauguration of IBSA Sports Complex in Ramallah, MEA, 
Speeches and Statements, November 19, 2011 at: 
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530118555 
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with IBSA delegations, the Ahamed called President, Mahmoud Abbas and 
Foreign Minister. Riyad Malki. MOS reiterated Government of India's continued 
support to Palestine in their efforts to achieve a just solution to the Middle East 
conflict. He also assured the Palestinian leadership of India's support in their 
efforts in state building'*"^. 
Economic and Humanitarian Support for Nation Building 
In addition to strong political and diplomatic support at the bilateral and 
international levels, India has also tried to help the Palestinians through 
economic, technical and humanitarian assistance, especially after the 
establishment of the PNA in 1994 in pursuance of the Oslo principles. The Indian 
Ambassador to Jordan A. K. Budhiraja met President Yasser Arafat on 
September 6, 1994 and conveyed Government of India's decision to send one 
million dollars of assistance to the Palestinian people. President Arafat 
appreciated India's gesture'^ ^ .^ 
In 1995, India first recognised the passport travel documents issued by the 
PNA. On June 1996, India's representative office in the PNA administered area 
(Gaza City) was opened. The office was aimed at 'further strengthening the 
close friendly relations' between India and the Palestine people and to 'promote, 
expand and diversify these relations in economic, commercial, cultural and other 
*°^" Visit of MOS Stiri E Ahamed to Palestine and Jordan", MEA Press Release, November 21, 
2011 at: http://meainciia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530218556 
'^°^ Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XL, No 1 January, 1994, http://mealib.nic.in/far/1994.pdf, p.225 
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fields'''^^ On its part, the PNA sought India's help and cooperation in the fields of 
infrastructure and technology. 
At the Washington Donors Conference in October, 1995, India pledged, 
and met, US$ 1 million for assistance to the Palestinian people. At the 
subsequent pledging conference in Paris in January, 1996, India pledged another 
US$1 million in assistance to the Palestinians, which was utilised for construction 
of a Library-cum-Activity Centre at the Palestinian Technical College in Deir-EI-
Balah and another Library at the Al-Azhar University in Gaza'*°^ 
In November 1997, during President Arafat's visit to India, a Memorandum 
of Understanding was signed between the two sides. The MOU provided for 
promoting scientific, technical and industrial cooperation including provision of 
training facilities in specialised areas and undertaking of mutually agreed 
projects. The MOU further provided for promoting commercial and economic 
cooperation including institutional linkages between the Chambers of Commerce 
& Industry and exchange of business delegations. Further spheres included 
education, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the field of information.'*^" 
Following a visit of a security delegation to India in March, 1997, led by the 
Head of the Palestinian Security Forces, Maj. Gen. Nasser Yussef, India offered 
""^  For more on Representative Office of India in Palestine see office website at: http://www.roi-
ramallah.org.ps/2010/india-palestine.html 
""^  Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XLIII, No UANUARY 1997 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1997.pdf, p. 
185. 
''^ ° Represeritative Office of India in Palestine website article on "India Palestine Relationship" at: 
http://www.roi-ramallah.org.ps/2010/india-palestine.html 
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51 specialised security training slots to Palestinians in various disciplines during 
the year 1997-98, which accounted for an estimated expenditure of Rs. 55 lakhs. 
Indian Government beared all the expenditure on training cost, 'including 
boarding, lodging, study tours, books, uniforms, etc'*^\ India also continued to 
offer 8 scholarships under ICCR Schemes to Palestinian students for higher 
studies in India, while also offering several slots for training courses under the 
ITEC Programme'*^^ 
In June 1998, two MoUs and Agreed Minutes for the implementation of 
two Indian aided projects namely the Jawaharlal Nehru library at Al-Azhar 
University and the Mahatma Gandhi library at the Palestine Technical College in 
Deir Al-Albalah in Gaza Strip were signed. At yet another International Donors 
Conference in Washington DC on 30 November, 1998, India pledged another 
US$1 million as assistance to Palestine'*^ .^ Out of the latter, a sum of US$ 
300,000/- had been disbursed to Al-Azhar University in Gaza for the construction 
of two additional floors to its library. The remaining amount was utilised for a 
Human Resource Development Programme. India added more than 50 training 
slots, at a cost of Rs. 40.63 lakhs, to Palestinian personnel for specialised 
training courses during the financial year 1998-99, where 58 Palestinian officers 
"^ ^ Foreign Affairs Record, 1997 op cit., No. 409, p. 185. 
"^ ^ The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme was launched on 15th 
September, 1964 as a bilateral programme of assistance of the Government of India. It is the 
flagship programme of the Indian Government's technical cooperation effort, not only because of 
-its wide geographical coverage but also for innovative forms of technical cooperation. Being 
essentially bilateral in nature, ITEC is about cooperation and partnership for mutual benefit. It is 
demand-driven and response-oriented. It is focused on addressing the needs of developing 
countries. For more see Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme at MEA 
website at: http://www.itec.mea.gov.in/ 
" " Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XLIV, No 1 January, 1998 at: http://mealib.nic.in/far/1998.pdf ,p. 
275. 
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completed their training. During the financial year 1999-2000, 38 more 
Palestinian officers utilised the facilities for training'* '^'. 
India gifted medicines and food supplies worth Rs. 75 lakhs and hospital 
equipment worth Rs. 1.40 crores approximately to Minister of Health of Palestine 
Riad Zanoun. Joint Secretary WANA visited Gaza on 15 July 2001 to formally 
hand over the medical supplies to the Palestinian Ministry of health'*^ .^ 
The volume of direct bilateral trade between India and Palestine which 
was US$ 5.2 million in 1998 increased to US$ 32 million in 2003. Products 
imported from India include fabrics, yarns, readymade garments, household 
appliances, stationery products, leather products, industrial tools and 
accessories, basmati rice, spices, vaccines and pharmaceutical products, 
sanitary wares, marble and granltes'*^ .^ 
E. Ahamed, Minister of State for External Affairs visited Palestine from 17-
19 September 2004. During the visit. Minister of State for External Affairs 
formally handed over medicines and TATA Safari vehicles worth Rs. 2 crore as 
donation to the Palestinian National Authority. A special course for 10 Palestinian 
diplomats had been organized by Foreign Service Institute of the Ministry of 
External Affairs from 22 November to 17 December 2004^ *^ .^ 
"'^ Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia, "India-Palestine Relations" at: 
http://en.wikipedla.org/wiki/lndia%E2%80%93Palestine_relations 
"^ ^ MEA Annual Report 2001-02 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50046684, pp. 42-43. 
"^ ^ Representative Office of India in Palestine website article on "India Palestine Relationship" at 
http://www.roi-ramallah.org.ps/2010/india-palestine.html. Also see MEA document on "India-
Palestine Relations", 2011 at: http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50044508 
^^ ^ MEA Annual Report 2004-05, op cit, No. 383, p. 59. 
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On August 2, 2005, Prime Minister Ahmed Qrei' said India had earmarked 
$15 million for different projects in Palestine and abroad. The projects included a 
Palestinian Embassy in Delhi, a college in Ramallah, a cardiology health centre 
in Nablus (Al Shifa Hospital), a new Prime l\/linistry in Ramallah and a school in 
Abu Abu Dees in Jerusalem, a Software Technology & Industrial Park in Gaza, a 
Centre for Indian Studies and Chair for Indian Studies at the Al-Quds University 
in Jerusalem and a park and zoo in Jenin"*^ .^ 
India announced humanitarian assistance of Rs.10 crores (US$ 2.3 
million) on 13 May 2006 to Palestine, to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian 
people following the freezing of aid by US, EU countries and non-transfer of 
taxes amounting to over US$50 million a month by Israel which it collects on 
behalf of Palestine, consequent on the formation of Government by Hamas after 
elections to Palestine Legislative Council in January 2006. As a part of the 
humanitarian assistance India sent life saving drugs identified by the Palestinian 
authorities. The first batch of medicines weighing 2500 kgs was handed over to 
the Palestinian authorities on 10 August 2006. The second batch of medicines 
weighing 8,500 kgs was handed over to the Palestinian authority on 28 
September 2006. The third batch of medicines weighing 10,500 kgs was handed 
over to the Palestinian authorities on 14 November 2006. The fourth 
"^ ^ "Indian aid to Palestine", August 03, 2005 at: http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-
affairs/58459-indian-aid-palestine.html 
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batch of medicines was handed over to the Palestinian Authority on 17 
December 2006'^ ^^ 
Younis Al-Khatib, Advisor to the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on 
health affairs who received the aid was highly appreciative of the timely supply of 
desperately needed life-saving drugs and profusely thanked the Government and 
the people of India for their unwavering support to the Palestinian people and 
lauded India's firm stand with the Palestinians at this critical time. The solidarity 
of the Government of India with the Palestinian people and to the Palestinian 
cause was reiterated on the occasion^^°. 
India attended the International Donors' Conference on Palestine in Paris 
in December 2007 and pledged US$ 5 million for Palestine for development 
projects. It also agreed to train 400 Palestinian officials under the ITEC 
programme^^V India also participated in the New Asia-Africa Strategic 
Partnership Ministerial Conference on Capacity Building for Palestine at Jakarta 
in July 2008. In this conference, India committed to provide 60 ITEC slots to the 
Palestinian people for training courses annually, which later were increased to 80 
slots"*^ .^ Similarly, during the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas's state visit 
to India from 6-9 October 2008, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh announced 
a grant of US$ 10 million as budgetary support to the Palestine National Authority 
^^ ^ MEA Annual Report 2006-07 op cit., No. 345, p.59. 
*^° "On the Handing over of Humanitarian Aid to Palestine", MEA, New Delhi, August 11, 2006 at: 
http://unispal.un.Org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/0211C212D9F59EAA852571C7005CBC57 
"^ ^ IVIEA Annual Report 2007-08 op cit, No. 388, p. 52-53. 
"^ ^ MEA Annual Report 2008-09 op cit., No. 390, p. 50-51. 
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as well as an additional US$ 10 million in project assistance for Palestinian 
development programmes'^ ^a 
India enhanced its contribution to the UN Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) 
during 2009 which was 60'^  anniversary year for its establishment for 
undertaking relief work in the occupied Palestinian territories from US$ 20,000 to 
US$ 1 million. The agency provides education, health, micro-finance and social 
services to more than four million refugees spread across Lebanon, Jordan, 
Syria and the Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. India 
also provided US$ 10 million as budget support to the Palestinian National 
Authority after the International Conference to Support the Palestinian Economy 
for the Reconstruction of Gaza held in Sharm-el-Sheikh in March 2009"*^ ". 
Appreciating India's "timely help" of USD 11 million in budgetary 
assistance and humanitarian relief in the aftermath of Gaza war, the Palestinian 
Authority had said that New Delhi was a "true friend" of the Palestinians. It may 
be mentioned here that India was among the first to contribute the humanitarian 
aid to the people of Gaza through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
after Israel wreaked havoc on the civilians there during the December 2008-
January 2009 attacks. According to the PNA Foreign Minister Ahmed Soboh "It 
(India) has proved itself a true friend and well wisher of the Palestinian masses 
'''Ibid 
^^ * MEA Annual Report, 2009-10 op cit, No. 393, p. 111. 
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by being among the first ones to provide the Palestinian Authority (PA) with 
budgetary support""^^. 
India contributed US$ 1 million to the United Nations Relief Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for the year 2010'*^ .^ Moreover, 
following President Mahmoud Abbas visit to India in February 2010, Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh announced US$ 10 million as untied budget support to 
the Palestinian National Authority''^ ^. In February 2010 during the visit of Hasan 
Abu Libdeh, Minister of National Economy, PNA a Memorandum of 
Understanding for cooperation was signed between the Federation of Palestinian 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture (FPCCIA) and Federation of 
Indian Chamber of Commerce Industry (FICCI)'*^ .^ 
The Minister of State for External Affairs visited Palestine from November 
18 - 19, 2011 to participate in the handing over ceremony of IBSA Multipurpose 
Sports Centre at Ramallah. The Commissioner General of UNRWA, Filippo 
Grandi met the Indian Minister who handed over a cheque of US$ 1 million as 
India's annual contribution to the UNRWA for 2011-12 to be utilized for 'providing 
daily supplement of food assistance to more than 76,000 students attending 
UNRWA schools in Gaza for 50 school days under the UNRWA's Emergency 
"^ ^ "Indian Aid to Palestine Makes it a "True Friend": PA" May 8,2009 at: 
http://news.chennaionline.com/new$item.aspx?NEWSID=c5d5619a-0b27-4805-b35a-
78a7df5d4344&CATEGORYNAME=INTER 
"^ ^ MEA Annual Report 2010-11 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500417371, pp. 48-49. 
*" Ibid, p. W7 
"^ ^ MEA Document on "India-Palestine Relations, New Delhi, July 2011. 
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Programme in Gaza strip'. The Minister assured UNRWA Commissioner of the 
Government of India's continued support in its operations and In its efforts to 
alleviate the sufferings of Palestinian refugees''^^ India is also actively involved in 
two more IBSA-funded projects that are being proactively pursued: the 
rehabilitation of the 'Al-Quds Hospital' in Gaza; and construction of a 'Centre for 
People with Special Needs' in Nablus. 
India's Support to Palestine: A Critique 
While the Government of India claims that there has not been any change 
in its Palestinian policy and it continues to provide adequate political and 
economic support to the people of Palestine from time to time, this is challenged 
by a number of leaders, scholars, journalists and activists. They argue that at 
one time, India had a consistent and unwavering record of support to the 
Palestinian cause. But now it is reduced to mere statements, resolutions and 
occasional economic assistance. This is not even whole heartedly. 
Criticising the Indian media for its partial coverage of Arafat's press 
conference during his 1992 India visit as a clear-cut-go-ahead signal from the 
PLO to India to establish ties with Israel, Bansidhar Pradhan has stated that 
Arafat explicitly emphasized that India's full diplomatic relationship with Israel 
was not a precondition for its association with the Peace process'*^°. In other 
words, he argues that Arafat did not agree that diplomatic relations with Israel 
•"^ ^ MEA Press Release, "Visit of l\/IOS Siiri E Aiiamed to Palestine and Jordan", November 21, 
2011 at: http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart,php?id=530218556 
'*^° Pradhan, "India's Policy Towards the PLO", op cit., No. 148, pp. 72-73. 
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were the only way by which India could be involved in the West Asia Peace 
process. Ninan Koshy has similarly stated that when the PLO had started 
negotiations with Israel, it apparently had no objection to India upgrading its 
relations with India. But the PLO never thought that this would develop into a 
defence nexus detrimental to the cause of the Palestinians. The government of 
India has always claimed that Its relations with Israel In no way affect its support 
for the Palestinian struggle for independence and statehood. But this, he thinks, 
is not true'*^\ 
John Cherian has regretted that although India was among the countries 
that voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 
condemning Israel's "excessive use of force" against Palestinian civilians during 
the second intifada In September 2000 yet New Delhi had not Issued an official 
statement condemning Tel Aviv and categorically supporting the Palestinians in 
their struggle. It has Instead made a token commitment, to supply medicines 
worth Rs.25 lakhs to Palestinians wounded In the second intifada. 
Cherian also writes that when there was an escalation of violence, the 
Government of India issued several statements that urged both sides to restore 
normalcy. These statements apportioned blame to both sides equally. This 
meant, he deplored, that the victims and perpetrators of crime were treated with 
the same yardstick'*^ .^ 
''^ ' Koshy, "India: Israel and Palestine", op cit, No.372. 
432 
John Cherian, "India's Changing Stand", Frontline, Volume 17 - Issue 22, Oct. 28 - Nov. 10, 
2000. 
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The Left parties had been critical of the Vajpayee government's pro-Israel 
tilt. The General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Harkishan 
Singh Surjeet, said that the government had reversed the national consensus 
that characterised India's foreign policy'^^l The Communist Party of India leader 
A.B. Bardhan said that by not condemning the Israeli attack on unarmed 
Palestinians "the Government of India has let down an old friend'"^ '^^ . 
According to Shamir Hasan, ever since Ariel Sharon became the Prime 
Minister, Israel accelerated the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, 
completely ignoring the Oslo Accords of 1993 but the Indian government's 
response to this act was completely unsatisfactory. He similarly deplores that 
when Arafat's residence and office were attacked by the Israeli forces, this 
evoked no protest from the Government of India. In fact, Omar Abdullah, Minister 
of State for External Affairs, blamed the Palestinians for spoiling their case by 
their resort to terror'*^ .^ 
Criticising heavily the NDA Government for the Sharon visit, John Cherian 
has written that at a time when Arafat was virtually imprisoned within his office in 
Ramallah, the BJP-led government thought it fit to invite Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon for a state visit to India. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in the 
banquet speech in honour of his Israeli counterpart, did not even mention 
Palestine or the plight of its people. He, instead, went on to say: "No cause can 
' " Cited in Ibid. 
'''Ibid. 
435 Hasan, "The Evolution of India's Palestine Policy" op c/f., No. 258. 
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justify the use of violence" - words the Israeli side wanted to hear. This, he thinks, 
signifies Indian political support for Israel's policy of occupation and aggression 
against the Palestinian people". Moreover, the failure of the Indian government to 
issue a strong statement condemning the Israeli government's decision of 
expelling or physically liquidating Palestinian President Yasser Arafat has only 
strengthened the suspicions of the international community about India-Israeli 
relations'*^^ 
In another article, Cherian has remarked that in the last couple of years, 
New Delhi had virtually forgotten the Palestinian leader and the sufferings of his 
people as a result of Israeli policies. Sharon, for all practical purposes, has 
junked the two-state theory to which the international community, including India, 
stands committed. The inhuman Israeli policies towards Palestinians, the 
targeted assassination of Palestinian leaders, and the building of the apartheid 
wall were all virtually glossed over by New Delhi during National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) rule. Instead, military and strategic ties with Israel were given 
importance. The Palestinian envoy to India, Khalid Sheikh, one of the longest-
serving diplomats, was virtually declared persona non grata by the NDA 
government. He was recalled by Arafat under pressure from New Delhi. In the 
last couple of years, Israel has emerged as India's second biggest supplier of 
defence weaponry. 
"^ ^ John Cherian, "A Visit and its Aftermath", Frontline, Volume 20, Issue 20, September 27 
October 10, 2003 
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Criticising the UPA Government for its Palestine policy, Cherian has 
mentioned that as Arafat was struggling for life at the Percy Military Hospital in 
Paris, the Indian government was busy preparing for the high-level political 
consultations with Israel that were to be held in the third week of November 
2004. Despite the Common Minimum Programme and the protests from the Left 
parties, the UPA I Government seemed to have persisted with its special 
relationship with Israel. He deplored that when the South African and Indonesian 
Presidents attended Arafat's funeral, India was represented by External Affairs 
Minister K. Natwar Singh and Railway Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav'*^ .^ 
Regretting on the UPA Government's treatment to the newly elected 
Palestinian President, Hindu wrote in its editorial that "The Manmohan Singh 
government handled the visit to India of the Palestinian Authority President, 
Mahamud Abbas in rather low key. If this was because Mr.Abbas, a far less 
charismatic figure than his predecessor Arafat, preferred to shun the limelight it 
would be understandable. However it would be inexcusable if the lack of 
enthusiasm over the visit reflected any decline of interest in the Palestinian 
cause. The editorial also pointed out that the call for an end to violence was 
grossly inadequate. The official statement on the visit should have included a 
condemnation of the Israeli occupation, which is the primary cause for the 
strife^ 38_ 
" " John Cherian, "A Breach of Trust", Frontline, Volume 21 - Issue 25, Dec. 04-17, 2004. 
'^^^ "Firm Up Support for Israel", Editorial, Hindu, 26 May 2005. 
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According to Ninan Koshy, recent statements or reactions from the Indian 
government of India on Israeli aggressions reflect more a calculated caution not 
to displease Israel in any way than a principled response to the developments or 
support to the Palestinian cause. He cites three instances to prove his argument: 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, aggression on Gaza strip 2008-2009 and 
military attack on the flotilla of humanitarian goods to Gaza in 2010. He thinks 
that the language and tone of the statements on these occasions were carefully 
modulated so as not to invite displeasure from Israel or from the USA. He also 
mentions that there have been important developments on which India has kept 
silent. It has not criticized, let alone condemned, the Apartheid Wall that makes 
Bantustans in Palestine, though the Wall has been declared illegal by the 
International Court of Justice'*^ .^ 
Sajad Ibrahim has similarly stated that on many occasions since 1992 
India was not ready to condemn Israeli atrocities against the Palestinians by 
sticking to a passive stand of supporting a 'peaceful solution'to the 
crisis. Moreover, he also thinks that although India is in a commanding position of 
using its good offices to influence Israel, it never used it to pressurise Israel to 
withdraw its forces from the occupied territories. To him ail this undermines 
India's values and principles"*^". 
"^ ^ Koshy, op cit, No. 372. 
'^"Ibrahim, op c/Y. No.264. 
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Criticising the UFA II Government for its stand on the Goldstone Report, 
the Communist Party of India (Marxist) said "It is shocking that the Indian 
delegation has expressed its reservations on endorsing the findings and 
recommendations of the Goldstone report at a special session of the UN General 
Assembly. The Indian action in questioning the "recommendations" and raising 
doubts about "procedures" followed by Judge Goldstone, in the opinion of the 
party, is nothing but colluding with the US and Israel's other allies in getting them 
off the charges of war-crimes that Judge Goldstone has shown Israel has 
committed. The party suggested that the Government of India should stand up 
for Palestinian rights and reverse the shameful stand it has taken in the UN'*^^ 
Prakash Karat, General Secretary of the CPI (M), has regretted that "The 
Indian government has condemned the attack on the flotilla but did not mention 
the name of Israel. He accused that Israelis are advising the Indian government 
in Kashmir"*^ .^ Praful Bidwai has similarly accused that the Indian government's 
statement on the flotilla massacre did not even mention Israel. He accused that 
the government has pursued a pusillanimous and collaborationist policy towards 
'*'" "India's Stand on Goldstone Report", CPI (M) Press Statement, New Delhi, November 6, 2009 
at: http://cpim.org/content/indias-stand-goldstone-report 
442 
Cited in the Report on the Two Day Conference on "A Just Peace for Palestine" held at New 
Delhi on 22-23 September 2010, Pragoti, September 24, 2010 at: 
http://www. pragoti. in/node/4148 
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Israel, led by a myopic and imprudent miiitary-purcliase relationship, and by 
intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism training'*^ .^ 
According to Harsh Pant, India is no longer initiating anti-Israel resolutions 
at the UN and has made serious attempts to moderate NAM'S anti-Israel 
resolutions'*''''. Another scholar has similarly remarked that although India 
expressed concern whenever there were setbacks to the peace process (for 
example, during the opening of the tunnel beneath the Temple Mount and the 
disturbances in the Har Homa neighbourhood) but, unlike in the past, it refrained 
from openly criticizing Israel. At the United Nations, India gradually stopped 
sponsoring anti-Israeli resolutions. Though there is no appreciable change in the 
voting pattern of the Indian delegation at the UN on the issues related to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the content analysis of speeches made by Indian delegates 
certainly reflects a softening of the Indian position vis-a-vis Israel'*'* .^ According to 
Achin Vanaik, India makes occasional noises about Palestinian suffering along 
with mildly worded criticisms about Israel, but Tel Aviv knows these are pro-
forma objections that mean little to nothing. He thinks that with regard to the 
Palestinian struggle for justice, India— like the EU—does two things: it throws 
"^ ^ Praful Bidwai, "Stooping Low, Frontline ,Vol:27 Issue No. 1319, June 1 9 - 2 July, 2010 at: 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=20100702271310900.htm&date=fl2713/&prd=f 
lines 
"""^  Harsh V. Pant, "India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints", The Middle East 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2004 available at: 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers13%5Cpaper1279.html 
'"'^ " India and Israel: Dawn of a New Era", Western Defence Organisation, May 21, 2002 at: 
http://pakistanyouthmovement.com/Research-Reports/lndia%20lsrael%20Ties.pdf 
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money to Palestinian agencies and pays lip service to its cause. Nothing 
more"''^ 
Sashi Tharoor, a Lok Sabha MP and the former Minister of State for 
External Affairs has recently accused that the Government that India is not taking 
an active part in regional issues especially in West Asia. He criticised that India 
no longer has a special envoy on West Asia, which meant that India was absent 
at the United Nations quartet discussions on policy''^''. 
Support to Palestine at the Non-Governmental Level 
Besides the official Government support, the issue of Palestine remains 
popular in India. This is evident from the numerous campaigns and 
demonstrations against Israel's actions in Palestine by various organisations and 
movements in the country from time to time. Moreover, frequent seminars and 
conferences have been organised in the country in the recent past to raise 
awareness and garner support for the just cause of Palestine. During the Gaza 
war in 2008-2009 and attacks on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla in 2010, for instance, 
several demonstrations were held against Israel by a large number of citizen 
groups and civil society organisations. Responding to the appeals from the 
Palestinian labour movement following the brutal attack on the Gaza Freedom 
Flotilla, Cochin dockworkers had declared a blockade on Israeli cargo till. In a 
Achin Vanaik," Israel and India, Zionism and Hindutva", Alternatives International, November 
9, 2009. 
'^^ "Tharoor flays West Asia Policy", Indian Express, December 11, 2011. 
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unanimous decision, the dock workers unions - from CITU to INTUC and BMS -
in Cochin dockyard had stopped unloading any goods coming from Israel'*'* .^ 
IVloreover, there has been a concerted campaign to break India's military 
ties with Israel and buying of Israeli arms. During the Lebanese conflict of 2006, 
the CPI-M launched a campaign whereby 86 MPs belonging to different political 
parties called on the government 'to suspend' all military purchases from Israel 
and return to India's position of non-alignment and an independent foreign 
policy'*'*^ . In 2009, a million signatures were submitted to the Indian Government 
by people all around the country calling for the break in security and military ties 
with the Jewish country"* "^. In May 2010, several Indian academics and cultural 
figures had appealed to the well-known writer Amitav Ghosh to refuse the Dan 
David prize awarded jointly by the Dan David Foundation and Tel Aviv University 
to individuals who have made an outstanding contribution in the fields of science, 
technology, culture or social welfare. The appeal was made on the ground that 
the prize is administered by a university that is funded by the state and, more 
crucially, is a leading academic partner of the state in developing weapons and 
justifying war crimes'*^^ On July 13, 2010, seventy-six Indian academics, 
journalists and artists of the India Chapter of the Palestinian Campaign for the 
^^ Prabir Purkayastha, "New Anti-Apartheid Movement Grows in India Against Israel", July 9, 
2010 at: littp://newsclick.in/international/committee-solidarity-palestine 
^^ 'Suspend Arms Purchase from Israel: MPs', The Hindu, July 29, 2006. 
^^° Purkayastha, "New Anti-apartheid Movement", op cit, No. 448. 
"^ ^ Open letter, "Amitav Ghosh, Don't Accept Dan David Prize", 7 May 2010 at: 
http://boycottisrael.info/content/groups-amitav-ghosh-dont-accept-dan-david-prize 
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Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israef^^ which was formed in June 2010, have 
Issued a call joining the on-going global academic and cultural boycott of 
Israel/^^ In August 2011, five Bangalore-based Indian artists refused to 
participate in a major group show on Indian art called "Deconstructing India," 
which is being planned for the Tel Aviv Museum of Art in May 2012 saying that 
"their boycott is not against individuals as such, it is against the Israeli state'"'^ ''. 
In addition to the campaign for the academic and cultural boycott of Israel, 
meetings and conferences have also been regularly organised across the 
country to create awareness about the Palestinian struggle. For instance, 
Harmony India, an association promoting communal harmony, secularism and 
human solidarity, organised a well-attended meeting in Chennai on December 3, 
2000 to express solidarity with the long-suffering people of Palestine. Nine other 
organisations, representing a broad spectrum of society"*^ ,^ co-sponsored the 
meeting which expressed support to the courageous uprising of the Palestinian 
people in what has been termed the second Intifada. The meeting urged the NDA 
Government not to deviate from the long-standing Indian position in support of 
" " The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel — PACBI - was 
launched in 2004 by a group of Palestinian academics and intellectuals. The campaign is 
supported internationally by John Berger and more than 90 leading authors, film-makers, 
musicians and performers. For more see http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=868. 
" " See full statement at: http://newsclick.in/international/join-india-chapter-palestinian-campaign-
academic-cultural-boycott-israel-icacbi 
^^'' Tripti Lahiri, "Israel Show Divides Indian Artists", The Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2011 and 
Rana Siddiqu Zaman, "Indian Artists to Boycott Major Show in Israel", Hmdu, August 2,"2011. 
"*" They included the Islamic Foundation Trust (IFT), the Indian School of Social Sciences (ISSS), 
the Democratic Youth Federation of India (DYFI), the Sisters of Islamic Society (SIS), the All India 
Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA), the Evangelical Church of India (ECl), the All India 
Lawyers Union (AILU), the Students' Federation of India (SFI) and the All India Insurance 
Employees Association (AIIEA). 
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the cause of Palestine''^ ^. A resolution passed at the end of the meeting called on 
the people of the country to 'demonstrate in various ways' that the Palestinian 
cause was their cause'*^ .^ 
On 12 -14 March 2007, a Conference was held at New Delhi on "War, 
Imperialism and Resistance in West Asia". In a resolution passed at the end of 
the three-day conference, the participants called for "an end to the illegal Israeli 
occupation of Palestine and all other occupied territories" and appealed the India 
people "to build a campaign on the nature of the apartheid state of Israel and to 
ensure breaking of India's military and security ties with Israel". The participants 
also wanted the Government of India not only to oppose the continued 
occupation of Iraq and Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories but also 
use all its diplomatic leverage and international stature to take an immediate 
initiative for a serious peace process in West Asia"*^ .^ 
in another seminar on "Palestine: 1967 and After" organized by the Indian 
Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and the mission of the League of Arab States 
(LAS) in June 2007 in New Delhi to mark the 40th anniversary of the June 5 war 
" " Sridhar, "An Expression of Solidarity" op cit. No. 328. 
Hindu, December 5, 2000. 
» 
458 
'Resolution of the Conference on "War, Imperialism and Resistance: West Asia", New Delhi, 
12 -14 March 2007. 
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leading to Israeli occupation of Palestine, the participants highlighted India's still 
unwavering historical support for the Palestinian people'*^^ 
In cooperation with the Palestinian Boycott, Divestments, Sanctions 
National Committee (BNC), a conference named 'A Just Peace for Palestine' 
was held at the India International Centre in New Delhi on 22-23 September, 
2010. The Conference was jointly organised by the Committee for Solidarity with 
Palestine, Palestine EDS National Committee, All India Peace and Solidarity 
Organisation, India Chapter for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel and other 
like-minded organisations. During the two-day long conference, the speakers 
emphasised that until the Israeli oppression of Palestine people ends, the much 
sought after 'two-state solution' would never get realised. It called on the people 
to collectively work and build a solidarity campaign for the liberation of 
Palestinian lands from Israeli occupation, self-determination and equality for all 
Palestinians and the right of return of Palestinian refugees^^°. 
On 5th October 2010, the Indian Life-line to Gaza forum in cooperation 
with the Asian People's Solidarity for Palestine (APSP), an alliance of peoples' 
organisations, social movements, trade unions, and civil society institutions of 
*59 Nasser, "Indian - Israeli Ties Could Neutralize Delhi's Palestinian Policy", op cit, No. 439 and 
Nilofar Suhrawardy, "Palestinian Issue: Concern Voiced in India", June 28, 2007 Muslim Media 
News Service (MMNS) at: http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=1122 
Dhananjay, Report on the Two Day Conference on "A Just Peace for Palestine", Pragoti, New 
Delhi, September 22-23, 2010 at: http://www.pragoti.in/node/4148; Also see "An Invitation to the 
Conference "A Just Peace For Palestine", Centre for Policy Analysis, New Delhi; "Karat Assails 
Deepening Military Ties with Israel", Hindu, September 25, 2010. 
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Asia, announced the launching of Asia to Gaza Solidarity Caravan in New Delhi. 
Around 500 civilian activists from 17 Asian countries including India launched a 
sea journey towards Gaza to break the Israeli blockade of the region. The month 
long "caravan" that was flagged off from New Delhi on December 2 spent few 
days in each of the 18 cities, meeting political activists, attending press 
conferences, doing road shows and other meetings and carried relief material for 
the besieged people of Gaza. Gautam Mody, the Secretary of New Trade Union 
Initiative said, "Palestine is emerging as a central geo-political issue and we 
resist the ethnic cleansing of Palestine...In view of Israel's ongoing collective 
punishment of Palestinians through illegal occupation and siege of Gaza, we 
started this movement'"*^^ Maulana Abdul Wahab Khiiji, member of the All India 
Muslim Personal Law Board stated, "People of India stand for the liberation of 
Palestine, though India's policy towards Palestine has changed"'*^^. Shahnawaz 
Ali Raihan of (Students Islamic Organisation of India) and Sandeep Pandey 
expressed their solidarity with the cause of behalf of the student community. 
The India Palestine People's Solidarity forum held a public meeting in 
Mumbai in January 2011 on the occasion of "Palestine - Israel: 60 Years of the 
"Nakba - Catastrophe", Occupation & Resistance". Prominent social and political 
personalities who spoke on the occasion agreed that "Israel Palestine conflict 
remains as one of the most crucial and intractable problems of our age and in 
''^' "In Solidarity for Palestine, Asian Activists Announce Caravan to Gaza", The Milli Gazette, Oct 
9, 2010 at: http://www.milligazette.com/news/li2-in-solidarity-for-palestine-asian-activists-
announce-caravan-to-gaza 
'''Ibid 
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fact it is the central geo-political issue of our times". They regretted that although 
the "Intifada" or "the uprising" of the Palestinian masses continues to resist the 
might of the Israeli-US occupation and capture the moral imagination of the 
people of the world yet the Indian Government today is a willing junior partner of 
the US-Israeli axis and the largest buyers of Israeli weapons''^ ^. 
On April 17, 2011, The Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) of 
India took part in a candle light vigil at New Delhi to support and express 
solidarity with the Palestinian people's struggle for peace and justice. The 
gathering, where participants lit candles and wore peace dove badges, was 
organised jointly by the India Solidarity Ecumenical Network (ISEN) and Kairos 
Palestine. Others who participated in the event were members and friends of 
various churches and faith-based organisations and Adii Sadeq, the Ambassador 
of the State of Palestine to India"*^. 
From the above statements and facts, one can deduce the following: 
Although the Government of India claims that it continues to provide diplomatic 
and political support to the Palestinians in their effort to have a separate 
homeland and help them in "the reconstruction of their nation" through economic. 
""^ ^ Asim Khan, "Palestine People's Solidarity", Joumospy, January 19, 2011. 
* " "The YWCA of India in Solidarity with the Palestinian Cause", April 27, 2011 at: 
http://www.worldywca.orgA^CA-News/World-YWCA-and-Member-Associations-News/The-
YWCA-of-lndia-in-Solidarity-with-the-Palestinian-Cause 
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technical and humanitarian assistance from time to time, this perception Is not 
shared by a number of leaders, scholars, journalists and activists who on the 
contrary argue that India's support Palestine has now been reduced to mere 
statements, resolutions and occasional economic assistance. In other words, it is 
clear that India, under the given the circumstances, is no longer supporting the 
national struggle movements that it used to do in the past. In the garb of so 
called 'pragmatism', India is steadily getting sucked into the vortex of Western 
design and quagmire. Whether India is under the NDA or UPA rule, the 
Government has diluted the country's principled foreign policy for certain 
interests that are not going to pay it in the long run. Second, the Indian support 
to the Palestine cause is not just limited to the government. The issue remains 
popular at the broader societal level. 
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Chapter Five 
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: 
Should India Play A Mediatory Role? 
India's political and economic support to the Palestine people in their 
search for a separate homeland is undoubtedly important and should be 
continued without any pause. But this alone would not solve the vexed Palestine 
issue. The problem can be amicably resolved only through a time- bound and 
result-oriented peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This 
chapter examines India's role in the Israel Palestine peace process including the 
possibility of a mediatory role between the two parties to solve their long pending 
dispute. 
Role Before 1991 
Although India actively supported the Arabs against Israel both within and 
outside the United Nations and always stressed the need for the Arabs to seek a 
negotiated settlement with Israel on the Palestine issue yet the Indian leaders 
were not eager to play any mediatory role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the eve 
of Israel's request for recognition Nehru, for instance, said, "India can play no 
effective part in this conflict at the present stage either diplomatically or 
otherwise'"*^ .^ He perhaps realised that the demands of the Arabs and the Israelis 
were so irreconcilable that there was hardly any scope for meditation by 
"^ ^ Quoted in G Parthasarathy ed. Jawaharlal Nehru'Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-64, Volume 
1, London, 1985, p. 128. 
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anyone''^ ^. Similarly dismissing any role for India in the peace process, Rajiv in 
1986 candidly admitted: "There are already so many parties involved, we would 
not like to add one more hand in the complicated situation. We prefer to watch for 
a while and see how things turn out before actively trying to take an interest in 
it'"^ '^'. Second, the absence of diplomatic relations with Israel, a party to the 
dispute also limited India's role in the peace process. The Israelis made it clear 
that in order to play any meaningful role in the peace process; India had to first 
establish full diplomatic relationship with their country. Third, the absence of 
India's role can be explained on the Indian apprehension that its quid pro quo 
could provoke activism on Kashmir by the countries in the region'*^ ®. Fourth, 
throughout the Cold War period, the India West Asia relationship remained one-
sided. It was always India and Indians who were dependant on the region and 
not the vice versa. This also limited India's role in West Asian conflict. Last but 
not the least, any sincere and substantial peace process to resolve the Arab 
Israeli conflict started only after the Madrid Conference not before it. However, 
India's basic approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during this period had 
been that the people of the region itself should decide and negotiate the problem. 
Therefore, India welcomed, for example, the Camp David agreements while 
stressing that all the people of the region have the right to self-determination and 
all states the right to exist within secure boundaries. 
"^ ^ Punyapriya Dasgupta, "Betral of India's Israel Policy, op cit. No. 92, p.769. 
"^ ^ Kumarswami, India's Israel Policy op cit, No. 176. 
"^ ^ Abhyankar ed. West Asia and the Region op cit, No. 13, p. 54. 
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Role Since Madrid Conference 
The Middle East Peace Process started with the IVIadrid Conference of 
October 1991 and India had played a limited role since then. It was Invited to 
become a participant in the multilateral track of the Peace Process that began in 
1991 and actively participated in all the five working groups discussing Middle 
East-Palestine question such as regional economic development, arms control 
and regional security and environment and water resources"*^ .^ 
The slow-paced Madrid talks which were leading nowhere were upstaged 
by a series of secret meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted 
by Nonway. These meetings produced the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between 
Palestinians and Israel, a plan discussing the necessary elements and conditions 
for a future Palestinian state "on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 
(1967) and 338 (1973)". The agreement, officially titled the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (OOP), was signed on the 
White House lawn on 13 September 1993 between Israeli Prime Minister and 
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. It provided for a two-phase time table. First was a 
five-year interim period during which Israel Defence Forces would incrementally 
"^ ^ MEA Annual Report 1992-93, p. 6. The Middle East peace process is a complex web of 
international negotiations based upon the structure set up at the Madrid Conference that was held 
on 30 October 1991. There were two different but parallel negotiating tracks, a bilateral one and a 
multilateral one. The bilateral track consisted of four separate sets of direct negotiations between 
Israel, and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. The multilateral track aimed at building 
confidence among the regional parties and at solving a number of complicated issues which were 
addressed in five different forums comprising representatives from states in the region as well as 
of the international community. The working groups of the multilateral negotiations were focusing 
on water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic development. 
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withdraw from Palestinian areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, transferring 
administrative powers to a soon-to-be elected Palestinian National Authority. 
Second was the 'final status' negotiations, to begin at the start of the third year of 
the interim period. These negotiations would cover the remaining issues such as 
the status of Jerusalem, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, Israeli 
settlements in West Bank and Gaza, security arrangements, final borders of the 
two resultant states, relations and cooperation with other neighbours and other 
issues of common interests '^^ °. 
India expressed its happiness on the signing of the Oslo Accord. An 
Official Spokesman of the MEA said that India welcomed mutual recognition by 
the State of Israel & the PLO, and the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli 
agreement on Palestinian self-rule. India stressed that these were the notable 
steps towards ensuring peace & stability in West Asia, which had been troubled 
by strife and discord for so many generations. India with her historic ties of 
friendship and socio-cultural links with the peoples of the region would continue 
to extend its support to further efforts that would be undertaken towards peace in 
West Asia, and would lend its good offices whenever required towards 
confidence-building measures in the area. India expected that these historic 
steps forward would lead to further positive developments aimed at achieving the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people'^ ^^ 
^^° "Oslo Accords", Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords 
^^^ Foreign Affairs Record op cit, No. 307, p.438. 
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India welcomed the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement in Cairo on 4'" 
May 1994 (also known as Gaza-Jericho Agreement) which marked the first stage 
of implementing the Declaration of Principles provisions dealing with the 
withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and 
the transfer of powers to the Palestinian National Authority'^ ^ .^ An Indian 
delegation led by the Minister of State for External Affairs, R.L Bhatia was 
present during the signing ceremony. 
On 30'*^  September 1995, the Oslo Interim Agreement (Oslo II) was signed 
between Israel and PLO in Washington D.C and was the second stage in the 
process begun with the Declaration of Principles. This agreement extended 
Palestinian self-rule to significant portions of the West Bank and made it possible 
to hold elections and set up the Palestinian National Authority that would 
negotiate a final settlement with the Israelis'*^ .^ India greeted the agreement and 
reiterated the view that durable peace in the region was necessary to resolve all 
outstanding issues to the satisfaction of all concerned parties. 
The signing of the Wye River Memorandum between Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat (after a lot of US 
pressure and personal intervention of President Bill Clinton on 23 October 1998) 
in Maryland which dealt with further Israeli redeployments in the West Bank, 
'^'^  Peter Malanczuk, "Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO from 
the Perspective of International Law", 7 EJIL( 1996) 485-500 at: 
http.7/www.ejil.org/pclfs/7/4/1389.pdf 
"^ ^ For the text of the Oslo Interim Agreement see Mid East Web at; 
http://www.mideastweb.org/meosint.htm 
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security issues and other concerns'*^ '* provided some relief to India on the vexed 
issue. While terming the agreement 'an important milestone' in the stalled peace 
process, India supported its unconditional implementation'*^ .^ The outbreak of the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, however, put an end to the Wye River's 
understandings and goals^^^ 
During the initial months of the second Intifada in September 2000, both 
the PNA as well as Israel sought India's intervention in ending the escalating 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was done formally through letters both from Ehud 
Barak, (the new Israeli Prime Minister since May 1999) and Arafat to Prime 
Minister Vajpayee. While Israel sought India's intervention in general terms—to 
exert its influence over the Palestinian leadership to 'end violence'—the PNA 
suggested three specific areas in which India could play a role in resolving the 
crisis. These areas included India's initiative for ensuring an expeditious 
functioning of the international fact-finding mission already set up in pursuance of 
the decision taken at Sharm-EI-Sheikh, its influence in the creation of an 
observer force or protection force under the UN auspices and finally, India's 
efforts to ensure the implementation of the UN resolutions 242 and 338 on the 
"^ ^ The text of the Wye River agreement see Mid East Web at: 
http://www.mideastweb.org/mewye.htm 
475 
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Foreign Affairs Record, No. 10, October 1998, p. 150. 
Difficulties in Wye Agreement, says Arafat, India Express, Aug 17 1999 at: 
http://www.indianexpress.com/Storyold/115860/ 
200 
Israeli Palestine conf l ic t . Without tilting either way, India advised the two 
warring groups to give peace a chance in the embattled region'*^ .^ 
A summit meeting was held at the Sharm El Sheikh in February 2005 
between Israeli and Palestinian leaders to end the 2000 Intifada and resume 
negotiations under the roadmap^^ .^ The Indian Trade and Industry Minister 
Ashwani Kumar participated in the summit. In a statement on 10 February 2005, 
the Government of India termed the meeting between the leaders of Israel and 
Palestine as "an important step in the resumption of the Israel-Palestine peace 
process which deserved the support of the international community'"*^". 
The next significant step in the Israel Palestine peace process was the 
Annapolis Conference which was held on November 27, 2007 at the United 
States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Palestinian President Mahmoud 
Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and U.S. President George W. Bush 
attended the meeting along with over 40 other invitees including the Arab 
League, the European Union and the United Nations. The conference for the first 
time accepted a two-state solution for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict'*^^ 
' ' " Muchkund Dubey, "West Asia: India's Neighbouring Region" in Moiiammad Gulrez ed. 
Settlements and Resistance in the Occupied Territories, Publications Division, AMU Press, 2005, 
p. 10, 
^^ ^ Hindu, November 30, 2000. 
"''^  For details of Summit see Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharm_el-Sheikh_Summit_of_2005 
''^ ° MEA Annual Report 2004-05 at http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=500410405, p.59. 
For more about Annapolis Conference see the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Historic+Events/The+Annapolis+Conference+ 
27-Nov-2007.htm 
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India was invited as a participant in this conference and Kapil Sibal, the Minister 
for Science and Technology and Earth Sciences, represented the country at 
Annapolis. Sibal was accompanied toy Ambassador Gharekhan, the Special 
Envoy for West Asia and met among others, Amre Moussa, the Secretary 
General of the Arab League who gave the Indian Minister his assessment to 
about the Israel-Palestine dialogue, the role of the Arab League and related 
issues including developments leading up to the Annapolis Summit. The Minister 
also met the Brazilian and South African Foreign Ministers and the three leaders 
were of the view that the Annapolis Summit was a positive development that 
needed support by the international community, in order to assist the peace 
dialogue between Israel and Palestine'*^ .^ 
From the above discussion, it is evident that while during the Cold War, 
India has played no direct role in the Israeli Palestinian conflict; it had only a 
limited role in the Middle East peace process since Madrid Conference of 1991 to 
the Annapolis Conference of 2007. 
^^^ India to attend the Annapolis Conference for Peace in the Middle East, November 26-28, 
2007, Annapolis, USA November 26, 2007, Indian Embassy, Washington, DC at; 
http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetaii684/--%09--india-to-attend-the-annapolis-conference-for-
peace-in-the-middle-east,-november-26-28,-2007,-annapolis,-usa; "India Backs US-sponsored 
West Asia Peace Meet", Rediff News at: http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/nov/28india.htm, 
November 28, 2007; Saeed Naqvi, "India's Role in West Asia Peace Process, Economic Times, 
November 30, 2007. 
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Should India Play a Mediatory Role in the Israel Palestine Peace 
Process? 
In recent years, there is a growing perception that India should play a 
mediatory role in the Israel Palestine Peace process. Before discussing this 
question, it is important to understand India's position on the Israeli Palestine 
peace process, whether India is actually interested for such a big role and if yes, 
how is India's new role perceived by the relevant countries in the region. 
India's Position: 
India's commitment to the Palestinian cause is an Important component of 
its long established foreign policy. The country maintains following position on 
the Israeli Palestinian peace process. 
• India considers the resolution of the Palestine issue as central to lasting 
peace in West Asia. As Vice President Hamid Ansari has recently said 
that "a primary cause of tension, instability and violence in the region is 
the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory'"*^ .^ 
• India shares the perception that the Israeli Palestinian conflict is 
essentially political in nature which can be resolved through political 
negotiations and diplomatic means, rather than through the use of 
force^« .^ 
• India believes that a comprehensive peace process within a definite 
• timeframe with all the stakeholders in the region can address the key 
^°^ India Supports Palestinian People's Right for State, Deccan Herald, October 12, 2011 at: 
http;//vww.deccanherald.com/content/197550/india-supports-palestinian-peoples-right.html 
''^ '' "India Seeks Revival of Peace Process in West Asia", Hindu, December 2, 2009. 
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• 
issues of the dispute and lead to the establishment of a sovereign, 
independent, united and viable Palestinian State, in accordance with the 
two-state solution"*^ .^ 
India has consistently supported the legitimate right of the Palestinian 
people to a sovereign, independent, viable and united Palestinian state 
with East Jerusalem as its capital, living within secure and recognized 
borders, side by side and at peace with Israel. 
With this objective, India has supported the UN Security Council 
Resolutions (242"*^ ^ and SSS''^ )^, the NAM Declarations, the Israeli "Land 
^^^ "India Says Has High Stake in West Asia Peace, Backs Arab Plan", Daily News Analysis, 
March 1,2010. 
''^ ^ United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (S/RES/242) was adopted unanimously by the 
UN Security Council on November 22, 1967, in the aftermath of the Six Day War. The preamble 
refers to the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security". 
Operative Paragraph One "Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application 
of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in 
the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State 
in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from 
threats or acts of force." Resolution 242 is one of the most commonly referred UN resolutions to 
end the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the basis of later negotiations between the parties. For more 
see "United Nations Security Council Resolution 242", Wikipedia Online Dictionary at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_242 
" " The three-line United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on October 22, 1973, 
called for a ceasefire in the Yom Kippur War in accordance with a joint proposal by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The resolution states: The Security Council, Calls upon all parties to 
present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 
hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the 
adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; Calls upon all parties concerned to 
start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 
(1967) in all of its parts; Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, 
negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at 
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for Peace" principle'*^^ the Quartet Road Map in April 2003^^^ (I\/1EA 
Report) and the Arab peace plan under which Israel would withdraw to 
pre-1967 borders and that the state of Palestine would be established, but 
that this would have to be accompanied by recognition of Israel. 
• India has delinked its bilateral relationship with Israel and Palestine from 
the progress in the Middle East peace process. This implies that even if 
the peace process does not make much headway in future, this would not 
affect its relationship either with Israel or with Palestine. 
• India also maintains that "protracted negotiations over decades" have not 
achieved the national goals of the Palestinian people and have "fuelled 
disappointment and anger which is a matter of great concern to it." 
Due to this anger and disappointment over the peace process, India is 
seriously considering for a mediatory role between the Israelis and the 
establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. For more see "United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 338", Wikipedia Online Dictionary at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_338 
*^ ^ Land for peace is an interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 which has formed 
the basis of subsequent Arab-Israeli peace making. The name Land for Peace is derived from the 
wording of the resolution's first operative paragraph which affirms that peace should include the 
application of two principles; Withdrawal of Israeli forces (Giving Up Land), and Tennination of all 
claims or states of belligerency (Making Peace). Since the resolution stipulates that both 
principles should apply they can be viewed jointly as giving up land for peace, referred to more 
concisely as 'land for peace' 
^^^ The 'roadmap for peace' is a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict proposed by a 
"quartet" of international entities: the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United 
Nations. The principles of the plan, originally drafted by U.S. Foreign Service Officer Donald 
Blome, were first outlined by U.S. President George W. Bush in a speech on June 24, 2002, in 
which he called for an independent Palestinian state living side by side with Israel in peace: "The 
Roadmap represents a starting point toward achieving the vision of two states, a secure State of 
Israel and a viable, peaceful, democratic Palestine. It is the framework for progress towards 
lasting peace and security in the Middle East. 
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Palestinians to solve the Palestine issue. C.R. Gharekhan who served India's 
Special Envoy to West Asia, for instance, stated that India is willing to play the 
role of a mediator if it is asked to, though it would stiN maintain its stand on 
settling disputes bilaterally. Since India has good relations with Israel as well as 
Palestine, it can talk to both parties candidly without compromising on its own 
position, he added'^ ^". An indication of the new Indian strategic shift is the 
appointment of the veteran diplomat and former assistant to the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, C. R. Gharekhan, as India's Special Envoy for the Middle 
East Peace Process- a development that proves that India is concerned about 
the Palestinian - Israeli peace process more than the struggle of the Palestinian 
people for liberation. Moreover, India is also viewed by both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians as a trustworthy intermediary. During the second intifada in 2000, for 
instance, both Israel and Palestine had requested India to help broker truce in 
West Asia and save the peace process from collapse. While Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak telephoned Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 
twice in those days, Palestine leader Yasser Arafat had sought Delhi's 
intervention through its representative in the Gaza Strip'*^\ 
During his India visit in October 2008, the Palestinian President Abbas 
made a request "to use New Delhi's growing influence for giving momentum to 
''^ ° "India Willing to Mediate in Israel-Palestine Peace Process", Hindu, March 4, 2005. 
"^ ^ "West Asia Warriors at India's Door", October 14, 2000 at: http://www.paklinks.com/gs/world-
affairs/53430-israel-and-palestine-request-indias-help.html. 
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the West Asian peace process'"*^^ Similarly, the Palestinian Authority Prime 
Minister Ismail Haniyeh has urged India to play an active role in the Middle East 
peace process since ""India has been one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned 
Movement and has a sound recording of upholding democratic principles"''^ ^. 
Echoing the same voice, the Palestinian Ambassador to India, Osama Musa said 
that India should play a greater role in putting an end to Israeli occupation. "We 
want India, and the international community, to see that the Israeli tanks are out 
of our bedroom"''®'*. 
Israeli Ambassador to India, David Danieli said in an interview to PTI after 
electoral victory of Hamas that "India certainly can contribute by having a 
dialogue with Palestinians and with Israel. India maintains equally good relations 
with both. So the ears of both sides are certainly open to hear Indian views and 
advise""*® .^ During a meeting in Jerusalem with India's Special Envoy to West 
Asia, Chinmaya Gharekhan, the Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told, "India's 
voice carries weight in the international community. It is an important country and 
Israel attaches a lot of significance to its relations with India,"'*®®. Speaking along 
"^ ^ "Abbas Lands, May Seek Larger India Role in Peace Process", Indian Express, October 7 
2008. 
"^ ^ Weak Leaks India Cable, 110122: "India Balancing Relations with Israel and Hamas", Hindu, 
March 15,2011. 
"^ ^ "Envoy Seeks Greater India Role in Palestine", Indian Express, March 13, 2008. 
"^ ^ "India Can "Contribute" to West Asia Peace Process: Israel", Outlook, February 9, 2006. 
"^ ^ India's Voice Carries Weight: Israel", Rediff News, September 3, 2007 at: 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/sep/03india1.htm 
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the same lines, Ahmed Salem Al-Wahishi, head of the League of Arab States 
mission, said "We are looking for a greater role for India in West Asia. India's 
expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian cause will help support peace 
process in the region"''^''. Hailing India as a supporter of the Arab cause, Syrian 
President Bashar Al-Assad has similarly said India can play a role in resolution of 
West Asia problem by using its "strong relations" with the US and Israel. As a 
"rising" country with important role in Asian and global affairs, India should not 
remain out of the West Asian peace process. To him "India has the credibility in 
the the West Asia peace process because of its objective position"''^^. 
The Domestic Discourse on India's Role in the Peace Process 
The domestic discourse on India's new role in the Israel Palestine peace 
process is sharply divided. There are four different discourses: the Radicals, the 
Nehruvians, the Pragmatists and the Status Quoits'*^ .^ These categorisations are 
designed to provide an outline of the competing lines of argumentation about 
India's new role, rather than identify Radicals, Nehruvians, Pragmatists or Status 
Quoits per se. It is also important to note that it is difficult right now in India to 
associate these perspectives with particular political parties, think tanks, or 
ministries. Thus, these perspectives are individualistic and do not correspond to 
''^ '' "Envoy Seeks Greater India Role in Palestine", Indian Express, iWarch 13, 2008. 
"^ ^ "India Can Play Role in West Asia Peace Process' Syrian Prez Hail India as Supporter of Arab 
Cause, Business Standard, June 19, 2008 and Assad: India Can Play Role in Resolving West 
Asia Conflicts, Indian Express" June 20, 2008. 
499 
For a different categorization see Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, "The Pragmatic 
Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy", Tiie Wasliington Quarterly, 34:2, Spring 2011, pp. 145_162 
and Kant! Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture," in Michael R. Chambers ed. Asia in 2020: Future 
Strategic Balances and Alliances, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 
PA, 2002, pp. 245—303. 
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particular organisations. They do, however, represent the views of important 
public intellectuals, policy analysts, academics, journalists, diplomats, and 
government officials on an important foreign policy subject. 
The Radical Perspective: 
Deeply perturbed by the inhuman conditions of Palestinians in the Israeli 
occupied territories and greatly influenced by the Palestinian Campaign for the 
Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, the Radicals take a different viewpoint 
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and India's role in this conflict. For them, the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine is the worst form of colonialism and the situation in 
the occupied territories represents apartheid in practice. According to Praful 
Bidwai, "the British exploited and oppressed India's people through systematic 
loot, despotic rule, and destruction of institutions and occupations. But they didn't 
come and grab your land, occupy your fields or steal most of your water. By 
contrast, Israel has confiscated 24 per cent of the area of the West Bank and 
Gaza and 89 per cent of East Jerusalem for settlements, highways, military 
installations, etc. It controls 80 per cent of the water resources of the occupied 
territories and also appropriates a large quantity, equal to one-third of its 
consumption, from the Jordan River. Fourth-fifths of the water from the West 
Bank's sole underground aquifer go to lsrael"^°°. 
5™ Praful Bidwai, "The End of the Arafat Era", Transnational Institute, November 2005 at: 
http://www.tni.org/es/archives/act/929 
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The Israelis have not only illegally occupied the Palestinian territory; they 
are also practicing an apartheid policy in the occupied territories as was adopted 
by the white regime in South Africa. This is clearly evident from their strategy to 
change the facts on the ground through a number of measures like: 
- Confining Palestinians to small pockets (Area 'A', defined by the Oslo accords 
of 1995-96 to be under the PA's full control, and Area 'B' under "joint" 
Palestinian-Israeli security), but keeping them out of the fully Israeli-controlled 'C 
Area of Palestine. 
- Obstructing the Palestinians' movement even within Areas 'A' and 'B', through 
closures, checkpoints, barriers, roadblocks, trenches, etc. 
- Breaking up the West Bank into some 300 enclaves, separated from one 
another, and joined by roads to which most Palestinians have no access. By 
contrast, Israeli settlers enjoy full freedom of movement in these, with state 
protection. 
- Imposing a tight system of work-and residence-permits, like South Africa's 
notorious "Pass Laws", which restrict people's liberties in respect of work and life. 
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- Erecting a 700-km-long "Separation Barrier" (almost five times longer than the 
Berlin Wall), and in places eight meters tall, although this has been declared 
Illegal by the International Court of Justice^°V 
The Radicals resent that Israel has not only occupied the Palestinian and 
Arab territories in violation of international law, international opinion and 
numerous United Nations resolutions starting with 224 and 338 and inflicted 
every conceivable form of violence, injustice, ignominy and insult upon 
Palestinian civilians, it has also refused to stop the Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem which .shows its continued policy of delaying 
and obstructing the regional and international efforts in dealing with the peace 
process and negotiations." Quoting Sharon's senior adviser Dov Weisglass who 
openly said "When you freeze the peace process, you prevent the establishment 
of a Palestinian state", the Radicals believe that the ultimate Israeli goal is to 
"severely harm the Palestinians" and end "the dream of a Palestinian state"^°^. 
Sitaram Yechury argues in this context that Israel and the U.S. have 
hatched a four-pronged conspiracy to obstruct peace in the region. The first 
element in the conspiracy is the annexation of Palestine after formally agreeing 
to concede annexed territories to Palestinians. The settling of Jews in the 
colonised areas is the second element of the strategy. This is being done to pre-
501 
Ibid. For more on Israel's apartheid policy in Palestine see "Israel and the apartheid analogy", 
Wikipedia online encyclopaedia at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lsrael_and_the_apartheid_anaiogy 
Praful Bidwai, "Giving Arafat his Due", Frontline, Vol. 21, No. 24, 20 November 2004. 
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empt the territorial claims of Palestinians in future. The third aspect of the 
strategy is aimed at limiting and constricting the scope of effective Palestinian 
sovereignty by herding the people into Bantustan-like enclaves reminiscent of 
apartheid-era South Africa, surrounded by a hostile Israel. The fourth component 
of the strategy is to attack mercilessly with the most sophisticated of weapons 
those who offer any resistance. The fascistic dimension of the Israeli regime, said 
Yechury, is evident from the brutal manner in which youth and children are 
systematically targeted by the Israeli security apparatus. By doing this, he 
accused, the Israeli state wants to wipe out the future of Palestine^°^. 
Describing Israel as a "rogue state" whose history is the history of violence 
and violations of human rights, the Radicals are sure that the Israelis on their 
own would never allow the Palestine state to become a reality. They therefore, 
think that growing international pressure on the Jewish state can bring it back to 
the negotiation table and make it fulfil its commitments towards Palestine. In this 
context, the Radicals are divided on what kind of role India should play in the 
Israel Palestine conflict. 
Considering that no peace is possible in the world without solving the 
issue of Palestine, some Radicals want India to fully support the Palestine issue 
and end all cooperation with Israel. Ending cooperation with the Zionist country, 
to them, would serve at least three important purposes. First, any Indian 
alignment with the Jewish country not only means direct supports to its colonial 
™^  Quoted in Sridhar, "An Expression of Solidarity" op cit. No. 328. 
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and brutal apartheid regime imposed on the Palestinian people but also 
subsidises the cost of Israeli war efforts against the Palestinian national liberation 
movement. For instance, an appeal in 2008 by a number of non-governmental 
organizations related to Palestine to the "Indian people and its government" to 
"Stop arms Trade with Apartheid Israel" said, "The Indian government which 
continues to reiterate its commitment to a just solution of the Palestinian question 
in accordance with international law, has unfortunately emerged as the major 
broker of Israel's arms industry. This is tantamount to financing continued, illegal 
occupation of Palestinian and Arab territory as it helps subsidize the occupation 
regime. India's arms trade strategically contributes to the perpetuation of Israel's 
occupation and apartheid system^"''". Nilotpal Basu, a CPM Member of 
Parliament, has similarly argued that India is indirectly supporting the Israeli 
atrocities on Palestinians by strengthening its economy through weapons 
purchase^°^. 
Second, India's bilateral trade with Israel stands at approximately $5 
billion annually and its defense ties are estimated to be worth $9 billion. India has 
become the largest client of Israeli military exports, with contracts totalling $9 
billion, including $2.5 billion for the Air Force and several hundred millions in 
Ballistic Missile Defence systems^°^. Severing these ties with Israel will tiurt its 
504 
Cited in Koshy, "India: Israel And Palestine" op cit., No. 372.' 
505 "Need to Launch Public Movement in India to Support Palestine; Speakers" at: 
http://twocircles.net/2009dec23/need_launch_public_movementjndia_support_palestine_speake 
rs.html 
^°^ Praful Bidwai, "Stooping Low", Frontline, Volume 27 - Issue 13, June. 19- July 2, 2010. 
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economic interests and force it to come to the negotiating table. Third, Israel has 
used its military equipment, trade and other sources such as agricultural 
research, culture and academia, to increase its influence in India. Stopping all 
these would end Israeli influence in India which is detrimental to the Palestinian 
struggle^°^ 
For some other Radicals, India should not only cut off all its ties with Israel 
but also boycott Israeli goods and services and call for a combination of global 
isolation, sanctions and external pressure against the Jewish country by the 
international community^°^. India must demand a complete cessation of military 
purchases and joint ventures with Israel, a boycott of Israeli goods and services 
beginning with those made in the occupied territories, and seek tough sanctions 
against the Jewish country. Just as it was in the case of the international call 
against South Africa in the apartheid years, they are confident that this boycott 
would be effective in contributing to international pressure on Israel to rein its 
colonisation and apartheid policy towards Palestine and implement the accords it 
has signed with the Palestinians leading to the establishment of an independent 
and viable Palestine state. The Radicals believe that these acts against Israel at 
this moment will have better impacts as the Jewish country is isolated world-wide 
^" Achin Vanaik's Interview to Aditi Bhaduri at: http://www.himalmag.comAA^hy-not-
Palestine_fnw85.html 
™^ "India must seek sanctions against Israel: Karat", Hindu, July 21, 2006. 
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for the "oppression and expulsion of the indigenous Palestine population through 
its military aggression, legal discrimination and economic persecution"^"^. 
Other Radicals are however less optimistic that India which has developed 
such a close relationship with Israel over the years would easily reverse its policy 
and go for the international boycott of Israel. They think that India would cease its 
growing strategic and defence ties with the Jewish country only when a strong 
people's movement is launched in the country by all like-minded political parties, 
civil society organizations and Intellectuals to pressurise the Government to 
reverse its Israel policy. This movement should also mobilize people against the 
brand Israel campaign for the boycott of both Israeli products and services and 
the Israeli academic and cultural institutions which are the major instruments of 
Zionist propaganda. The Asian Forum at its recent meeting in Delhi has passed a 
resolution to reinforce the boycott of Israeli products and financial divestment 
from companies directly implicated in the occupation and/or Israeli industries. 
The Nehruvian Perspective: 
The Nehruvian perspective traces its roots to India's traditional Cold War 
foreign policy. It is based on the view that ideas about universalism, liberal 
internationalism, and solidarity with fellow national liberation movements that 
influenced independent India's early foreign policy thinking should also guide 
India's present and future policy posture on international issues. On the issue of 
^°^ "India Chapter Formed to Campaign against Israel", Hindu, July 12, 2010. 
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Palestine, the Nehruvians want India to provide more vigorous support and play 
an active role in the Israeli Palestinian peace process because this is dictated by 
both principle and national interest. They argue that India should not forget its 
own history or abandon the high ideals of its foreign policy such as support to 
self-determination and anti-colonialism in the world on the basis of which it 
traditionally supported the Palestinian people. 
Sharing the Radical concern that (a) Palestine is a just and humanitarian 
cause (b) there has not been any change on the ground situation in the occupied 
territories and (c) Israel continues its crimes against the Palestinian people (the 
brutal and continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, its 
inhumane siege of the Strip from time to time and the policies of ethnic cleansing 
and ghettoization of the Palestinian people) in violation of international law and 
morality, the Nehruvians argue that India has historically played a key role in 
garnering international support for Palestinian self-rule, the South African anti-
apartheid struggle and other anti-colonial struggles. Now as the leader of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, with its proud de-colonisation history, India should once 
again play a key role in the Palestinian struggle for justice and against Israel's 
occupation, colonization, and apartheid policies^^°. 
Bansidhar Pradhan argues that support for the Palestine cause is part of 
India's legacy of opposing the illegal occupation of someone else's territory in 
^^° Call for the Conference on "A Just Peace for Palestine", New Delhi, 22-23 September, 2010 
at; http://www.focusweb.org/content/invitation-conference-%E2%80%9C-just-peace-
palestine%E2%80%9D 
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violation of international legality and morality^^^ The Hindu writes, "given India's 
historical standing as a leader among the non-Western countries, New Delhi 
should do well to live up to its moral stature and offer vigorous support to the 
genuine Palestinian cause in spite of the growing warmth in official ties between 
India and Israel"^^^ 
The Nehruvians deplore that there has been a decline in India's traditional 
support to Palestine due to India's growing ties with Israel but unlike the Radicals 
they don't prefer India to cut off all its relationship with Israel or isolate and 
impose sanctions against the Jewish country. They want India to have normal 
state-to-state relationship with Israel as distinct from the present close 
relationship and retain its earlier pro-Arab and anti-Israel policy as well as the 
Nehruvian tradition of bold support to the Palestinian people in their struggle for 
self-determination'. In other words, the Nehruvians want India to maintain 
relationship with Israel strictly to the extent that it contributes to the Middle East 
peace process and not to deviate it in any way for its strong traditional support to 
the Palestinians who are still living in the occupied territory and fighting for an 
independent state. For them, India should use all of relations in the Middle East 
toward the peace process, toward the end of the occupation, toward the peaceful 
settlement of all conflict. For this, they prefer India to play an intermediary role 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. They cite the following reasons for 
this. First, as the leader of the Third World through the Non-Aligned Mov.ement in 
^" Pradhan, "Changing Dynamics of India's West Asia Policy" op cit, No. 5, p. 87. 
^^ ^ "India's Stake in Palestine Cause", Hindu Editorial, April 5, 2002 at: 
http;//www.hindu.com/2002/04/05/stories/2002040501151000.htm 
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the General Assembly and the G77 in UNCTAD, India has acquired considerable 
respect as the 'voice of the voiceless' and the leader of the developing world^^ .^ 
This image of India would help it to bridge the gulf between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. Second, with its historic and cultural links with the Arabic world, 
Persia, Central Asia, East Asia and the Anglo-American west, India occupies a 
position of cultural confluence and can help bridge civilisational differences 
between states and societies. Considering India as a "bridging power", Sunil 
Khilnani writes "as India grows economically and its status rises in the global 
arena, it can play a balancing and bridging role in the world. It can bridge the 
divides and differences between rich and poor nations, east and west, powerful 
and less powerful"^ '^*. Third, India has friendly relations with both Israel and 
Palestine and Its views and positions on Middle East issues are carefully 
observed by all sides. These can be used in pushing the peace process forward. 
Fourth, India is one of the few countries which have relevant expertise to 
facilitate effective negotiations, especially through informal channels^^ .^ India had 
historically demonstrated this capability in the days of super-power rivalry in 
Korea and the Congo, and earlier in the case of the transfer of power from the 
Netherlands to Indonesia. In more cent times, it stood bravely resisting the 
agenda of the West in the WTO, UN Climate Summits and many other 
^^ ^ Amrita Narlikar, "Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating 
Strategy of a Rising India", International Affairs, Vol. 82, No.1, 2006, p. 75. 
^^ ^ Sunil Khilnani, "Bridging identities: India As A Positive Power?" in Through A Billion Voices: 
India's Role In A Multi-Polar World, Foresight Group, Berlin, 2010, p 13-16 and his "India As A 
Bridging Power" in India As A New Global Leader, Foreign Policy Centre, 2005. 
^^ ^ M.L. Sondhi, "A Task For India, Israel And Syria", The Pioneer, September 24, 1997. 
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international forums. This hardline negotiating stance may have imposed some 
short-term costs on India, but it also helped build its reputation as a tough, 
credible and principled negotiator which can be used in West Asia. Finally, based 
on India's status as a leader of the Nonaligned crowned by its consistent support 
to the Palestinians, India has considerable political capital in West Asia built up 
over the Nehru years. Moreover, India's international standing as a non-
interventionist nation and its image of having no regional hegemonic ambitions 
place it in a better position in West Asia than the Americans and Europeans. 
These countries' deep historical interventions and occupations in the region have 
led to perceptions of them being non-objective actors in the peace process. Also 
despite Israel's blatant contempt for international law and Its continued crimes 
against the Palestinian people, the US and EU continue to hold out a shield of 
impunity for Israel and their aim is to permanently sustaining and deepening their 
dominance over the Middle East. 
Shikha Bhatnagar writes in this context that "there may be an intermediary 
role for India across the continent that neither Europe nor the U.S. can employ as 
effectively. These countries' deep historical interventions and occupations in the 
region have led to perceptions of them being non-objective actors in the peace 
process. India has the unique ability to utilize its growing global and regional 
Influence, strengthened alliance with Israel and its continued support for the 
Palestinians, to discreetly encourage further dialogue that helps push the two 
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sides closer to an acceptable compromise. This could lead to much needed, and 
thus far elusive, stability in the region"^ ^®. 
However, the Nerhuvians caution that India should never expect 
reciprocity from Palestine for its support because while Israel is an independent 
state and that Palestine is yet to emerge as one. For them, what India would get 
for its support to the Palestine cause is the goodwill of the Palestinians and the 
entire Muslim world. In some cases, the Nehruvians agree that it would be 
beneficial for India's interests. Pradhan writes that the continuation of the conflict 
due to Israeli intransigence is the fundamental source of instability in the West 
Asian region where India has huge stakes. Hence it would be in the interest of 
everyone to seek an end to it. Moreover, at a time, when religious extremism is 
sweeping through the region, a secure Palestine would serve India's interests 
better. He suggests that the real challenge for Indian diplomacy lies in ending the 
occupation rather than providing mere economic and technological help to the 
already defunct PNA^^ .^ Muchkund Dubey suggests that "India should support all 
resolutions which call for the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people 
and for a just and fair solution of the problem. This is not a matter of principle but 
also guided by wider political considerations relating to India's relations with 
other countries and the sentiments of a vast segment of India's own 
population"^^^ In an editorial, the Hindu wrote "both principle and national 
^^® Shikha Bhatnagar, "India-Israel: BFFs or Fair Weather Friends?, New Atlanticist, August 1, 
2011 at: www.acus.org/new.../india-israel-bffs-or-fair-weather-friends 
^^^ Pradhan, "Changing Dynamics of India's West Asia Policy" op oil. No. 5, p. 87. 
^^ ° Dubey, "West Asia: India's Neighbouring Region" op cit, No. 297. 
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interest dictate that India should not dilute its traditional support for the 
Palestinian campaign for self-determination. This principled position will not 
hamper the development of relations with Israel over the long term. Many 
countries have interacted with Israel at a controlled pace in the hope that the 
peace camp could be strengthened. India too followed such a course over most 
of the 11 years since full diplomatic relations were established with Israel. 
Delusions about a new strategic equation, which would enable the two countries 
to dominate the geographical region between their territories, have brought about 
a policy imbalance that needs immediate correction"^^^. 
The Pragmatic Perspective: 
The end of the Cold War led to new challenges and new debates about 
India's foreign policy. Some Indian strategists, referred here as the pragmatists, 
argued that India's traditional foreign policy was no longer relevant to the post-
Cold War world, and pushed for the unabashed consideration of the Indian 
national interest rather than global justice, ethics or ideological positions. As 
Shashi Tharoor, India's former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, once put it, 
traditionally India "seemed to take greater satisfaction in being right than being 
diplomatic"^^°. More recently and controversially he criticized Nehruvian foreign 
policy for being a "moralistic running commentary"^^\ Others believe that Indian 
^^ ^ "Strategic Delusions" (editorial), Hindu, September 11, 2003. 
^^° Shashi Tharoor, "Can India Afford an Ethical Foreign Policy?" 7/mes of India, October 14, 
2007at: http://timesofinclia.indiatimes.com/S_Tharoor_Ethics_and_foreignj)olicy/articleshow/2456205.cms. 
^" D. Vasudevan, "Tharoor Criticises Nehru's 'Moralistic' Foreign Policy," Daily News and 
Analysis, January 10, 2010 at: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_tharoor-criticisesnehru-s-
moraiistic-foreign-policy_1332933. 
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policy is often geared toward consistency with past positions without recognizing 
India's changed circumstances. But as strategist C. Raja Mohan suggested, 
Indian foreign policy debates are so focused on semantics that "they have little 
time for the 'grammar' of global power politics"^^^. He argues that this focus on 
semantics was understandable when India was weak, when "rhetoric 
compensated for power," but unnecessary for an India that has become far more 
consequential in global affairs. 
The pragmatists admit that India's shift In its Middle East policy has 
reaped good dividends for New Delhi especially that the 'Israeli card' is becoming 
useful in dealing with the Arab states. It has helped India to assume an added 
importance for the Arabs, including the Palestinians. As the two sides compete to 
extract favorable statements from New Delhi during the crisis situations, India 
has a useful opportunity to carve out a role for herself in the volatile Middle East. 
Moreover, close relations with Israel could counter moves by those Muslim 
countries which were inclined to act against Indian interest if instigated by 
Pakistan. The pragmatists however caution that this new approach does not 
mean New Delhi to abandon its efforts to seek political support from the Arab 
world on Kashmir or a permanent seat in the UNSC. What it implies is that, unlike 
in the past when the Indian support for the Arabs was taken for granted due to its 
automatic support in their dispute with Israel especially at the United Nations and 
allowed them to influence India's policies in the region, India should now 
^^^C. Raja Mohan, "India's Diplomacy: Between Semantics and Grammar," Indian Express, July 
18, 2009 at; http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indias-diplomacy-between-semanticsand-
grammar/491094/0, 
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forcefully assert its interests in the Arab world conveying to the Arab leaders that 
in their dispute with Israel, they cannot take Indian support for granted, especially 
at the United Nations, unless they reciprocate by taking India's interests into 
consideration. 
On Israel Palestine peace process, the pragmatists want India to play a 
leading role both for the sake of its own rising power profile and on the ground of 
national interest. The pragmatists argue that India's voice carries more weight 
today in global forums than in the past. The country has outgrown its Cold War 
role as a third world, non-aligned nation to exercise influence as an emerging 
power through global governance institutions—be it as part of the Five Interested 
Parties in the World Trade Organization (WTO); the Brazil, South Africa, India, 
and China (BASIC) group at the Copenhagen climate change negotiations of 
2009; or the Group of 4 (G4) coalition of countries (Brazil, Germany, India, and 
Japan) demanding permanent membership in the UN Security Council^ ^^. 
Besides, several major countries like the United States, China, European Union, 
Russia, Japan etc have signed regional trade arrangements or bilateral strategic 
partnerships with India^ '^*. This is largely due to its enhanced economic power, 
political stability, and nuclear capability. 
For the pragmatists, India's heightened profile at this juncture provides a 
golden opportunity for the country to play a competent leadership role in the 
523 
For more on this see Rohan Mukherjee and David M. IVIalone, "From High Ground to High 
Table: The Evolution of Indian Multilateralism", Global Governance, No. 17, 2011, pp. 311-329. 
^^* See for instance, Ummu Salma Bava, "New Powers for Global Change? India's Role in the 
Emerging World Order", FES Briefing Paper A, Berlin, March 2007. 
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world and help in solving important global problems like Palestine. In other 
words, if India sees itself playing a larger role in the world, it has to increase its 
clout in its proximate or what the government calls the 'extended' 
neighbourhood"^ As C Rajamohan argues that unlike in the past, India need no 
to be a mute spectator to the changes in the balance of power around it. It is in 
position to influence the direction and shape of the content of the structural 
change unfolding in Asia and elevate Its own standing as a great power"^. 
According to Bharat Karnard "to be recognised as a great power, India will have 
to do what other great powers have done throughout history: Think big, act big, 
take risks, and back up its diplomacy with force. To believe India will attain great 
power by lesser means is to be delusionjal""^. Dhruva Jaishankar is of the view 
that India is investing considerable diplomatic capital in its bid for a permanent 
membership of the UNSC, so it should be better attuned to the expectations 
which that privilege entails. Abstaining on key decisions is hardly a marker of 
leadership and weakens India's claims to what it sees as its rightful position on 
global affairs. Moreover, India's own growing security amid increasing regional 
instability means the possibility of India having to intervene in another country is 
today far greater than that of India being at the receiving end of such an 
intervention. With an eye on the future, setting a precedent for intervention on 
^^ ^ David Scott, "India's "Extended Neighbourhood" Concept: Power Projection for a Rising 
Power", India Review, Vol. 8, No. 2,2009, pp. 107-143 at: 
http://www.tandfoniine.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14736480902901038. 
^^ ^ C Rajamohan, Tournament of Shadows, Indian Express, November, 17, 2011. 
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Bharat Karnard Endless delusion. The Asian Age, Sep 29, 2011. 
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dire humanitarian grounds may be prudent"^ According to Rajiv Sil<ri, India's 
sliyness in offering its mediation and good offices for playing a conflict-resolution 
role through the Non-Aligned Movement or directly in the areas of specific 
concern like Palestine do not augur well for its aspirations to play a larger global 
role^^^ P R Kumaraswamy writes "a seat in the UNSC is not about membership 
in an ivy-league or high-power body but it is about shouldering responsibilities, 
exhibiting maturity, evolving nuanced positions on sensitive issues and skilful use 
of diplomacy to minimize, if not resolve, major problems confronting the world. It 
is about working for a more peaceful world and in the process helping India and 
not other way around"^^°. He suggests that abandoning the temptations of high-
sounding rhetoric, India needs to get down to the nitty-gritty of negotiations, 
compromises and bridging proposals. Bluntly put, foreign policy is not about 
ignorant rhetoric, simplistic worldviews and wishful thinking but about evolving a 
more detached and non-sentimental view of the world and its challenges^^\ 
Amrita Narlikar similarly argues that even after certain structural conditions 
are met, such as large market size and rapid economic growth, the rise of a 
country to a recognised great power is not automatic. Rather, the process 
^^ ° Dhruva Jaishankar, Rocky Road to Damascus, Indian Express, November 16, 2011. 
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Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy, Sage Publications, New 
Delhi, 2009. 
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P R Kumaraswamy India and tine UNSC Responsibility, Middle East Institute Dateline, Issue 
No. 10, October 21, 2010 at: 
http://www.mei.org.in/front/cms/publicationsDetail.php?id=NTQ=&cid=MTA= 
''' Ibid. 
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whereby a state's rise is negotiated matters, both in terms of recognition by other 
parties as well as the outcomes that the state is able to generate^^^. The 
pragmatists further argue that it is mainly because of India's increasing power 
profile, the country has been called upon by the international community to play a 
larger role in the West Asian affairs. This is evident in the pressure on India to 
adopt a more visible role in Iraq and to use its leverage on Iran to curtail its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. In a first of its kind, India was invited by the US to 
participate in the West Asian peace conference at Annapolis in November 2007 
as a recognition of India's growing stature in the international system. Most 
countries in the region are also now seeking comprehensive partnerships with 
India based on a recognition and appreciation for India's role in shaping the 
emerging regional and global order. 
The pragmatists also want India to play an active role in West Asia as it 
has a huge stake in sustaining the peace process in the region. C. Raja Mohan 
feels that there is a big danger today that extremist forces on both sides will push 
the region into a renewed conflict that will undermine the Indian interest in 
pursuing good relations with both Israel and the Arab nation. He suggests that 
India needs to stick with some broad principles, support pragmatic moves to 
defuse tension, and lend whatever support it can for a restoration of the peace 
process^^ .^ According to Harsh Pant, from energy security to defence ties, from 
^^ ^ Amrita Narlikar, "Power and Legitimacy: India and the World Trade Organization", India and 
Global Affairs, Inaugural Issue, January-March 2008, pp.176-180 at: 
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199215294/smith_ch15.pdf. Also see her book Tfie World 
Trade Organization: A Very Sfiort Introduction Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. 
^^ ^ C. Raja Mohan, "India's West Asian Stakes", Hindu, October 16, 2000. 
226 
countering China to pursuing stability in the region, India now has an array of 
interests in West Asia. He suggests that as India tries to re-define its interests in 
West Asia, Indian xliplomacy should become more outcome-oriented^ '^*. M. L 
Sondhi writes that "from India's point of view, an out and out conflict In the West 
Asian area could have the gravest consequences for Indian economy and 
society"^^ .^ According to Narendra Sisodia, "West Asia is strategically located, 
focal point of diplomacy and a destination of export of India's manpower, 
technical know-how and expertise. India can't feel safe if West Asia is in 
turmoil""®. Shebonti Ray Dadwal argues that if an Israeli-Palestinian peace 
settlement can be made permanent, a sure sequel will be a free flow of goods 
between Israel and the Palestinian entity that will emerge from the settlement. If 
former Prime Minister Shimon Peres' "New Middle East" can become a reality, 
and a common market comprising Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity can 
be set up, this would logically be the biggest growth area in the next decade. 
With India's relations with both favourable, it can be beneficial, both politically 
and economically for India. Therefore, it is in New Delhi's interest to promote 
peace between both parties and encourage them to abandon their mutual 
^^^ Harsh Pant, "India Redefines Ties in West Asia", Rediff News, October 14, 2008 at: 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/oct/14guest2.htm 
535 Sondhi, "A Task for India, Israel And Syria" op cit, No. 515. 
^^ ^ "India Has an Abiding Interest in Peace in West Asia", Times of India, January 30, 2006. 
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suspicions and hostilities. India should take a more active interest in the current 
negotiation and do what it can to push it forward "^^ ''. 
Thus, the pragmatists want India to follow an active role in the Palestine 
Israeli conflict that matches India's profile as an emerging great power. Besides, 
such a role, they argue is also beneficial for India's national interests. Thus, there 
is a commonality between the Nehruvians and the Pragmatists in so far as both 
argue for an interest based approach to India's policy towards Israel and 
Palestine but unlike the Nehruvians, the Pragmatists do not think high ideals and 
lofty principles should dictate India's policy. Rather under the certain 
circumstances, these should be altered to serve India's national interest. 
The Status-Quoits Perspective 
This perspective owes its origin since early 1990's when India decided to 
establish full diplomatic relationship with Israel and followed a more balanced 
policy towards Israel and the Arab world. According to this perspective, India 
should not change its present policy of keeping a low profile in the Middle East 
peace process because such a posture better serves its national interests. In 
other words, India should continue to resist any temptation to play any overt role 
in the peace process as it helps to maintain normal ties with all parties of the 
conflict without forcing the country into unpleasant situations. 
^" Shebontl Ray Dadwal, "The Current Israeli-Palestinian Process: Consequences for India", 
Strategic Analysis, Volume 22, Issue 9,1998, pp. 1341-1351. 
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There are several reasons why the status-quoits prefer India to keep a low 
profile in the region and avoid active involvement in the Middle East conflict. 
First, they believe that there is no shortcut to the end of a conflict that has 
endured for decades," and that "ultimately, it's the Israelis and the Palestinians 
who must live side by side." Second, keeping strict neutrality in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is crucial for India to gain the confidence of both sides and thereby 
enhance its profile in the region and beyond. Third, India's choices are actually 
limited in the context of West Asia as it needs the support and co-operation of 
both sides of the dispute for its own interests. For its energy security, it needs the 
hydrocarbon resources of the Arab countries. At present, India imports 60 
percent of its crude oil requirement, from the Middle East^ ^ .^ Moreover, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council accommodates over 5.5 million Indian nationals who send 
back $ 30 billion annually^^ .^ Indian companies are also executing major projects 
across West Asia in energy, infrastructure and services. Similarly, India's 
relations with Israel have acquired a depth and diversity which cannot be rolled 
back. This has happened because Israel has been able to meet crucial Indian 
needs in the field of defence, agriculture and technology without pre-conditions or 
succumbing to pressures from other countries. Recently Israel has replaced 
Russia as India's top military supplier and the trade relationship between India 
^^ ^ "India Has an Abiding interest in Peace in West Asia: Pranab", Times of India, January 30, 
2006. 
^^ ^ Taimiz Alimad, "New Relations with New Arabia", Economic Times, June 16, 2011, p. 13; 
"India Seeks Revival of Peace Process in West Asia", Tharoor's Speech at ICWA, Hindu, 
December 2, 2009 and Nicola Nasser, "Indian - Israeli Ties Could Neutralize Delhi's Palestinian 
Policy", Global Research, July 12, 2007. 
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and Israel is one of the most dynamic in the region '^*". Thus, the status-quoits 
argue that unlike the past when India followed a one-sided policy towards the 
Arab world and could freely voice her opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
now it has to maintain good relations on both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide and 
this makes it necessary for the country to follow a policy of equidistance in the 
Israeli Palestinian conflicts. Girijesh Pant argues in this context that 'for India, 
West Asia is a region to augment its power rather than to display or assert its 
power. The thrust of India's West Asia policy and diplomacy thus has to be 
geared towards mobilizing resources - political, strategic, economic and cultural -
from the region to contribute in its emergence as global power" '^*\ 
Others argue that India is actually not In a position to play the role of a 
mediator due to its own domestic constraints. Ramachandra Guha, for instance, 
argues that India is still a developing country, with many problems, and should 
concentrate on internal challenges rather than focusing on external matters "^*^ . 
Rajiv Kumar similarly writes that other global powers will not give sufficient 
credence to India's role if the country's human development and social indicators 
^° Subhash Kapila, "India - Israel Relations: The Imperatives For Enhanced Strategic 
Cooperation", SAAG Paper, August 1, 2000; Vinay Shankar, "Arab-Israel Relations; Can India be 
the Fulcrum?, Bitter Lemons International Organisation, November 20, 2003 and Adam C 
Castillo, "India and Israel: A Balancing Alliance", International Relations and Security Network, 16 
July 2008. 
^^ Quoted in R.M. Abhyankar, 'India & West Asia' lecture at IIT Mumbai on 16th July 2010 at: 
http://indiandiplomacy.blogspot.com/2010/07/amb-rm-abhyankar-lecture-on-india-west.html 
^^ Cited in C Rajamohan," Rising India's Great Power Burden", The Singur Centre for Asian 
Studies, Asia Report, Issue No. 7, January 2010 at: 
www.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/asia.../11.16.09Risinglndia.pdf 
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remain at sub-Saharan levels. He cites four critical challenges facing rising India: 
governance deficit, human resource development imperatives, infrastructure 
weaknesses and rising disparities in personal and regional incomes and 
suggests that continued global clout Is a direct result of progress at home^^. 
Some other status-quoits argue that even without being actively involved 
in the Middle Eastern peace process India has benefited from it the most, so 
there is no need for any direct Indian role. For instance, the September 13 1993 
agreement between the PLO and Israel on their mutual recognition and on 
Palestinian self-rule provided a good opportunity to the Rao government to justify 
its decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and its balancing act in 
the Israel-Palestine conflict^'^. Another section argues that if the US could not 
bridge the gap between the two warring sides, India could not even dream of 
playing such a role. To one scholar, "Indian policy makers should not forget that 
West Asian sensitivities have been offended and hurt by aggressive US 
intervention in the region"^^. Another scholar argues, "over the last several 
years, India has sought close relations with the United States, especially in the 
area of nuclear cooperation. Therefore, it is hardly in a position to deviate from 
the line of the US in West Asia" '^* .^ 
^^ Rajiv Kumar, "International Role and Respect? Not Without Economic Prosperity", Global Asia 
Journal, Vol. 6, No.1, March, 2011. 
^'' John Cherian, "A Breach of Trust" op cit., No. 437. 
^^ Abhyankar, 'India & West Asia' op cit. No. 13. 
^^® Sujata Ashwarya Cheema, " Palestinian Israeli Peace Process in the New Middle East: Can 
India Have a Role to Play? in Anwar Alam ed. India and West Asia in the Era of Globalisation, 
New Century Publications, New Delhi, 2008, p. 314. 
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other status quoits are against any Indian involvement in the peace 
process because it would make the country unnecessarily controversial. For 
instance, a direct Indian role in the conflict could lead to accusations of an 
- i t . 
"American-Zionist-Hindu Communal Parties" alliance against Islam^^. According 
to one scholar, an Israeli government that Is less flexible on peace negotiations 
would make it harder for India to get the desired outcome^^. This would 
adversely affect its relationship with the Jewish country which is smooth at the 
moment. Similarly an undesirable outcome could trigger anti-Indian sentiment in 
the Arab world and undennlne the goodwill of the Palestinians. Another scholar 
has written that India as an emerging power has significant interests with Israel, 
the source of most of the Indian military's advanced technology edge, by joining 
in the peace process Instead of leaving it to the two sides to thrash it out in 
negotiations, in the manner Delhi would prefer the Kashmir issue to be settled. It 
would only harm Its own Interests. He cites the recent example when India joined 
the call for a sovereign Palestinian state in the UN General Assembly which led 
the US President Barack Obama to reject a meeting with Manmohan Singh in 
New York and made the Israelis hurt^ **^ . Moreover, Pakistan would certainly 
^^ Ronak D. Desai_ & Xenia Ddrmandy "Indo-lsraeli Relations: Key Security Implications", Policy 
Brief, July 10, 2008 at: 
http://belfercenter.ksg.han/aM.edu/publication/18414/indoisraeli_mlations.html?breadcrumb=%2F 
experts%2F1631%2Fronak_d_desai%3Fgroupby%3D 1 %26page%3D 1 %26hide%3D 1 %26id%3D 
1631%26back_ui1%3D%252Fexperts%252F%26%3Bback_text%3DBack%2Bto%2Blist%2Bof% 
2Bexperts 
"^^  Harsh V. Pant cited in Arielle Kandel, "Indo-lsraeli Relations in the Post-Cold War Period", 
Weekly Blitz, February 21, 2010. 
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exploit from any Indian role in the peace process. For instance, even during the 
absence of diplomatic relations, Pakistan accused India of conspiring with the 
'Zionist enemy' to threaten and undermine the larger Islamic world. After 
normalisation, 'Hindu-Jewish', 'Brahmin-Zionist' or Jndo-lsraell conspiracies have 
periodically become a prime theme in the Pakistan media^^°. Internally, India's 
active role in the peace process would put it into a difficult situation. There are 
several left-wing political parties in India that are openly hostile toward Israel and 
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Moreover, as a functioning democracy with 
a sizable Muslim population, no government in India could ignore the influence of 
its Muslim constituency. Indifference toward their views and sentiment would 
undermine the country's democratic credentlals^^\ Also, the Muslim factor does 
play a role in the calculation of India's political parties. For instance, a large 
section of India's Muslim population has traditionally voted for the Congress party 
in India's national elections, and the party fears it would lose the support of these 
voters if it adopted an overly friendly attitude toward Israel^ ^ .^ Thus, due to all 
these reasons, the status-quoits want India to remain neutral in the Israel-
Palestine conflict and follow a low profile posture in the peace process. 
®^ Sadanand Dhume, "India Fumbles tin Palestine", Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2011. 
^^ ° See for instance, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Growing Indo-lsraeli Nexus", The News, 09 
September, 2001 and "India Israel Nexus gives Musharraf Sleepless Nights", Indian Express, 
September 13, 2003. 
^^ ^ P.R. Kumaraswami, "The Muslim Factor in India's Foreign Policy", Japan Times, July 30, 
2008. 
^^ ^ Kandel, "Indo-lsraeli Relations in the Post-Cold War Period" op cit.. No. 548. 
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Which streams of thought would be close to the future Indian role in the 
Palestine Israeli peace process? This study has found that India took part in 
multilateral initiatives such as the Annapolis Conference in November 2007 when 
invited by the Americans. Otherwise it has confined itself to generalities, 
highlighting the need for negotiations and accommodation. This posture would 
continue in future as argued by the status-quoits. A recent U.S. Embassy cable 
on India, accessed by The Hindu through WikiLeaks revealed that as an 
emerging global power, New Delhi recognises that it cannot afford to alienate 
either the Palestinians or Israelis, as this could endanger Indian defence interests 
or provoke a domestic backlash. It further suggested that India hopes to avoid 
being forced publicly to choose between its pragmatic strategic relationship with 
Israel and its commitment to the Palestinians. India's bilateral relationship with 
Israel continues to flourish with growing defence ties, trade links and 
opportunities for high tech collaboration. However, with a large Muslim population 
that plays a critical role supporting the ruling Congress in national elections, India 
has historically supported Palestinians in multinational fora and considered itself 
a strong supporter of Palestinian self-determination^^"'. In another raw cable 
dated March 31, 2006 (58913: confidential), US Ambassador to India David 
Mulford wrote that "the underlying straddle of meek statements about the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict combined with full-steam-ahead engagement with Israel on 
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practical and strategic matters is unlikely to change in future^ "^*. Jim Colbert 
similarly argues that while India can be expected to pursue bilateral ties with 
Israel, its regional approach will always employ rhetoric that pleases the Arab 
states and Iran^^l Pratap Bhanu Mehta calls such an Indian Foreign Policy 
posture as cautious prudence. It is cautious in recognising a limit to its own ability 
to affect change elsewhere. It is also a prudent power, in the sense that, contrary 
to standard narratives, it understands that power does matter^ ^ .^ 
From the above analysis, it is evident that while India has been playing a 
limited role in the Middle East peace process, there is a growing perception that 
India should play a larger role in the Israeli Palestinian conflict although the 
Radicals have a different viewpoint on this issue. The Nehruvians and the 
pragmatists differ in important respects but they adopt a common position for an 
active Indian role in the peace process both for the sake of Palestine people and 
for India's own interests. The status quoits perspective is different on this 
important issue as they consider India's has its own limitations to play a 
mediatory role between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The real challenge for 
India in future would be how to balance its domestic concerns with the actual 
requirements at the extended neighbourhood. 
^^* Cited in Hasan Siiroor, "West Asia Policy Hostage to 'Muslim vote", l-lindu, March 15, 2011 at: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1539452.ece 
^^ ^ Jim Colbert, "India's Misunderstood Israel Policy", The Diplomat, December 02, 2010. 
^^ ^ Pratap Bhanu Mehta, 'Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy 
Frameworks in India', India Review, Vol. 8, No.3, 2009, pp. 209 — 233. 
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CONCLUSION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
This study demonstrates that India has had a consistent and unwavering 
record of support for the Palestinian cause since the days of its freedom struggle. 
Right from the very beginning, Indian leaders regarded the Palestinian question 
as a colonial question and considered the elimination of colonialism, in terms of 
the termination of the British Mandate and establishment of an independent state 
of Palestine. India's position here was primarily anti-colonial and directed against 
the British policy of 'divide and rule', that is, exploitation of Arab-Jewish 
differences to perpetuate the domination of Palestine. In this phase, India viewed 
the Palestine question in the light of its own colonial experiences. In an 
expression of solidarity, the Congress Working Committee sent its greetings to 
the Palestinian Arabs and observed September 27,1936 as the Palestine Day. 
India's perception of the Arab-Jewish issue in Palestine registered a shift 
with the large-scale migration of Jews from Eastern and Central Europe to 
Palestine, between 1935 and 1947, primarily owing to Nazi persecution. While 
India deeply sympathised with the sufferings of the Jews, it was opposed to a 
separate state fdr the Jews in Palestine on two grounds. First, it regarded any 
state exclusively based on religion as untenable. The foundations of a secular 
India are laid on this principle. Secondly, jt considered a remote historical 
connection with the area as an insufficient ground for the creation of a separate 
Jewish state in Palestine." 
This Indian view spelt out during the freedom struggle by the Indian 
National Congress and its top leadership like Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal 
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Nehru and Maulana Azad laid the foundation to India's foreign policy on 
Palestine and on the Jewish question which was pursued more or less with the 
same verve for many years in the post-independence era. The first sign of this 
policy was seen on November 29, 1947, when India along with 12 other nations 
voted against the UN General Assembly resolution 181 for the partition of 
Palestine. India supported the Minority Plan which called for the establishment of 
a federal Palestine with internal autonomy for the Jewish illegal immigrants. 
On May 11, 1949 India voted against the U.N. resolution for admission of 
Israel into the United Nations. This time, India stood alongside six Arab states, 
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Burma. Explaining India's stand, the 
Indian delegation stated that "India could not recognise an Israel which had been 
achieved through the force of arms and not through negotiations." But soon 
after. Pandit Nehru watered down his stance and the Government of India 
accorded de jure recognition to Israel on September 17, 1950. The Jewish 
government was allowed to open an office in Mumbai that was converted into a 
consulate in 1953. Nehru, however, made it clear that recognition did not mean 
endorsement of Israeli position on its frontiers and India would continue to 
support the cause of the Palestinians. 
The Indira Gandhi era witnessed an all-round development of Indo-Arab 
relations. She evinced keen interest in the affairs of the Arab world and 
especially showed a great concern for the people of Palestine. India supported 
the Arab stand on the Palestine issue in the United Nations and Non-Aligned 
Summits. India became the first non-Arab State to recognise the Palestine 
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Liberation Organisation (PLO) as 'the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people' and allowed it to open its office in New Delhi in January, 
1975. She invited PLO leader Yasser Arafat to New Delhi and established formal 
diplomatic relations. 
When Janata party came to power in 1977, there were speculations about 
a possible shift in India's Palestine policy. Belying all expectations, the Janata 
Government reaffirmed India's support to the Arabs in general and Palestinians 
in particular and was supportive of any peace initiative between Arabs and Israel. 
In 1980, Indira Gandhi returned to power with a thumping majority and continued 
her support to the Palestinian struggle. Her Foreign Minister, P.V Narasimha Rao 
announced in Parliament on 26*^  March 1980 that India had decided to accord 
full diplomatic recognition to the office of the PLO in New Delhi by upgrading its 
office to that of an embassy endowed with all diplomatic immunities and 
privileges. Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89) followed the footsteps of his mother and 
grandfather. He accorded recognition to the State of Palestine in November 1988 
and the PLO office in New Delhi started functioning as the Embassy of the State 
of Palestine. 
Thus, India's West Asia policy from 1947 to 1991 was characterized by a 
pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy. This stance reflected India's own interest 
in the Middle East as well as its traditional sympathy with the Arabs; it was further 
influenced by India's commitment to the United Nations, the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and the sentiments of its own minority population. 
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However, the Government of India's policy on the Arab Israel conflict 
remained a subject of deep dispute within the country as it was challenged by the 
political parties in opposition — the right wing Jan Sangh and the Swatantra 
Party and the middle of the road Pra/a-Socialist Party (PSP) and the Samyukta 
Socialist Party (SSP)--, the national media and the informed Indian citizens. The 
Congress party itself was also divided on the issue and even senior Cabinet 
Ministers had been known to entertain serious reservations regarding the 
unqualified support extended by the Prime Minister and the External Minister to 
various moves made by the West Asian nations on different occasions especially 
during the Chinese aggression in 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan wars in 1965 & 
1971. 
There was however, a shift in India's foreign policy towards Israel during 
P.V. Narasimha Rao's tenure as India announced its decision to establish full 
diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992. But the Indian Government's 
decision to normalize ties with Israel did not happen all of a sudden. The move in 
this direction was undertaken in mid-1980 when Rajiv Gandhi, known for his non-
ideological approach to foreign policy, met his Israeli counterpart Shimon Pares 
during the annual UN General Assembly session in September 1985 and 
undertook a number of steps afterwards. The ideological rhetoric of the past had 
no attraction for the young leader who sought to carry forward the country into 
the next century as modern and technologically developed country. But a series 
of events stalled the process of normalization with Israel. With the change of the 
international scenario caused by the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of 
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the Soviet Union, the emergence of the United States as the only super power, 
the change of PLO's strategy towards Israel, the start of the Middle East peace 
process, India's own economic liberlisation, delinking of Pakistan from Its Middle 
East policy, the rising problem of terrorism in the country, the change in India's 
domestic politics and a strong domestic discourse in favour of establishing full 
diplomatic relationship with Israel, also influenced India's decision in favour of 
Israel. After the release of Israeli hostages held in Jammu and Kashmir in 
summer 1991, along with the publicly reported visit of the Deputy Director 
General for Asia of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Moshe Yegar, the Indian media, 
right-wing political leaders and intellectuals came out openly in support of full 
diplomatic relations with Israel leading to the normalisation of relations with the 
Jewish country since January 1992. 
Although India's relation with Israel started at a low profile during the 
Congress regime, the relations between the two countries reached new heights 
during the BJP led National Democratic Alliance regime of Atal Biharl Vajpayee 
(1998-2004). When the United Progressive Alliance Government under the 
Congress leadership came to power In mid-2004, it decided to follow the same 
line of the policy adopted by the earlier NDA regime. The growing ties between 
India and Israel and Its consequent effect on New Delhi's posture towards 
Palestine have generated another lively debate In the country. There are two 
different viewpoints on this Issue. According .to one view, India's growing ties with 
Israeli has neutralised its traditional support to the Palestine Issue. The other 
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view argues that India's friendship with Israel has not affected its support to the 
Palestinian cause. 
After establishing diplomatic relationship with Israel, India continued to 
support the cause of Palestine. At the political and diplomatic level, India 
provided strong support to the people of Palestinian in their quest for a 
sovereign, independent and viable state, economically India provided both 
material and technical support to the Palestinian government and its people in 
their search for nation-building. The Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat 
frequently visited India, so also other high level dignitaries. After Arafat's death, 
the new Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, accompanied by several 
ministers visited New Delhi in May 2005, October 2008 and in February 2010. 
From the Indian side, the Union Home Minister, the External Affairs Minister, the 
Minister of State for External Affairs and other senior officials visited Palestine. 
Besides supporting the cause of Palestine through several bilateral visits, 
India also espoused the cause of Palestine at various international forums such 
as the UN and NAM. India supported numerous Palestinian-related resolutions at 
the United Nations from time to time. It also helped to pass several Non-Aligned 
Movement-sponsored resolutions on the Palestine issue. In addition to securing 
international support, India also provided much needed economic, technical and 
humanitarian assistance to the PNA, especially after its establishment in 1994 in 
pursuance of the Oslo principles. India also continues to financially contribute to 
the UN Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) for undertaking relief work in the 
occupied Palestinian territories from time to time. Besides, the Government of 
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India has recognised the passport/ travel documents issued by the PNA and 
established a Representative Office to the Palestine National Authority in Gaza in 
1996 which was shifted to Ramallah in 2003. 
However, the Government's claim that it continues to provide diplomatic 
and political support to the Palestinians in their effort to have a separate 
homeland and help them in "the reconstruction of their nation" through economic, 
technical and humanitarian assistance from time to time, has not been shared by 
a number of leaders, scholars, journalists and activists who on the contrary argue 
that India's support Palestine has now been reduced to mere statements, 
resolutions and occasional economic assistance. In other words, it is clear that 
India, under the given the circumstances, is no longer supporting the national 
struggle movements that it used to do in the past. In the garb of so called 
'pragmatism', India is steadily getting sucked into the vortex of Western design 
and quagmire. Whether India is under the NDA or UPA rule, the Government has 
diluted the country's principled foreign policy for certain interests that are not 
going to pay it in the long run. 
In addition to the Government support, the people of India have always 
come forward In support of the Palestine issue. This is evident from the 
numerous campaigns and demonstrations against Israel's actions in Palestine by 
several civil society groups from time to time. Moreover, frequent seminars and 
conferences have also been organised in the country in the recent past to raise 
awareness and garner support for the just cause of Palestine. 
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India has also played a limited role in the Middle East peace process to 
solve the problem of Palestine. It was invited to become a participant in the 
multilateral track of the Peace Process that began in 1991 and actively 
participated in all the five working groups discussing Middle East-Palestine 
question such as regional economic development, arms control and regional 
security and environment and water resources. India welcomed the mutual 
recognition by the State of Israel & the PLO and the signing of the Palestinian-
Israeli agreement on Palestinian self-rule on 13 September 1993. It welcomed 
the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement in Cairo on 4"^  May 1994 (also known as 
Gaza-Jericho Agreement). An Indian delegation led by the Minister of State for 
External Affairs, R.L Bhatia was present during the signing ceremony. India also 
greeted the Oslo Interim Agreement (Oslo II) signed on 30th September 1995 
and reiterated the view that durable peace in the region was necessary to resolve 
all outstanding issues to the satisfaction of all concerned parties. Terming the 
Wye River Memorandum signed between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on 23 October 1998 as 'an 
important milestone' in the stalled peace process, India supported its 
unconditional implementation. The Indian Trade and Industry Minister Ashwani 
Kumar participated in the Sharm El Sheikh summit in February 2005 between 
Israeli and Palestinian leaders to end the 2000 Intifada and resume negotiations 
under the roadmap. India was invited as a partfcipant in the Annapolis 
Conference which was held on November 27, 2007 and Kapil Sibal, the Minister 
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for Science and Technology and Earth Sciences, represented the country at 
Annapolis. 
In recent years, there is a growing perception that India should play a 
more direct and mediatory role in the Israel Palestine Peace process. While India 
has shown some interest in the regard and this is welcomed by the Israelis and 
the Palestinians, the domestic discourse on India's new role is sharply divided. 
There are four different discourses: the Radicals, the Nehruvians, the 
pragmatists and the status quoits. The Radicals want India to fully support the 
Palestine issue, end all cooperation with Israel and call for a combination of 
global isolation, sanctions and external pressure against the Jewish country by 
the international community. The Nehruvians want India to provide more vigorous 
support and play an active role in the peace process because unlike in the past, 
it is now in a better position to play such a role. They support an active role for 
India in the Palestine issue because the Palestinians are not only fighting for a 
just and humanitarian cause but there has also not been any change on the 
ground situation in the occupied territories. The pragmatists, like the Nehruvians, 
want India to play a leading role in the peace process but for the sake of its own 
rising power profile and national interest. According to the status-quoits, India 
should not change its present policy of keeping a low profile in the Middle East 
peace process because such a posture better serves its national interests. In 
other words, the status-quoits maintain that India should continue to resist any 
temptation to play any overt role in the peace process as it helps to maintain 
normal ties with ail parties to the Middle East conflict without forcing the country 
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into unpleasant situations. In view of these differing perceptions, the real 
challenge for India in future would be to balance its donnestic concerns with the 
actual requirements at its extended neighbourhood. 
However a small comment is needed on 'national interest' since it is the 
buzzword which has united people from mutually opposed viewpoints. Foreign 
policy does not automatically or routinely pursue national interest. Ideas of 
pragmatism and national interest pre-suppose a socially neutral state which can 
look after the interest of all its citizens. This is problematic. States, even 
democracies, are biased in favour of certain classes, castes, patriarchy and so 
on. 
Therefore unless pressured from below, states tend to pursue the 
sectional interest of the powerful and pass it off as national interest. Foreign 
policy is a combination of morality and pragmatism and just what the mix will be 
will depend on the nature of the country's political leadership. It is not at all 
coincidental that leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi were 
so pro-Palestine and would strongly consider morality, decency and dignity in 
foreign policy in comparison to Rajeev Gandhi, Atal Behari Vajpayee or 
Manmohan Singh. 
245 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
United Nations: 
The United Nations and the Question of Palestine, (Department of Public Information, 
1st October 1994) at: 
http://domino.un.Org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/3b58e8d0adf62b5f852561230077c62d? 
OpenDocument 
The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1988, Part I to IV (New York: 
United Nations, 1978,1979, 1984 and 1990). 
http://unispal.un.Org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/57C45A3DD0D46B09802564740045CC0A 
"United Nations Security Council Resolution 338", October 22,1973 at: http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/288/65/IMG/NR028865.pdf?OpenElement 
"United Nations Security Council Resolution 247, November 22,1967 at: http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement 
Untied Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) Report to the General 
Assembly, Vol. I & III, (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 
1947) at: http://unispal.un.Org/unispal.nsf/0/07175de9fa2de563852568d3006e10f3, 
http://unispal.un.Org/unispal.nsf/0/7735b7dc144807b985256e8b006f4a71 
U.N. General Assembly, Second Session, Official Records, Verbatim Recond of the 
Plenary Meeting, Vol. II, 110th-128th meetings ( Lake Success, N.Y., Sept. 16-Nov. 29, 
1947). 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/181(II) (A+B), dated 29 November 
1947 at: 
http://domino.un.Org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d2537OpenDocume 
nt 
Other Documents 
Israeli-Palestinian Summit Proposals at Camp David, July 25, 2000 at: 
http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid2.htm 
League of Nations Covenant Mandate Provision, June 28,1919 at: 
http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/United-Nations,-The-Palestine-
Problem/Story712.html#Article%2022%20of%20the%20Covenant%20of%20the%20Lea 
gue%20of%20Nations,%2028%20June%201919 
246 
Quartet Road Map Statement - Sept. 17, 2002 at: 
http://www.un.org/media/main/roadmap122002.html 
Stiarm El-Sheikti Summit Concluding Statement by President Bill Clinton, 
October 17, 2000 at: http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=423 
The Arab Peace Initiative, March 28, 2002 at: http://www.al-
bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm 
The Balfour Declaration, November 2,1917 at: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_docum 
ents/168296 Istm 
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on The West Bank And The Gaza Strip, 
Washington, D.C. September 28,1995 at: http://www.mideastweb.org/meosint.htm 
The Oslo Declaration of Principles, September 13,1993 at: 
http://www.mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm 
The Peel Commission Report, ^937 at 
http://www.passia.org/publications/bookmaps/page1.htm 
The Report of the Worid Bank on Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011 at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011 -Ebook. pdf. 
The Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding 
Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Penvanent Status 
Negotiations, September 4, 1999 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharm_el-
Sheikh_Memorandum 
The Wye River Agreement, October 23,1998 at: http://www.mideastweb.org/mewye.htm 
India 
Annual Reports, 1999-2000 to 2010-11, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of 
India, New Delhi at: http://wvw.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=2702 and 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=2702&pg=02&m=03&y=2011 
Asian Relations: Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian 
Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April 1947 (New Delhi: Asian Relations 
Organization, 1948). 
Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting Publications Division, Government of India, 1958). 
Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-79, Ministry of External 
Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1981. 
Foreign Affairs Record, 1955-1999, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 
New Delhi at: http://mealib.nic.in/72013 
247 
Fcreign Relations with Palestine, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 
2011 at: http//-meaindia.nic.in/ 
Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1947-64 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha 
Secretariat, Parliament of India, 1966). 
India and Palestine: The Evolution of Policy (New Delhi, MEA, Government of India, 
1968). 
"India Palestine Relationship", The Representative Office of India in Palestine at: 
http://www.roi-ramallah.org.ps/2010/india-palestine.html 
"In Response to a Question on Developments in Palestine and Israel", MEA statement, 
New Delhi, May 26, 2007, at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290012862 
"In response to a question on the Mecca Agreement", MEA, New Delhi, March 06, 2007, 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart. php?id=290012437 
Lok Sabha Debates (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, Government of India, 1952-
2003). 
Jawaharlal Nehru's Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-65, Vol 1-4 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal 
Nehru Memorial Fund, 1985). 
"Official Spokesperson's Statement on Gaza Situation", MEA, New Delhi, January 9, 
2009 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014621. 
"Official Spokesperson's Statement on Situation in Gaza", MEA, New Delhi, December 
29, 2008, at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014596 
"On the Handing overofHumanitanan Aid to Palestine", MEA, New Delhi, August 11, 
2006 at: 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/0211C212D9F59E/\A852571G7005CBC57 
Rajya Sabha Debates (New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, Government of India, 1952-
2007). 
Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, 
New Delhi, March-April 1947 (New Delhi: Asian Relations Organization, 1948). 
Selected Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: 
Publications Division, MEA, 1958). 
Summit Declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement 1961-2009 (Kathmandu: Institute of 
Foreign Affairs, 2011). 
President Abdul Kalam's address to the Joint Session of Parliament, 7 June 2004, Office 
of the President of India, New Delhi available at: 
http://presidentofindia.nic.in/scripts/palatest1 .jsp?id=6. 
248 
President of India, Smt. Pratibha Devlslngh Patil's Speech at The Banquet In Honour of 
the President of The Palestinian National Authohty, H.E. Mahnnoud Abbas on October 7, 
2008 at: http://presidentofindia.nic.in/banq_speeches.html 
Resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) on 31st July, 
2006 on Situation In West Asia, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi at: 
http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2006/07/31pr02.htm. 
"Speech by MOS (EA) at the inauguration oflBSA Sports Complex in Ramallah, MEA, 
Speeches and Statements, November 19, 2011 at: 
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530118555 
"Statement by Official Spokesperson about Assistance from Government of India in 
Response to Gaza Flash Appeal", MEA, New Delhi, January 2, 2009 at: 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014603 
"Statement by OfTicial Spokesperson on Situation In Gaza", MEA, New Delhi, January 4, 
2009 at: January 04, 2009 http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014609 
"Statement by OfTicial Spokesperson on the Agreement in Mecca for the formation of 
the National Unity Government in Palestine", MEA website. New Delhi, February 20, 
2007 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290012408 
"Statement by Official Spokesperson on the Situation in Gaza", MEA, New Delhi, 
December 27, 2008 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290014593 
"Statement by the Prime Minister at the XV Summit of the Non Aligned Movement', 
MEA, New Delhi, July 15, 2009 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290015039. 
"Statement by the Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh at the General Debate of the 
66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly", MEA, New Delhi, September 24, 
2011 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290018311 
"Statement by the Prime Minister of India Dr Manmohan Singh at The XlVth Summit Of 
The Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba", MEA, New Delhi, September 15, 2006 at: 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290011851. 
"Statement on incident involving boats carrying supplies for Gaza", MEA, New Delhi, 
May 31, 2010 at: http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=290015819. 
Statement of Official Spokesperson on the Tension at the Israel-Lebanon Border, MEA, 
New Delhi, 13 July 2006 at: http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2006/07/13pr01.htm. 
Text ofPhme Minister Manmohan Singh's Speech at the Tenth Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas 
in Jaipur, January 8, 2012 at: http://www.pravasitoday.com/read-complete-text-of-pm-
manmohan-singhs-speech-at-2012-pravasl-bhartiya-divas 
"Visit of MOS ShhEAhamed to Palestine and Jordan", MEA Press Release, November 
21, 2011 at: http.7/meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530218556 
249 
other Resources: 
Party Documents, 1951-72, Bharatiya Janasangh (New Delhi: 1973). 
"Gandhi, Jews And Palestine, A Collection of Articles, Speeches, Letters and Interviews" 
at: 
http://\OTVw.gandhiserve.org/inforrnation/writings_online/articles/gandhiJews_palestine.ht 
ml 
"India Balancing Relations with Israel and Hamas", WeakLeaks India Cable, 110122: 
Hindu, March 15, 2011 at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-
cables/articlel 539484.ece 
India's Campaign against Israel, ADL International Report (New York: ADL, 1987). 
"Strong Economic Synergy Between Israel and India", Exim Bank Study, 28 June, 2000 
at: http://www.eximbankindia.com/pressy2k0628-1 .html 
Israel 
"Annapolis Conference", The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.iI/MFA/H istory/Modern+History/Historic+Events/The+Annapolis+Con 
ference+27-Nov-2007.htm 
Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel May - September 1948, Vol. 1, Yehoshua 
Freundlich ed. (Jerusalem: Israel Government Press, 1981). 
Documents on the Foreign Policy of the State of Israel: October 1948 - April 1949, Vol. 2, 
Yehoshua Freundlich ed. (Jemsalem: Israel Govemment Press, 1984). 
Documents on the Foreign Policy of the State of Israel: Armistice Negotiations with the 
Arab States, December 1948- July 1949, Vol. 3, Yemima Rosenthal ed.(Jerusalem: Israel 
Government Press, 1986). 
Documents of the Foreign Policy of the State of Israel, Companion Vol. 4 (Jerusalem: 
Israel Government Press, 1986). 
Facts About Israel, Ellen Hirsch ed. (Jerusalem: Israel Information Centre, 1996). 
Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947-May 1948, Gedalia Yogev ed. 
(Jerusalem: Israel Govemment Press, 1980). 
The Middle East Peace Process: An Overview (Jerusalem: Information Division, Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, 1995). 
The Search for Peace in the Middle East: Documents and Statements, 1967-79, Report 
Prepared for the Sub-Committee on Europe and Middle East of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs (Washington D.C: US Government Printing Office, 1979). 
250 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
A) Book & Book Chapters 
Abbas, Mahmoud (Abu Mazen), Through Secret Channels (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 
1995). 
Aburish, Said K., Arafat: From Defenderto Dictator{Ne\N York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). 
Abhyankar, Rajendra M, (ed.) West Asia and the Region: Defining India's Role (New 
Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2008). 
Abi-Aad, Naji and Michel Grenon, Instability and Conflict in the Middle East: People, 
Petroleum and Security Threats (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). 
Abunimah, Ali. One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse 
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). 
Adams, Michael, The Middle East: A Handbook {London, 1971). 
Agha, Hussein, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff, Track-ll Diplomacy: 
Lessons from the Middle East (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003). 
Ahmad, Maqbul, Indo-Arab Relations (New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 
1978). 
Aggestam, Karin, Reframing and Resolving Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, 
1988-1998 (Lund: Lund University Press, 1999). 
Agwani, M.S. The West Asian Crises (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1968). 
—Contemporary West Asia (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1995). 
"The Palestine Conflict in Asian Perspective," in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., The 
Transformation of Palestine (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 
443-62. 
— 'Inaugural remarks', in K.R. Singh (ed.), Post-War Gulf Implications for India (New 
Delhi, 1993). 
Appadorai, A. and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations (Mew Delhi: South 
Asian Publishers, 1985). 
Appadorai, A. (ed.) Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947- 72, 
Vol. II (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
Armajani, Yahya, Middle East: Past and Present {He\N Jersey: Printice Hall, 1970). 
251 
Arthur Neslen, In YourEye^ a Sandstorm: The Palestinian Collective Experience 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
Aryeh, Y. Yodfat and Yuval Arnonchana, PLO Strategy and Politics (London: Croom 
Helm, 1981). 
Avimor, S. (ed.) Relations between Israel and Asian and African States: A Guide to 
Selected Documentation (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Maor-Wallach Press, 
Jerusalem, 1991). 
Babbage, Ross, "India's Strategic Development: Issues for the Western Powers," in 
Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon (eds.), India's Strategic Future: Regional State in 
Global Power (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 153-169. 
Bachar, Giora "The Normalization in Indian-Israel Relations," in Moshe Yager, Yoseph 
Govrin,and Ariyeh Oded, (eds.), Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The First Fifty Years 
(Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter, 2002), pp. 543-49. 
Bailey, Sydney D., Four Arab Israeli Wars and the Peace Process (Macmillan Press, 
1990). 
Bajpai, Kanti, "Indian Strategic Culture," in Michael R. Chambers (ed.) Asia in 2020: 
Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2002), pp. 245—303. 
Bajpai, Kanti and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.) Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice 
(New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996). 
Bandyopadhya, J, The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, 
Processes and Personalities (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984). 
Baxter, Craig, The Jana Sangh. A Biography of an Indian Political Party (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969). 
Beg, Aziz and Nasim Ahmad (Ed.), Pakistan and the Arab Israel War (Lahore: Babur 
and Amir Publications, 1973). 
Bellin, Yossi Jouching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999). 
Ben-Gurion, David, Israel: A Personal History {London: New English Library, 1971). 
Berindernath, Dewan, War and Peace in West Asia (New Delhi: 1969). 
Bhargava, G.S., India and West Asia: A Survey of Public Opinion (New Delhi: Popular 
Books Services, 1967). 
Bhutani, Surendra, Hope and Despair: The United Nations and the Arab Israeli Conflict 
(New Delhi: Sopan Publication House, 1980). 
252 
Binder, Leonard, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1964). 
BIyth, Robert J., The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858-
1947 (New Yorl<: Palgrave iVIacmillan, 2003). 
Bondurant, Joan V, Harijan: Collected Issues of Gandhi's Journal, 1933-1955 (19 
volumes) (Garland Publishing: New York, 1973). 
Bose, Sisir and Sugata Hose (eds.) The Essential Writings of Netaji Subhas Chandra 
Bose (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
Brecher, Michael, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963). 
India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968). 
Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images and Process (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972). 
Bregman, A. & El-Tahri J., The Sixty Year War: Israel and the Arabs (London, Penguin 
Books, 1998). 
Burns, E.L.M., Between Arab and Israeli (London: George G. Harrap and Co., 1962). 
Sustain, Emile, Doubts and Dynamite: The Middle East Today (London: Allen Wingate, 
1958). 
Carter, Jimmy, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid {fievj York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
Cattan, Henry, Palestine, The Arabs and Israel, The Search for Justice {long^^an:^969). 
Palestine in International Law (London: 1973). 
Chatterjee, Margaret, Gandhi and His Jewish Friends (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1992). 
Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya, "Palestinian Israeli Peace Process in the New Middle East: 
Can India Have a Role to Play? in Anwar Alam (ed.j India and West Asia in the Era of 
Globalisation (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2008). 
Chomsky, Noam, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (South 
End Press: Cambridge, 1999). 
Choudhury, Upendra Security in a Period of Strategic Uncertainty: A Study of India's 
Ballistic Missile Programme, Unpublished Ph D Thesis, CPS/SSS, JNU, New Delhi, 
1999. 
Cohen, Stephen P., India: Emerging Power (Hevj Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
253 
Cook, J., Disappearing Palestine (London, Zed Books, 2008). 
Corbin, J.P., Gaza First: Ttie Secret Non/vay Channel to Peace Between Israel and the 
PLO (London: Bloomsbury, 1994). 
Grossman, Richard, Palestine Mission (London: 1947). 
Darwaza, Al-Hakam, The Palestine Question: A Brief Analysis (New Delhi: PLO Office, 
1973). 
Das, Durga, India: From Curzon to Nehru and/A/ifer (London: Collins, 1969). 
Dasgupta, Punyapriya, Cheated by the World: The Palestine Experience (New Delhi: 
Orient Longman, 1988). 
Das, Gurucharan India Unbound (New York: Viking, 2000). 
David, H. Ott, Palestine in Perspective: Politics, l-luman Rights and the West Bank (New 
York, 1980). 
Dayan, Moshe, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israeli Peace 
Negotiations (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981). 
Dev, Arjun (ed.) Nehru: Years of Struggle (New Delhi: National Book Trust of India, 
1989). 
Dewan, Manorama, Arabs and Israel: An Indian Interpretation of the Palestine Problem 
(New Delhi: Afro-Asian Publications, 1966). 
Dieckhoff, Alain, The Invention of a Nation. Zionist Thought and the f\/laking of Modern 
Israel (London: Hurst & Co, 2003). 
Dietl, Gulshan. "The Security of Supply Issue: The Growing Dependence on the Middle 
East," in Pierre Audinet, P. R. Shukia and Frederic Grare (eds.) India's Energy: Essays 
on Sustainable Development (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000), pp. 209-224. 
Dixit, J.N. Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Picus Books, 
1998). 
My South Block Years (UBSPD, New Delhi, 1996). 
Doumani, Beshara, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 
1700--/900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
Dowty, Alan, The Jewish State: A Century Later (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998). 
Dubey, Muchkund, "West Asia: India's Neighbouring Region" in Mohammad Gulrez (ed.) 
Settlements and Resistance in the Occupied Territories (Aligarh: Publications Division, 
AMU Press, 2005). 
254 
Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt, Elusive victory: tfie Arab-Israeli wars, 1947-1974 (Harper & Row, 
1978). 
Dutt, V.P. India's Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House, 1999). 
Ehrlich, Avishai, "Zionism, Anti-Zionism, Post-Zionism" in Ephraim Nimni (ed.), The 
Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics (London: Zed 
Books, 2003), pp. 63-97. 
Ellis, Marc H., Israel and Palestine Out of the Ashes: The Search for Jewish Identity in 
the Twenty-First Century (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 
Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking", in Avraham Sela (ed.), The Continuum Political 
Encyclopaedia of the Middle East (New York: Continuum, 2002). 
Eytan, Walter, New Delhi Diary {\srae\ State Archives, Jerusalem, FO 2383/21). 
The First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London, 1958). 
Farooqi, Naimur Rahman, Mughal-Ottoman Relations (New Delhi: Idrah-I Adabiyat-i-
Delhi, 1989). 
Fawcett, L. Intemational Relations of the Middle East (Great Britain: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
Finkelstein, Norman G., Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (New York: 
Verso, 2003). 
Fischer, Louis, Gandhi and Stalin: Two Signs at the World's Crossroads (New Delhi: 
Rajkamal Publication, 1947). 
Fraser, T.G., The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Studies in Contemporary History (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). 
Freedman Lawrence and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and 
War in the New World Orcfer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
.Friedman, Isaiah, Palestine: A Twice Promised Land? The British, the Arabs & Zionism 
1915-1920, Vol. 1 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2000). 
Gabby, Fenny E., A Political Study of the Arab Israeli Conflict: The Arab Refugee's 
Problem {Pans: 1959). 
Ganguly, Sumit (ed.), India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
255 
Gelber, Yoav, Palestine, 1948: War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2001). 
Gelvin, J. L, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
Gerberg, itzhal<, India-Israel Relations: Strategic Interests, Politics and Diplomatic 
Pragmatism (Israel National Defence College, IDF, February 2010). 
The Changing Nature of Israeli-Indian Relations: 1948-2005 (University of South 
Africa, Pretoria, 2009). 
Ghanem, As'ad, The Palestinian Regime: A Partial Democracy (Sussex: Academic 
Press, 2001). 
Golan, Galia, Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans from Oslo to Disengagement (Princeton: 
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007). 
Gold, Dore. The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the 
Holy City (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2007). 
Goldberg, David J, To the Promised Land: A History of Zionist Thought (London: 
Penguin Books, 1996). 
Golwalkar, M.S, Bunch of Thoughts (Bangalore: Jagarana Prakashana, 1980). 
Gopal, Krishna and Kokila Krishna Gopal, West Asia and North Africa: A Documentary 
Study of Major Crises {t^e\N Delhi: V.I. Publications, 1981). 
Gopal, Krishan and Sarabjit Sharma, India and Israel: Towards Strategic Partnership 
(Authors Press, New Delhi, 2007). 
Gopal, S. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography 1889-1947, Vol.1 & 2 (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1979). 
Gordon Sandy, India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (Houndmills: 
MacMillan Press, 1995). 
Grover Verinder ed., West Asia and Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Deep and Deep 
Publications, 1992). 
Guha, Ramachandra, India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy 
(London: Macmillan, 2007). 
Gujral, I K, Continuity and Change: India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Macmillan 
Publishers, 2003). 
Halliday, F., The Middle East in International Relations (Cambridge, 2005). 
Hamid, Khataybeh, India's Foreign Policy and the Arab World (Jaipur: Printwell, 1993). 
256 
Hamid, Muhammad The Unholy Alliance: Indo-lsraeli Collaboration Against the Muslim 
World (Lahore: Islamic Book Center, 1978). 
Hasan, Shamir, Emergence of Political Zionism (Aligarh: Centre of West Asian Studies, 
AMU, 1990). 
"India's Palestine Policy: A Historical Review" in Rajendra M. Abhyankar (ed.) West 
Asia and the Region: Defining India's Role (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2008). 
Harms, G and Ferry, T, The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction (Canada: 
Pluto Press, 2005). 
Hatina, Meir, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement (Tel Aviv: 
Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University, 2001). 
Heimsath, Charts H. and Surjith Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modem India (New 
Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971). 
Helpern, Ben, The Idea of Jewish State (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1961). 
Heptulla, Najma, Indo-West-Asian Relations: The Nehru Era (New Delhi: Allied 
Publications, 1991). 
Herzog, Chaim and Shiomo Gazit, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle 
East from the 1948 War of Independence to the Present (Vintage Books, 2005). 
Herzl, Theodor, The Jewish State (New York: Scopus Publishing Co., 1943). 
Hiro Dilip, Dictionary of Middle £as^ (London: Macmillan, 1994). 
Hirst, David, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East 
(New York: Nation Books, 2003). 
Hodawi, Sami, Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 1914 and 1967 (New York, 1967). 
Hoskins, Halford L., The Middle East: Pmblem Area in World Politics (New Yori<: 
Macmillan, 1985). 
Hudson, Michael (ed.) Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab 
Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
Indian Opinion on the West Asian Cnsis, (Bombay: Indo-lsraeli Friendship League 
1967). 
Jaffries, Josph, M.N., Palestine: T/?eRea//fy (London: 1939). 
Jansen, G.H, Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism (Beirut: The Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, 1971). 
257 
Jetly, Nancy (ed.) India's Foreign Policy: Challenges and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House, 1999). 
Jiryis, Sabri, The Arabs in Israel {London: Monthly Review Press, 1976). 
Kallen, H.M., Zionism and World Politics (London, 1921). 
Kapur, Ashok, India: From Regional to H^ oA/cf Powder (Routledge, 2006). 
Kapur, Harish, India's Foreign Policy 1947-1999: Shadow and Substance (New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1994). 
Karnad, Bharat, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security. The Realist Foundations of 
Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002). 
Karsh, Efraim, Israel : The First Hundred Years, Vol. I to IV (London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2004). 
, The Arab-Israeli conflict: the Palestine War 1948, Volume 28 (Osprey Publishing, 
2002). 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The 1948 War (The Rosen Publishing Group, 2008). 
Karunakaran, K.P., India in World Affairs (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1958). 
Kazzinha, Walid W., Palestine in the Arab Dilemma (London: Groom Helm, 1979). 
Khalilzad, Zaimay and Ian 0. Lesser (eds.) Sources of Conflict in the 2f' Century: 
Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1998). 
Khan, Javed Ahmad. India and West Asia: Emerging Markets in the Liberalisation Era 
(TMew Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999). 
Khilnani, Sunil, "India As A Bridging Power" in India As A New Global Leader (London: 
Foreign Policy Centre, 2005). 
"Bridging Identities: India As A Positive Power?" in Through A Billion Voices: India's 
Role In A Multi-Polar World (Berlin: Foresight Group, 2010), pp. 13-16. 
Khuri, Fred J., The Arab Israeli Dilemma (London: 1969). 
Kiniche, David, The Last Option After Nasser, Arafat and Saddam Hussein: The Quest 
for Peace in the Middle East (Londorv: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1991). 
Knight, Paul, The PLO and Palestine (London: Zed Books, 1983). 
Koestler, Arthur, Promise and Fulfilment: Palestine 1917-1918 (London: Macmillan, 
1949). 
258 
Koshy, Ninan, Under the Empire. India's New Foreign Policy (New Delhi: LeftWord 
Books, 2006). 
Kumar, Rajiv and Matliew Joseph, "India" in Growth And Responsibility: The Positioning 
Of Emerging Powers In The Global Governance System ( Berlin: Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung publication, January 2009). 
Kumarswami, P.R, India's Israel Policy (Columhla University Press, 2010). 
"Israel- India Relations: Seeking Balance and Realism" in Efraim Karsh (ed.) 
Israel: The First Hundred Years, Vol. IV (Frank Cass, London, 2004). 
"Looking West 2: Beyond the Gulf in David Scott (ed.) Handbook of India's 
International Relations {London: Routledge, 2011). 
Lak, D., The Future of the New Superpower {U&N Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Laqueur, Walter, The Israel-Arab Reader (New York: 1976). 
Lenczowski, George The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th edition (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1980). 
Little, Tom, The Middle East and North Africa (England: Euro Publications, 1998). 
Louis, W. M Roger and Roger Owen (eds.) Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences 
(Oxford: Claranden Press, 1989). 
Lustick, Ian S, "Jewish Fundamentalism and the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse" in L.J. 
Silberstein ( ed.), Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective (New York: New 
York University Press, 1993), pp. 104-16. 
Lyon, Peter, Roots of Modem Conflict: Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An 
Encyclopedia (California: ABC CLIO INC, 2008). 
Magnus, Lady, Outlines of Jewish History {London: 1956). 
Malik, Shalu, Continuity And Change In Indo- Arab Relations : A Study Of Israel As A 
Factor (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis), (New Delhi: Department of Political Science, Jamia 
Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, 2008) at: 
http://old.jmi.ac.in/2000/Research/ab2008_pol_sc_shalu.pdf 
Malone, David, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
Malone, David and Rohan Mukherjee, "Polity, Security, and Foreign Policy in 
Contemporary India," in T.V. Paul, ed., South Asia's Weak States: Understanding the 
Regional Insecurity Predicament {Sianford, CA: Stanford University Press), 163-64. 
259 
McCarthy, Timothy V, "India: Emerging Missile Power," in William C. Potter and Harlan 
W. Jencks, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview, 1994), pp. 201-33. 
Mansingh, Lalit et al (eds.) India's Foreign Policy: Agenda for 2f' Century, Vol. 1 & 2 
(New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1998). 
Mangold, Peter, Super Power Intervention in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 
1978). 
Maoz, Zeev, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and 
Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006). 
Masaiha, Nur, Imperial Israel and the Palestinians (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 
Mearsheimer, John and Stephen Walt, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New 
York: Straus and Giroux, 2007). 
Mehrish, India's Recognition Policy Towards New States (New Delhi: Orient Publishers, 
1972). 
Mishal, S. and Sela, A, The Palestinian Hamas: '\/ision, Violence and Coexistence 
(Columbia University Press, 2006). 
Mishra, K.P., India's Policy of Recognition of States and Governments (New Delhi: Allied 
Publishers, 1966). 
Mohapatra, Gouri, Indo-lsrael Colloquium (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University, 
1998). 
Mookerji, Girija K., History of Indian Nationaf Congress (Meerut: Meennakshi Prakashan, 
1974). 
Moorre, John Norton ed. The Arab-Israel Conflict, Vol. 1 & 2 (Princeton, New Jersey, 
1974). 
Morris, Benny, Israel's Border Wars, 1949 - 1956. Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, 
and the Countdown to the Suez War {Oxford University Press, 1993). 
Mudiam, Prithvi Ram, India and the Middle East (London: British Academy Press, 1994). 
Muni, S. D., India's Foreign Policy The Democracy Dimension (New Delhi: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
-Murti, B.S., Nehru's Foreign Policy {He\N Delhi: The Beacon Information and Publication, 
1953). 
Naaz, Farah, West Asia: Changing Perspectives (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005). 
Nair, R. Sreekantan, Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed; India and Israel (New Delhi: 
Kalpaz Publications, 2004). 
260 
Nanda, B.R., Indian Foreign Policy: Nehru Years (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976). 
Narlikar, Amrita, The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Nayar, Baldev Raj and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power 
Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, Glimpses of World History (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1982). 
The Discovery of India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961). 
Neimeijer, A.C, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1972). 
Nimni, Ephraim (ed.), The Challenge of Post-Zionism. Alternatives to Israeli 
Fundamentalist Politics (London: Zed Books, 2003). 
Nizami, Taufiq A. (ed.) Nehru: The Architect of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Icon 
Publishers, 2005). 
Oren, Michael B, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: American in the Middle East, 1776 to the 
Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007). 
Orr, Akiva, Israel: Politics, Myths and Identity Ciises (London: Pluto Press, 1994). 
Pande, B.N, (ed.) The Indian Nationalist Movement 1885-1947: Select Documents 
(London: Macmillan, 1979). 
History of the Indian National Congress 1885-1985 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1965). 
Panjabi, Riyas and A.K Pasha (eds.) India and the Arab World (New Delhi: Radiant 
Publishers, 1998). 
Pant, Girijesh, "India and West Asia Relations: The Changing Economic Matrix," in N.N. 
Vohra and Karan Singh ed.. History Culture and Society in India and West Asia (New 
Delhi: Shipra, 2003). 
Pant, Harsh V, Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India 
Negotiates its Rise in the International System (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
ed., Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World (London: Routledge, 2009). 
Papf5e, llan, A History of Modem Palestine: One Land, Two People (United States of 
America: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
—The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951 (I.B.Tauris, 1994). 
Parasuram, T.V., India's Jewish Hehtage (New Delhi: Sagar Publication, 1982). 
261 
Parthasarathi, G. (ed.), Jawaharial Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964, Vol. 2 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press for the Jawaharial Nehru Trust, 1986). 
Pasha, A. K. (ed.) Perspectives on India and the Gulf States (New Delhi: Detente 
Publications, 1999). 
—India and QIC: Strategy and Diplomacy (New Delhi: Center for Peace Studies, New 
Delhi, 1995). 
Penslar, Derek, Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective (London: 
Routledge, 2007). 
Peretz, Don, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder; Westview Press, 1990). 
Peters, Joel, Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks (London: 
Royal Institute of international Affairs, 1996). 
Pollack, Kenneth Michael , Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991{ U of 
Nebraska Press, 2002). 
Pradhan, Bansidhar, "Globalisation and the Shift in India's Palestine Policy", in Anwar 
Alam (Ed.), India and West Asia in the Era of Globalisation (New Delhi: New Century 
Publications, 2008), pp.296-297. 
, "India's Policy Towards the PLO", in Riyaz Punjabi and A.K Pasha eds. India and 
the Islamic Wo/fd (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1998). 
Prasad, Bimal, The Origin of India's Foreign Policy: Indian National Congress and World 
Affairs: •/885-)947 (Calcutta: Bookland Pvt. Ltd, 1962). 
India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change (New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House, 1979). 
Prasad, Birendra, Indian Nationalism and Asia (New Delhi: B.R Publication Corporation, 
1979). 
Prashad, Vijay, Namaste Sharon. Hindutva and Sharonism Under US Hegemony (New 
Delhi: LeftWord Books, 2003). 
Quandt, William, Peace Process: Amehcan Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Since 1967 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and University of California Press, 
2005). 
Rafael, Gideon, Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israel Foreign Ministry-A Personal 
Account (London: Widen Field and Nicholson, 1981). 
Rajamohan, C, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy (New 
Delhi: Penguin, 2003). 
262 
— "Rethinking India's Grand Strategy) in N. S. Sisodia and C. Uday Bhaskar (eds.), 
Emerging India (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2005). 
Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs, 1954-1956 (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 
1963). 
Studies on India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1993). 
Rajkumar, N.J (ed.) The Background of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Navin Press, 
1952). 
Rao, Sudha, The Arab-Israel Conflict: The Indian View (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 
1972). 
Reiser, Stewart, "The Religious Parties as a Support System for the Settler Movement" 
in Bernard Reich and Gershon R. Kieval (eds.), Israeli Politics in the 1990s: Key 
Domestic and Foreign Policy Factors (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991). 
Riaz, H. (ed.), India Israel in Focus (New-Delhi: Krest Publications, 2006). 
Roberson, B. A, "South Asia and the Gulf Complex," in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi 
eds., South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986). 
Robonson, Jacob, Palestine and the United Nations (Washington D.C, 1947) 
Rodinson, Maxime, /srae/and z r^abs (Australia: Penguin, 1968). 
Rogan, Eugene L. and Avi Shiaim (eds.), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 
1948, Volume 15 (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
Ross, Dennisc(ed.) The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East 
Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005). 
Rubenberg, Cheryl A., Israel and American National Interest: A Critical Examination 
(Chicago; University of Illinois Press, 1986). 
Sacco, Joe, Palestine (Seattle: Fantagraphics Books, 2002). 
Sahni, Varun, "India as a Global Power:"Capacity, Opportunity and Strategy," in Lalit 
Manslngh and M. Venkatraman et al (eds.), India's Foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st 
Century. Vol. 1 (New Delhi, Foreign Service Institute and Konark, 1997). 
Said, Edward W., The Question of Palestine (New York: Times Books, 1979). 
Sami, Hadawi and Robert John, The Palestine Dairy, Vol. 1&2 (Beirut: 1970). 
Sandler, Shmuel, The State of Israel, the Land of Israel: The Statist and Ethnonational 
Dimensions of Foreign Po//cy (Westport, Conn,: Greenwood Press, 1993). 
263 
Satheeshkumar, (ed.) Documents on India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 
1975). 
Savir, Uri, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Random 
House, 1998). 
Schechtman, Joseph B., "India and Israel" in V. Grover (ed.) International Relations and 
Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1992), pp. 471-72. 
Schuize, Kirsten E., The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Seminar Studies in History (Pearson 
Longman, 2008). 
Sela, Avraham, "Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Avraham Sela (ed.) The Continuum Political 
Encyclopedia of the Middle East. (New York: Continuum, 2002), pp. 58-121. 
Selzer, Michael (ed.) Zionism Reconsidered (New York: Macmillan, 1970). 
Senker, Cath, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Questioning History (UK: Wayland Publishing 
House, 2004). 
Shimoni, Gideon, Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews: A Formative Factor in India's Policy 
towards Israel (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1977). 
Shiaim, Avi, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin Books, 2001). 
Shukia, Vatsala, India's Foreign Policy in The New Millennium (New Delhi: Atlantic 
Publications, 2005). 
Sikri, Rajiv, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2009). 
Singh, Jaswant. Defending India (London: Macmillan, 1999). 
Singh, K. R, "Meeting Energy Needs: Domestic and Foreign Policy Options, in Lalit 
Mansingh and M. Venkatraman et al (eds.), India's Foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st 
Century. Vol. 2 (New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute and Konark, 1997), pp. 342-361. 
"India and West Asia: Retrospect and Prospects" in Nancy Jetly (ed.), India's 
Foreign Policy: Challenges and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1999). 
"The Arab League and Israel" in Melkdite Ram (ed.) Regional Organisations: A 
Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Sterling, 1990). 
Sita Rammayya, Pattabhi, T77e History of Indian National Congress (Bombay: Padma 
Publications, 1947). 
Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict {Bed^ord/St Martin's, 2007). 
Stein, Leonard, The Balfour Declaration {Nevj York: 1961). 
264 
Subrahmanyam, K. Indian Security Perspectives (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 
1982). 
Sunders, Harold H., Tiie Other Walls: The Arab Israeli Peace Process in a Global 
Perspective (New Delhi: Affiliated East-West Press, 1991). 
Tal, David, War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy, Volume 26 (Routledge, 
2004). 
Tamari, Salim, Palestinian Refugee Negotiations: From Madrid to Oslo II (Washington: 
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996). 
Taylor, Alan, Prelude to Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959). 
Taylor, Alan R., The Super Powers and Middle East (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1991). 
Tendulkar, D.G., Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Vol. VII (New 
Delhi: Publications Division, 1962). 
Tessier, Mark A, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University Press, 
1994). 
Thirlwell, Mark P, India: The Next Economic Giant (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2004). 
Thomas, Raju G. C. Indian Security Policy {Pmceton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
"Arms Procurement in India: Military Self-Reliance Versus Technological Self-
Sufficiency," in Eric Arnett (ed.), Military Capacity and the Risk of War China, India, 
Pakistan and Iran (London: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
Troy, Gil (ed.) Why I Am a Zionist: Israel, Jewish Identity and the Challenges of Today 
(Montreal: Bronfman Jewish Education Centre, 2006). 
Vajpayee, A.B., New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vision Books, 
1979). 
Vanaik, Achin, "Indian Foreign Policy and Security Perspectives: Past Practice and 
Future Possibilities," in Mushirul Hasan and Nariaki Nakazato (eds.). The Unfinished 
Agenda: Nation-Building in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001). 
Varma, Seema, Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi: Mohit Publications, 2004). 
Vincent, P.J, "Cultural Determinants of India-Israel Relations and the Question of 
Palestine" in M.H llias and P.J Vincent (eds.) India-West Asia Relations: Understanding 
Cultural Interplays (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2007). 
Vohra, N.N., (ed.) History, Culture and Society in India and West Asia (New Delhi: 
Shipra Publications and India International Centre, 2003). 
265 
Walker, Robin J. Awakening Tiger: India's Quest for Expanded Influence in tlie World 
(Monterey: California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
Ward, Richard Edward, India's Pro-Arab Policy: A Study in Continuity (Westport, 
Colorado: Praeger, 1992). 
Woolf, Alex, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Atlas of Conflicts (World Almanac Library, 2004). 
Worth, Richard, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Open for Debate,(Marshall Cavendish, 2006). 
Xezid, Sayigh, Arnied Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National 
Movement, 1949-1993 (Washington D.C: Oxford University Press & Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1999). 
Wahby, Mohammed, Arab Quest for Peace (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1971). 
Zaidi, A. Moin (ed.) Congress and the Minorities (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Applied 
Political Research, 1984). 
Zaidi, A. Moin and Shaheda Gufran Zaidi (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Indian National 
Congress, Volume 1 to 28 (New Delhi: S.Chand, 1976-1994). 
Ziff, William B., The Rape of Palestine (New York: Longman and Green, 1938). 
Zureik, Elia, Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process (Washington: Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1996). 
B) Journal, Magazines and Web-Based Papers & Articles 
Aaron, Sushil J, Straddling Fautlines .India's Foreign Policy toward the Greater Middle 
East, Centre De Sciences Humaines (CSH) Occasional Paper, July 2003 available at: 
http://www.csh-delhi.com/publications/downloads/ops/OP7.pdf 
Abhyankar, R.M, "India & West Asia" lecture at IIT Mumbai on 16th July 2010, Indian 
Diplomacy, July 17, 2010. 
"Aggression by Israel Condemned", People's Democracy, 23 July 2006 at: 
http://pd.cpim.org/2006/0723/07232006_pb%20statement.htm. 
Agwani, M.S., "India and the Arab World", Indian Horizon, Vol. XXII, No. 2, January 2, 
1973. 
Agarwal, Manmohan, "Implications of Economic Liberalisation for India's Foreign Policy", 
International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2,1993. 
Ahmad, Aijaz, "Israel's Killing Fields", Frontline, Vol. 17, Issue 23, November 11 - 24, 
2000 at: http://www.hindu.com/fiine/fl1723/17231080.htm 
Aiyar, Mani Shankar "Chutzpah," Sunday, 6 June 1993, pp. 14-17. 
266 
Andersen, Walter, "Recent Trends in Indian Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 
5, September/October 2001, pp. 765-776. 
Aziz Qutubuddin, "indo-lsraeli Conspiracy Against Muslim World: Israel's 
Mossad to Set Up Spy Cells in Indian Embassies", Special Report, August 
2000 at: http://www.motamaralalamalislami.org/muslimworld/aug2000/aug2000.html 
Bard, Mitchell, "The Gulf War" available at: 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Gulf_War.html 
Basu, Prahlad, "How is India Doing? A Score Card," Asian Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 
2003. 
Bard, Mitchell G. "Myths & Facts Online - The Peace Process" Jewisfi Virtual Library, 
November 28, 2010. 
Bava, Ummu Salma, "New Powers for Global Change? India's Role in the Emerging 
World Order", FES Briefing Paper4, Berlin, March 2007. 
Bedi, Rahul, "Moving Closer to Israel," Frontline, 15-28 February 2003. 
Benkin, Richard L., "An India-lsrael-United States Alliance: The Last Great Hope for 
Humanity" Arvind Ghosh Memorial Lecture, Chicago November 1, 2008 at: 
http://www.freechoudhury.com/Arvind%20Ghosh%20Memorial%20Lecture.pdf 
"India-Israel Relations: The Imperative and the Challenge", Foreign Policy 
Research Centre Journal special issue on India Israel Relations, No. 5, 2011 at: 
http://www.fprc.in/J-5.pdf. 
Bentsur, Eytan, "The Way To Peace Emerged At Madrid: A Decade Since The 1991 
Madrid Conference", Jerusalem Letter/ Viewpoints, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 
No. 472,15 February 2002. 
Beryl, Anand, "India, US and Israel: Setting up Tri-national Fund", IPCS Article No. 
#1433, 12 July 2004. 
Berman, llan, "Israel, India, and Turkey: Triple Entente?," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. IX, 
No. 4, Fall 2002. 
Bhaduri, Aditi, "Why Not Palestine", Himal Magazine at: http://www.himalmag.com/Why-
not-Palestine_fnw85.html 
Bhanumathy, K.P, "Reinforcing Inda-lsraeli Relations," Mainstream (New Delhi), 
February 15, 1997. 
Bhatnagar, Shikha, "India-Israel: BFFs or Fair Weather Friends?, New Atlanticist, 
August 1, 2011 at: www.acus.org/new.../india-israel-bffs-or-fair-weather-fhends 
Blanche, Ed, "Mutual Threat of Islamic Militancy Allies Israel and India, Jane's Terrorism 
and Security Monitor, 14 August 2001. 
267 
Buzan, Barry, "South Asia Moving Towards Transformation: Emergence of India as a 
Great Power," International Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2002. 
Castillo, Adam C, "India and Israel: A Balancing Alliance", International Relations and 
Security Network at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=19199 
Cherian, John, 'India's Changing Stand', Frontline (Chennai), 28 October-10 November, 
2000, http://www.FronWneonnet.com/fl1722/17220140.htm 
— "A Breach of Trust", Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue, 25, December 4-15, 2004. 
Chiriyankandath, James, "The US and Indo-lsraeli Relations", Israeli Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
5, No. 6,1989, pp. 1-7. 
. "Creating a Secular State in a Religious Country: The Debate in the Indian 
Constituent Assembly", Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. Vol. 38, No. 2, 2000, 
pp. 1-24. 
. 2004. Realigning India: Indian Foreign Policy after the Cold War. The Round 
TaWe 93 (2): 199-211. 
Clarke, Duncan L, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Transfers," Foreign Policy, No. 99, 
Summer, 1995, pp. 89-109. 
Ciorciari, John D, "India's Approach to Great-Power Status", The Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs, Vol.35, No. 1, Winter, 2011. 
Colbert, Jim, "India's Misunderstood Israel Policy", The Diplomat, December 2, 2010. 
Dadwal, Shebonti Ray, "The Current Israeli Palestinian Process: Consequences for 
India", Strategic Analysis, \/o\ume 22, Issue 9,1998, pp. 1341-1351. 
Dasgupta, Punyapriya "Betrayal of India's Israel Policy," Economic and Political Weekly 
(Bombay), Vol. 27, No. 15-16,11-18 (April 1994), pp. 767-772. 
Dormandy, Xenia, "Is India, or Will It Be, a Responsible International Stakeholder?" The 
Washington Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 117-130. 
Desai, Ronak D. and Xenia Dormandy, Indo-lsraeli Relations: Key Security 
Implications", Policy Brief, July 10, 2008 at: 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18414/indoisraeli_relations.html7breadcru 
mb=%2Fexperts%2F1631 %2Fronak_d_desai%3Fgroupby%3D1 %26page%3D1 %26hid 
e%3D1 %26id%3D1631 %26back_url%3b%252Fexperts%252F%26%3Bback_text%3DB 
ack%2Bto%2Blist%2Bof%2Bexperts 
Dhume, Sadanand , "India Fumbles on Palestine", Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2011 
at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203914304576628572684660598.html. 
268 
Dubey, Muchkund, "West Asia: India's Neighbouring Region", Journal of West Asian 
Studies, Vol.-, No.-, 2001, pp. 01-11. 
"Gaza Flotilla Raid", Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_flotilla_raid 
"Gaza War" Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_War 
Gharekhan, Chinmaya R, "Close Regional Ties and Contrasting Loyalties", November 
20, 2003 at: 
http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=18#72 
Ghosh, Jayati, 'The Dubious New Alliance', Frontline, 7-20 June 2003 available 
at:http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2012/stories/20030620005411900.htm. 
Gobarev, Victor M., "India as a World Power, Policy Analysis, No.381, September 11, 
2000 at: www. Cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-38/es.pdf. 
Gordon, Leonard A, "Indian Nationalist Ideas about Palestine and Israel," Jewish Social 
Studies (New York), Vol. 37, No. 3-4 (Summer- Fall), 1975, pp. 221-34. 
Gandhi, Sonia, "Conflict and Coexistence in Our Age," Seminar, Issue 521, January 
2003. 
Gupta, Shekhar, "Indo-lsraeli Relations: A Pragmatic Peace", India Today, February 29, 
1992. 
Halim, Ahmed Abdel, "The Indo-lsrael Military Relationship and Its Impact on the Arab 
World", Middle East Round Table, Edition 18, Volume 1, November 20, 2003 at: 
http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=18#72 
"Hamas-Fatah Mecca Agreement" Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas-Fatah_Mecca_Agreement 
Haqqi, S.A.H, "Israel and the West Asian Crisis", Mainstream, 29 July, 1967. 
Hameed, Shahul, "India & Israel: A Wrong Alliance", Ovi Magazine, October 17, 2008. 
Harkavy, Robert. "Strategic Geography and the Greater Middle East," Naval War 
College Review, Autumn, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2001, pp. 37-53. 
Hasan, Shamir, "The Evolution of India's Palestine Policy: A Fall from the Heights?", 
Social Scientist, Vol. 36, No. 1-2, January-February, 2008. 
"The Palestinian Peace Process and its Enemies", Proceedings of the Indian 
History Congress, 65'" Session, 2005, Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. 
" Development of Zionist Ideology", Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 
59^ Session, 1999, Patiala, Punjab. 
—"Gandhi, Jews and Zionism", Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 1994, 
Mysore, Karnataka. 
269 
—"Peace in West Asia: Prelude and Postscript", Journal of West Asian Studies, 1993. 
—"Palestinians and the Gulf War", Strategic Studies Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 & 2,1991. 
Hazan, Reuven Y, "Religion and Politics in Israel: the Rise and Fall of the Consociational 
Model", Israel Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999, pp.109-37. 
Hilali, A.Z. "India's Strategic Thinking and its National Security Policy," Asian Survey, 
Vol.41.No. 5, pp. 737-764. 
Hordes, Jesse N., "Is India Rethinking Its Policy on Israel?" ADL Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 4, 
April 1989, pp. 3-5. 
Ibrahim, K M Sajad, "India's Collaboration with Israel: A Policy of Opportunism", FPRC 
Journal {He\N Delhi) No.5, 2011, pp. 139-151. 
Iqbal, Jawaid, "The Palestinian Uprising: Causes and Catalyst", Journal of West Asian 
Studies, 2004. 
Inbar, Efraim, "Israel's Strategic Environment in the 1990s," Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 21-38. 
"The Indian-Israeli Entente", Orbis, Vol. 48, No. 1, (Winter), 2004. 
—"The Indian-Israeli Partnership", November 20, 2003 at: http://www.bitterlemons-
international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=18#72 
"India Can "Contribute" to West Asia Peace Process: Israel", Outlook, February 9, 2006. 
"India to attend the Annapolis Conference for Peace in the Middle East", November 26-
28, 2007, Annapolis, USA November 26, 2007, Indian Embassy, Washington, DC at: 
http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail684/-%09~india-to-attend-the-annapolis-
conference-for-peace-in-the-middle-east,-november-26-28,-2007,-annapolis,-usa 
"India-Palestine Relations", Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lndia%E2%80%93Palestine_relations 
Indian Opinion on the West Asian Crisis, Indo-lsraeli Friendship League, Bombay, 1967. 
"Indo-lsrael Military Relations" available at: 
http://www.stopthewall.org/downloads/pdf/lndo-lsrael-D.pdf. 
"Israel's Unilateral Disengagement Plan", Wikipedia,Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lsrael%27s_unilateral_disengagement_plan 
Jain, Girilal, "Disillusionment with the Arabs: A Shift in Indian Opinion", Round Table, 
July 1967, pp. 433-8. 
Jansen, Michael, "Non-Aligned in the Middle East," Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 574, 21-
27 February 2002. 
270 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), Public Opinion Poll No. 35, "On 
Palestinian and Israeli Attitudes towards the Future of the Peace Process, December 
1999," at http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/1999/no35.htm. 
Joshi, Manoj "Changing Equations: The Coming Together of India and Israel," Frontline 
(Chennai), June4,1993. 
Kannan, K. P. and K S Hari. Kerala's Gulf Connection: Emigration, Remittances and 
their Macroeconomic Impact 1972-2000, Working Paper No. 328, March 2002, Centre 
for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. 
Kapila, Subhash, "India-Israel Relations: The Imperatives for Enhanced Strategic 
Cooperation", South Asia Analysis Group paper, August 1, 2000 at: 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers2/paper131 .html. 
"Israeli-Indian Strategic Cooperation and Prime Minister Sharon's visit: The Added 
Dimensions" South Asia Analysis Group paper at: www.saag.org/papers. 
Kandel, Arielle, "Indo-lsraeli Relations in the Post-Cold War Period", Weekly Blitz, 
February 21, 2010. 
Karamatullah K. Ghori, "Pakistan's Perception of India-Israel Relationship", FPRC 
Journal, No. 5 No. 5, 2011 at: http://www.fprc.in/J-5.pdf. 
Karat, Prakash, "Palestine: The Bush-Sharon Axis of Evil", People's Democracy, 12, 
May 2002. 
Khalidi, Rashid I, "The Palestinians and the Crisis", Current History, Vol. 90, No. 552, 
January 1991. 
Khan, Malik Tauqir Ahmad, "Palestine Question and India's Israel Policy" Journal of 
Research (Humanities) Vol. 27, 2007. 
Khan, Zahid Ali, "Development in Indo-lsrael Defence Relations Since 9/11: Pakistan's 
Security Concern and Policy Options", South Asian Studies, A Research Journal of 
South Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, January-June 2011, pp. 131-151. 
Klare, Michael T. "The New Geography of Conflict", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.3, May 
June 2001. 
Klein, Claude, "Zionism Revisited", Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005, pp. 238-53. 
Koshy, Ninan, "India and Israel Eye Iran", Foreign Policy in Focus, February 13, 2008 at 
http;//www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4959 retrieved on 10-09-2008 
—"India: Israel and Palestine", Foreign Policy Research Council Journal, (New Delhi) 
No.5, 2011,pp.139-151. 
271 
Kozichi, Richard J, "Indian Policy towards the Middle East", Orbis, Fall, 1967. 
Kumar, D, "India and Israel: Dawn of a New Era", Jerusalem Institute for Western 
Defence, Jerusalem, December 2001 at: www.westerndefence.org/bulletins/Dec-01. 
Kumar, Rajiv, "International Role and Respect? Not Without Economic Prosperity", 
Global Asia Journal, Vol. 6, No.1, March, 2011. 
Kumaraswamy, P. R. "India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership," Mideast Security 
and Policy Studies, No. 40, September 1998, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 
Bar-llan University. 
"Mahatma Gandhi and the Jewish National Home." Asian and African Studies, 
(Haifa), Vol. 26, No.1 (March), 1992, pp. 1-13. 
"India and Israel: Prelude to Normalization," Journal of South Asian and Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 58-70. 
"India's Recognition of Israel, September 1950," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 
31, No. 1, (January), 1995, pp. 124-138. 
"Indian-Israeli Relations: Humble Beginnings, A Bright Future," The American 
Jewish Committee, 2002 at: 
http://www.ajc.org/lnTheMedia/PublicationsPrint.asp?did=512 
. "Strategic Partnership between Israel and India," Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, (May) 1998, pp. 42-54. 
"India and Israel: Emerging partnership", Journal of Strategic Studies^ Vol. 25, No. 
4, (December), 2002. 
"Israel-China Military Relations: India's Red Lines," Strategic Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 
6 (September), 1995, pp. 781-792. 
"The Limitations of Indo-lsraeli Military Cooperation," Contemporary South Asia, 
Vol. 5, No. 1 (March), 1996, pp. 75-84. 
"Israeli-Pakistani Normalization: Green Light from India?" Strategic Analysis, Vol. 
20, No. 9 (December), 1997, pp. 1355-65. 
"The Friendship with Israel: India Squares the Circle", Middle East Institute, New 
Delhi, Occasional Paper, Issue No. 12, 26 July 2010 at: 
http://www.mei.org.in/front/cms/publicationsDetail.php?id=MTli&cid=Ng== 
— "India and the UNSC Responsibility", Middle East Institute Dateline, Issue No. 10, 
October21,2010at: 
http://www.mei.org.in/front/cms/publicationsDetail.php?id=NTQ=&cid=MTA= 
272 
"The Israeli Connections of Sri Lanka", Strategic Analyses, Vol. 11, No. 11, 
February 1987, pp. 141-55. 
"Mahatma Gandhi and the Jewish National Home," Asian and African Studies 
(Haifa), Vol. 26, No. 1 (March), 1992, pp.1-13. 
"India and the Holocaust: Perceptions of the Indian National Congress," Journal of 
Indo-Judaic Studies (Miami, Florida), April 2000, pp. 117-25. 
"India's Recognition of Israel, September 1950," Middle Eastern Studies (London), 
Vol. 31, No. 1, (January) 1995, pp. 124-38. 
"K.M. Panikkar and Indo-lsraeli Relations," International Studies (New Delhi) Vol. 
32, No. 3, (July) 1995, pp. 327-37. 
Lieberfeld, Daniel "Secrecy and "Two-Level Games" in the Oslo Accord: What the 
Primary Sources Tel! Us", International Negotiation, Vo/.13, 2008, pp. 133-146 at: 
http://www.duq.edu/policy-center/jDdf/lieberfeld-inter-neg.pdf 
Madhok, Balraj, "India's Foreign Policy: The Jan Sangh View", India Quarterly, Vol. 23, 
No. 1, January-March 1967. 
Maira, Sunaina , "India Loses Her Palestinian Heart and Gains a Calculating Israeli 
Mind" at: http://wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/8522 
Malanczuk, Peter, "Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO 
from the Perspective of International Law", EJIL, No. 7,1996, pp. 485-500 at: 
http://www.ejil.Org/pdfs/7/4/1389.pdf 
Malik, J. Mohan, "India Copes with the Kremlin Fall," Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter), 
1993, pp. 69-87. 
Mattair, Thomas R, "The Arab Israeli Conflict: The Madrid Conference and Beyond", 
American Arab Affairs, No. 37, (Summer), 1991. 
Mehta, Ashok K, "Tel Aviv Calling," Sunday 23 July 1995, pp. 65-66. 
Mehta, Pratap Bhanu, "Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy 
Frameworks in India", India Review, Vol. 8, No.3, 2009, pp. 209- 233. 
Menon Ramesh and Martin Sherman, "Indo-lsrael Ties: A New Beginning", Strategic 
Assessment, Vol. I, No. 4, January 1999. 
Mishra, Brajesh address to the American Jewish Committee, Washington, D.C.,8 May 
2003, available at official website of India, Ministry of External Affairs at: 
http://www.meadev.nic.in/speeches/bm-nsa-ad.htm 
273 
Mitra, Subrata, "Emerging Major Powers and the International System: Significance of 
the Indian View," Heidelberg Papers in Soutti Asian and Comparative Politics, Working 
Paper No. 9, April 2002. 
Mohiddin, Syed Sultan, "Palestine Conflict and India's Response", Radiance Views 
H/ee/c/y, November 14, 2010. 
Monthly Public Opinion Surveys, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Opinion, July 1967. 
Muslih, Muhammad, "The Shift in Palestinian Thinking", Cun-ent History, Vol. 91, No. 
561, January 1992. 
Mukherjee Rohan and David M. Malone, "From High Ground to High Table: The 
Evolution of Indian Multilateralism", Global Governance, No. 17, 2011, pp. 311-329. 
Naaz, Fara, "Indo-lsraeli Cooperation: Agriculture, Trade and Culture", Strategic 
Analysis, XXIII (6), 2000. 
—Indo-lsraeli Military Cooperation. Strategic Analysis, XXIV (5), 1999. 
Narayan, Jayaparkash, "The Arab-Israeli Question," Indian and Foreign Relations, 
6, (15 July 1969), pp. 1-2. 
Narlikar, Amrita, "Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the 
Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India", International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2006. 
— Power and Legitimacy: India and the World Trade Organization, India and Global 
Affairs, Inaugural Issue, January-March 2008, pp. 176-180 at: 
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199215294/smith_ch15.pdf. 
"All That Glitters is Not Gold: India's Rise to Power", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, 
No.5, 2007. 
Nasser, Nicola "Indian - Israeli Ties Could Neutralize Delhi's Palestinian Policy", 12 July 
2007, Arabic Media Internet Networi<, at 
http://www.amin.org/look/amin/en.tpl?ldLanguage=1&ldPublication=7&NrArticle=41334& 
Nrlssue=1 &NrSection=3 
Navon, Emmanuel, "From Kippurto Oslo: Israel's Foreign Policy, 1973-1993", Israel 
Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, pp. 1-40. 
Noorani, A. G. "Palestine and Israel," Frontline, Volume 18 - Issue 14, 7-20 July 2001. 
Neuberger, Benjamin, "Religion and State in Europe and Israel", Israel Affairs, Vol. 6 
No.2, 1999, pp.65-84. " . 
Nuri, Maqsudul Hasan, "The Indo-lsrael Nexus", Regional Studies, Vol. X I I , No. 3, 
Summer 1994, pp. 3-54. 
Ollapally, Deepa, and Rajesh Rajagopalan, "The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign 
Policy", The Washington Quarterly, Vo. 34, No. 2, Spring 2011, pp. 145-162. 
274 
"Oslo Accords", Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords 
"Palestine Liberation Organisation" at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/plo.htnri. 
Pant, Girijesh. "Gulf NRIs: From Expatriates to Entrepreneurs," World Focus, Vol. 22, 
No. 3, i\/iarch2001. 
Pant, Harsh V, "India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints", Middle East 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No.4, December 2004 at: 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8no4a6.html. 
"Postscript to Oslo: The Mystery of Nonway's Missing Files", Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (Autumn 2008). 
Pradhan, Bansidhar, "Establishing Ties with Israel: Prudence or Pressure?", Link, 
Vol.34, No. 23, January 19,1992. 
"Changing Dynamics of India's West Asia Policy", International Studies, Vol. 41, 
No. 1,2004. 
Rajamohan, C, "Rising India's Great Power Burden", The Singur Centre for Asian 
Studies, Asia Report, Issue No. 7, January 2010 at: 
www.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/asia.../11.16.09Risinglndia.pdf 
"India and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, July/August 
2006. 
Rajesh, Rajagopalam and Varun Sahni, "India and the Great Powers: Strategic 
Imperatives, Normative Necessities", South Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008. 
Rajiv, S Samuel C, "India, Israel, and the Defence Taboo", IDSA Comment, September 
30, 2010. 
"India and the Palestinian Bid for Statehood at the UN", IDSA Comment, November 
19, 2011 at: 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/lndiaandthePalestinianBidforStatehoodattheUN_sscraji 
v 190911 
-"Palestine's Strongest Ally", The Diplomat, September 21, 2011. 
Ramakrishnan, A.K. "Mahatma Gandhi Rejected Zionism", August 15, 2001, The 
Wisdom Fund at: http://www.twf.org. 
Rubin, Barry, "Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the Arab States", Mideast Security 
and Policy Studies, No. 36, January 1998 available at: 
http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/books/36pub.html . 
275 
Rubinoff, Arthur G. "Changing Perception of India in the U.S. Congress," Asian Affairs, 
Vol. 28, No. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 37-60. 
— "Normalisation of India-Israel Relations: Stillborn for Forty Years", Asian Survey, 
Vol.35, No.5, May 1995. 
"Sharm el Sheikh Summit" Wil<ipedia Online Encyclopaedia at; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharm_el-Sheikh_Summit_of_2005 . 
"Speech by Ambassador Chinmaya Gharekhan" on 4th December 2005 at the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, London 
at:http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-iiss-regional-security-summit/manama-dialogue-
archive/gulf-dialogue-2005/plenary-sessions-and-speeches/day-two-plenary-
sessions/ambassador-chinmaya-gharekhans-speech/ 
Sajad, Ibrahim, K M, "India's Collaboration with Israel: A Policy of Opportunism", FPRC 
Jot/ma/(New Delhi) No.5, 2011, pp. 139-151. 
Schaffer, Teresita C, "India as a Global Power"? Deutsche Bank Research Report, 
December 2005. 
Scott, David, "India's "Extended Neighbourhood" Concept: Power Projection for a Rising 
Power", India Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2009, pp. 107-143 at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14736480902901038. 
Sengupta, Ramananda, "India Walks a Tightrope in its Relations with Israel, Arab 
Nations", Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, July 2010. 
Shankar, Priya, "Old Player, New Role? India In A Multi-Polar World", Foresight Paper, 
New Delhi, 25-26 March, 2010, pp. 1-18. 
Shankar, Vinay, "Arab-Israel Relations: Can India be the Fulcrum?", November 20, 2003 
at: 
Shindler, Colin, "Likud and the Search for Eretz Israel: From the Bible to the Twenty-First 
Century", Israel Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1/2, 2001/02, pp. 91-117. 
Singh, Jasbir, "Growing Indo-lsraeli Defence Cooperation", Indian Defence Yearbook 
2002. 
Singh, K. Gajendra, "Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's Indian Visit: Historical Perspective", 
SAAG Paper, No 782, September 9, 2003 at.-
http://www,southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers8%5Cpaper782.html, 
Slater, J., "What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process", 
Political Science, Vol. 116, Issue 2,2001, pp.171-199. 
Sridhar, V, "An Expression of Solidarity", Frontline, 23 December 2000-5 January 2001 
at: http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1726/17260600.htm. 
276 
Srivastava, R.K, "India and the West Asian Crisis", Foreign Affairs Report, April, 1968. 
Stakelbeck, Frederick Jr., "India and Israel Shape a New Strategic Relationship", Global 
Politician at http://www.globalpoliticlan.com/2345-israel 
Subhash Kapila, "India's Payback Time to Israel", South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 
442, April 10,2002. 
Swamy, Raja "The Case against Collaboration between Indian and Israel", MR line, 
August 30, 2006 at: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/swamy300806.html 
"The Madrid Peace Conference", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, (Winter) 
1992. 
"The Nobel Peace Prize 1994" at: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobelj3rizes/peace/Iaureates/1994/press.htmt 
Telhami, Shibley, "The Camp David Accords: A Case of International Bargaining", 
Columbia International Affairs Online at: 
http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/tes01/index.html, 
"Why Protest the First Ever Visit of Israeli Prime Minister?" Janshakti at: 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Janshakti/message/217. 
Walker, Martin. "The New US Triple Alliance: India, Israel and Turkey," G/o6a//sf, 17 
January 2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/ analysis/2002/0117triple.htm 
Withington, Thomas, "Israel and India Partner Up," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57:2 
(January-February 2001), pp. 18-19. 
Yegar, Moshe, "The Normalization of Relations between India and Israel: H", November 
16, 2010 available at: 
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/The-normalization-of-relations-between-
lndia-and-lsrael-ll.html 
"2006 Lebanon War" Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikl/Gaza%E2%80%93lsrael_conflict 
1993 Year in Review: Israeli-Palestinian Peace Treaty at: 
http://www.upi.com/Audio/YearJn_Review/Events-of-1993/lsraeli-Palestinian-Peace-
Treaty/12315348902747-2/ 
277 
